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ABSTRACT 
During the period between 2004 and 2008 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
witnessed high levels of inflation. This was largely due to the US dollar pegged exchange 
rate regime operating in these economies at the time, and the depreciation of the US dollar 
over other major currencies during the same period.  
 
This research explores alternative exchange rate regimes available for the GCC, taking into 
consideration their size, wealth and economic performance. It also evaluates the possible 
effects on the private sector if an alternative regime is adopted. Finally, it assesses the 
readiness of the GCC economies to move towards a single currency and compares the GCC 
proposed currency union with the Euro experience.  
 
Researchers supporting fixed exchange regime believe that it leads to a better inflation 
performance according to Ghosh et. al. (1996), Hausmann et. al. (1999) and Eichengreen 
et.al. (1999). Others, like Caramazza et. al. (1998) believe that this is not standard for all 
emerging economies and also Collins (1996) supports a fixed regime for economies with 
poor growth, which is not the case for the GCC. On the other hand, Duttagupta et. al. (2005) 
and Velasco (2000) support a floating regime for economies with technical knowhow and an 
international trading volume. The move to a more flexible regime will lead to fluctuation in the 
nominal exchange rate, which is expected to affect the stock market performance according 
to Frankel et. al. (2007), Tian et. al. (2010) and Dornbush et. al. (1980). Other researchers 
such as Bartram et. al. (2012), Nieh et. al. (2002) and Tsai (2012) are of the view that this 
relation between the stock market and exchange rate doesn’t exist. Taking into consideration 
the size of the combined GCC economy and the integration between these economies, this 
support the move to a single currency union as the GCC forms an Optimum Currency Area. 
This move is supported by researchers like Laabas et. al. (2002), Rose (2000) and Pisani-
Ferry (2012) who believe that a single currency union will increase intra-trading, liberate 
reserves and increase the trust of the union economies. 
 
The methodology adopted in this research combines both empirical approach and informal 
approach and compares the outcome from both methodologies. Tests such as Unit Root 
Test to examine stationarity, Cointegration to examine long-run relationship between 
variables, VAR and ECM tests for short-run relationship test and Granger Causality tests to 
examine if a variable can be used to forecast another variable were used in this research. In 
addition to the above formal approach, a Mundell-Fleming theory was introduced to examine 
the relationship between stock market and exchange regime and an informal theoretical 
analysis was presented to assess the GCC readiness to form a currency union. 
 
The main findings of the research can be summarized as follow:    
 
1. Analysis of economic indicators from the GCC supports the move towards a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. 
2. The effect of nominal currency fluctuation on the private sector is expected to be minimal 
in the short-run and managabele in the long run. 
3. GCC countries still have a long way to go if they are to form a currency union as the 
underlying infrastructure is weak. 
 
This research was conducted in the period between 2006 and 2015, which has witnessed an 
abnormal economic cycles, mainly the 2008 international financial crisis. This has led the 
author to eliminate some years following the 2008 crisis. Also, one of the main complications 
raised in this research was data collection, especially GCC related data. This has led to 
following different informal approaches to collect the required data for the research.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
There are plenty of economic discussions and subjects considered “taboo” in the Middle 
East, especially in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. For example, the Middle 
East is one of the main sources for crude oil in the world, yet there appears to be 
minimal influence for these economies in oil pricing. At the same time, GCC countries 
have followed since the 1980’s a pegged regime with the US dollar (USD). The effect of 
this on the GCC countries has, however, not always been positive. For example, the 
high inflation levels between 2006 and 2008 have forced the GCC economies to 
respond by increasing wages for public sector employees. This was a result of not 
having any monetary tools, due to the pegged currency to the US dollar. 
 
During the last few years and after witnessing high levels of inflation, governments of 
the GCC countries began to ask the question of whether they should adopt an 
alternative exchange rate regime. It will likely result in the adoption of a non-dollarization 
regime but will allow the GCC countries to control their own destiny as they will have 
effective monetary tools available and will not be tied to US monetary policy. 
 
Unofficial discussion on regime change started in the period of expansion between 2005 
and 2008. At that stage the whole world was enjoying a boom and liquidity and 
investment opportunities were welcomed by both institutions and individuals across the 
region. Following these discreet discussions, an announcement was made by the 
Governor of the Central Bank of the UAE in June 2008 that they were considering 
unpegging their currency with the US dollar and were going to peg it to a basket of 
currencies instead.  There was also talk of adopting a managed floating regime. This 
statement encouraged economists and investment banks around the world to determine 
what the real value of the AED (UAE currency) was in case the UAE decided to unpeg 
its currency. Economic analysis suggested that the AED would immediately appreciate 
against the US dollar following such an announcement and may have a profound effect. 
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As a result “hot cash” started to enter the country and deposits at local banks in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) almost doubled. This immediately affected lending in the 
market. In September 2008, and within a few months of the unofficial announcement, a 
crisis hit the world.  A further statement had to be issued by the UAE Central Bank 
confirming that they were not now moving ahead with the new regime and that it would 
continue to peg the currency to the US dollar.  Deposits with local banks quickly fell 
back causing a serious cash shortage for all banks in the UAE. The rest of the GCC and 
some economists within the UAE, however, linked the volatility of banks’ deposits and 
instability in the banking sector in the UAE to the announcement of the new regime 
rather than mismanagement of the UAE Central Bank in dealing with the “hot cash”. 
This painful experience has forced local banks, the private sector and individuals to be 
more careful in making public discussions concerning the adoption of alternative 
exchange rate regimes. 
 
The above experience of the UAE stopped discussion on alternative exchange regimes 
for some time. However, in 2010 and prior to the pre-announced launch of the GCC 
single currency, the exchange rate regime which the new union would use came up 
again. The main questions of this research can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Should GCC countries individually adhere to the dollarization regime? Should an 
alternative regime which takes into account the wealth, economic performance 
and size of these economies be considered? 
2. As these economies can afford the short-term negative effect of adopting a 
different regime (due to the availability of large cash reserves) how will it affect 
the market and private sector in both the short and long-term? 
3. Although the GCC single currency was due to have been launched in 2010, it 
has not yet been achieved.  It is natural to ask therefore how many of the GCC 
countries are currently ready for it? 
4. How can the GCC benefit from other experiences of currency union, such as the 
Euro experience, in moving forward? 
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The objective of this research is to provide answers to the above questions. To do so it 
employs both an empirical and statistical approach. It also investigates previous 
approaches. 
1.2 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC):  An Overview 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was created in Abu Dhabi in 1981 and brought 
together countries that shared similar political, economic, social and religious ties. The 
members of the GCC comprise the Arab Gulf nations of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  
 
Source: Gulf Cooperation Council publication 2008 
 
The main objectives behind the formation of the GCC can be summarised as follows: 
 Formulating regulations in relation to finance, trade, customs, tourism, legislation 
and administration. 
 Fostering scientific and technical progress in industry, mining, agriculture, water 
and animal resources. 
 Establishing scientific research centers. 
 Setting up joint ventures. 
 Creation of a unified military presence. 
 Encouraging cooperation within the private sector. 
 Strengthening ties between their peoples. 
 Establishing a common currency by 2010.  
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The (economic) health of the GCC economies has a very close relationship with the 
price of crude oil. A high oil price provides a high level of income to the GCC and with it 
higher GDP and GDP per capita. Chart 1.1 below shows the recent behavior of GCC 
GDP and oil prices for the period 2002–2013. 
 
Chart 1.1: GCC GDP and Oil Prices (2002–2013) 
 
Source: Economic Statistics Bulletin of Arab Countries 2013 & inflationdata.com 
 
GCC nominal GDP doubled between 2002 and 2009 from US$ 441 billion to US$ 908 
billion. The latest data from the IMF shows that GCC GDP reached US$ 1.39 trillion in 
2012, indicating that GDP had increase by almost 46% between 2009 and 2012.  
 
Table 1.1: GDP at Current Market Prices (US$ million) (2003–2013) 
 
Source: Economic Statistics Bulletin of Arab Countries 2013 and IMF Data  
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GDP 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Bahrain 9,747          13,459        18,471        19,621        25,825        29,291        
Kuwait 47,869 80,799 114,565 105,993 160,940.0  182,538     
Oman 21,543 30,905 41,901 48,268 72,680        82,434        
Qatar 23,534 44,530 79,712 97,798 173,519     196,805     
Saudi Arabia 214,573 315,337 384,686 376,692 597,086     677,215     
UAE 124,346 180,617 257,916 259,733 338,690     384,142     
TOTAL 441,612     665,647     897,251     908,105     1,368,740  1,552,425  
A
n
n
u
a
l 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
 o
il 
p
ri
c
e
s
 i
n
 U
S
$
 
G
C
C
 G
D
P
 a
t 
c
u
rr
e
n
t 
p
ri
c
e
s
 i
n
 U
S
$
 M
ill
io
n
 
5 
 
The size of the GCC combined economy is considered significant when compared to 
other economies.  Its combined GDP of US$ 1.39 trillion dollars places it 12th in a 
ranking of countries ranked by nominal GDP (8th if the EU countries are considered as 
individual countries rather than a single entity).  Chart 1.2 below compares nominal 
GDP in the GCC countries to a number of other leading economies. 
 
Chart 1.2: Nominal GDP (2012) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2012 
 
The GCC region contains some of the fastest growing economies in the world.  This is 
largely due to the rise in oil revenues over the last decade.  However it also resulted 
from the boom in construction and investment resulting from decades of saved 
petroleum revenues. Ignoring the effects of the Iraq war in 2004 and the severe 
recession following the September 2008 global crisis, the combined GCC economy 
maintained an average annual growth rate in excess of 15% between 2001 and 2008. 
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Table 1.2: GDP Growth (2003–2013) 
 
Source: Computed by the author using Economic Statistics Bulletin of Arab Countries 2013 
 
The strong economic growth was also associated with huge population growth in the 
GCC countries between 2001 and 2009. This was mainly due to increased job 
opportunities in the GCC for international job seekers resulting from the rapid economic 
growth.  The combined population of the GCC grew from 29.2 million in 2001 to 40.2 
million in 2009 - an average annual growth rate of 4.7% per annum, with Qatar leading 
the way with annual growth of 12.5% and Saudi Arabia bringing up the rear with annual 
growth of 3% per annum. 
 
Table 1.3: GCC Population (Millions) (2001–2013) 
 
Source: Economic Statistics Bulletin of Arab Countries 2013 and IMF Data  
 
 
 
 
GDP Growth 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bahrain 15% 15% 20% 18% 17% 20% -11% 12% 18% 7% 4%
Kuwait 26% 24% 36% 26% 13% 29% -28% 13% 34% 8% 6%
Oman 7% 15% 25% 19% 14% 45% -21% 23% 23% 6% 5%
Qatar 22% 35% 40% 37% 31% 45% -15% 30% 36% 7% 8%
Saudi Arabia 14% 17% 26% 13% 8% 24% -21% 21% 31% 5% 6%
UAE 13% 19% 22% 23% 16% 22% -17% 9% 19% 7% 6%
GCC 15% 19% 27% 19% 13% 27% -20% 18% 28% 7% 6%
GDP 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Bahrain 0.7           0.8           1.0           1.2           1.2              1.2           
Kuwait 2.4           2.7           3.1           3.7           3.7              3.8           
Oman 2.5           2.4           2.6           3.2           3.3              3.4           
Qatar 0.7           0.8           1.0           1.6           1.7              1.8           
Saudi Arabia 21.4         22.6         23.7         25.4         28.4            30.1         
UAE 3.4           4.1           6.2           8.2           8.4              9.0           
TOTAL 31.1         33.4         37.6         43.3         46.7            49.4         
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1.3 Justification of the Study 
The first reason for undertaking this study is to remedy the lack of empirical studies on 
GCC exchange rate policy. This is mainly due to the fact that the exchange rate regimes 
used by most of the GCC countries have remained unchanged since the 1980s. Few 
researchers have needed to evaluate the effects the existing exchange regime have on 
the GCC. Others have simply followed classical (theoretical) approaches in determining 
which regime to adopt. However, the lack of economic (and financial) data and history 
that results from use of alternative regimes means that it is not easy to generate 
recommendations regarding exchange rate policy. It demands a new approach in 
determining which exchange regime should be adopted. This approach is based on 
available data and creates a benchmark that can also be used in comparing a country 
(or a group of countries) against another country. In this research a number of widely 
used economic indicators are employed. The indicators chosen allow the creation of a 
rule that identifies which countries should follow a fixed exchange rate regime and 
which should follow a flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
The second justification for this research is that it covers areas that are not among the 
top priorities of those investigating GCC exchange rate policy. For example, previous 
work relating to the GCC exchange rate regime uses statistical analysis to focus on the 
type of regime that the new union should be following, and to test whether the 
necessary conditions for proposed currency union are satisfied. This research provides 
analysis of whether the GCC is ready to form a currency union or not and whether 
further work is required. It also evaluates the rationale behind the formation of the Euro 
zone and shows whether it has been a success. 
 
Finally, the results of this research can be used by policy makers as a starting point for 
further detailed discussion in the future in relation to exchange regime policies.  
1.4 Motivation of the Research 
This research initially started as a personal motivation rather than a requirement by any 
institution or a university. The author lived in the UAE during the period of expansion 
between 2004 and 2008 and witnessed first-hand the incredible changes in public 
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sector wages. Annual increases in salaries of 50% were commonplace.  Meanwhile, the 
private sector, did not enjoy anywhere near the same! 
 
After investigating the rationale underlying these decisions, it was concluded that this 
was the only way forward for the Government to respond to inflation in the market.  And 
the cause was the lack of available monetary tools and the operation of the pegged 
exchange rate throughout the UAE. 
 
Following this the author had a meeting with the head of research at the UAE Central 
Bank.  The meeting focused on what the UAE should do, taking into consideration that it 
is a cash rich oil producing economy. The main concern for the central bank was how 
the private sector should react to the economic changes affecting the country. At that 
time the UAE was in the process of improving its economic infrastructure to join the 
GCC currency union that was due to be launched in 2010.  
 
Following further researches, a list of questions were raised with no answers available. 
As a result, this research was conducted for further comprehensive investigation, and 
this thesis is the result of that investigation. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of an introduction providing a detailed overview of the GCC, three 
chapters providing answers to each of the major questions asked and a final chapter 
that draws some tentative conclusions as well as indicating limitations and areas for 
future research. 
 
The structure of the three main chapters of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome of the Chapter 
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
Should the GCC countries continue with the dollarization regime? 
Should an alternative exchange rate regime based on wealth, economic 
performance and economy size be considered? 
 
Options 
 
An alternative more flexible 
regime should be adopted 
 
Pegged regime is optimum for 
the GCC countries 
 
OR 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
 
 
Outcome of the Chapter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcome of the Chapter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided the rationale and motivation for conducting the research. The 
research carried out and described below adds to knowledge by providing answers to 
questions that are important not only to researchers but to policy makers as well.  
How is the market and the private sector, as represented by the stock market,  
affected by exchange rate fluctuation? 
 
Minimal short-term and long-term effects are expected in GCC stock markets, 
assuming that increased exchange rate fluctuations result from the revised regime. 
 
Do the GCC countries satisfy the requirements necessary to form an optimal currency 
area (OCA)? Are they ready for the move? How can the GCC benefit from other 
experiences of currency union such as the Euro in moving forward? 
 
The GCC countries satisfy all of the requirements to form an OCA, 
but are not yet ready to proceed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS AND 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
IntroductionIn the past few decades, much has been written about the conditions under 
which countries choose to peg or to float their exchange rate. However, there is no 
specific answer to the question why economies follow a given exchange rate regime. 
After the September 2008 credit crisis, many GCC countries reconsidered their 
exchange rate regimes. It is known that economies working under fixed exchange rate 
regimes, (and often tied to the US dollar) are more reliant on the fortunes of other, 
larger economies although there is often no direct evidence of this. 
 
Numerous economies have moved from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes during 
the last 20 years. For example, Brazil1 and Poland2 have moved gradually by adopting 
intermediate types of exchange rate regimes, such as soft pegs, horizontal and crawling 
bands and managed float before finally adopting pure floating. On the other hand, 
Egypt3 moved immediately to a floating exchange regime. 
 
One of the major consequences of adopting a fixed exchange regime is that it requires 
the surrender of sovereignty over effective monetary instruments. This often leads local 
governments to respond to inflationary pressures by raising wages in the public sector 
and expanding subsidies on a variety of goods. 
 
On the other hand, economists believe that selection of an exchange rate regime should 
be treated like any other commodity - driven by fundamentals such as demand and 
supply – in deciding the way forward. These fundamentals include the capability and 
willingness of public authorities to take such decisions and the expectations and 
preferences of the private sector. According to Laidler (1999) pp. v (abstract), such 
                                            
1 See Duttagupta et. al. (2005) for more detail. 
2 See Kokoszczynski (2001) for more detail 
3 See Kamar (2004) for more detail 
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changes require existence of a coherent monetary order.  A coherent monetary order 
"requires a well-defined goal for monetary policy, one that the authorities are capable of 
achieving, and that anchors private sector expectations. For it to be liberal, the relevant 
authorities should be accountable to the electorate for their performance”. 
 
Although economists believe that the decision to change exchange regime policy is 
subject to the character and fundamentals of an economy, and should not be 
automatically implemented across all countries that exhibit similar criteria, there is still a 
basic fundamental analysis that should be undertaken before drafting any 
recommendation for a specific economy. 
 
The motivation for this chapter is to investigate if there is a relationship between choice 
of exchange rate regime and major economic indicators.  The initial sample chosen 
comprised 100 randomly selected countries.  It was then reduced to 86 countries due to 
data availability problems. Economic variables used reflect the wealth, openness and 
monetary policy capabilities of each economy and included: GDP per capita; inflation; 
trade openness; the ratio of trade volume to reserves; trade volume per capita and 
reserves per capita. 
 
The data used comprised annual observations for the seven year period from 2002 to 
2008 in order to test a proper business cycle and ignore the abnormal year following the 
September 2008 financial crisis. Snapshots for two years are used to investigate 
exchange rate regime policy. In each of two years - 2005 and 2008 - an exchange rate 
regime policy recommendation is derived based on the averages of the selected 
indicators over the previous four years. For example, the exchange regime 
recommendation for 2008 is based on the averages for the period 2005–2008. The 
exchange regime is set as the dependent variable and the annual averages of the six 
variables used as independent variables in a binary logit model. Three variables - GDP 
per capita, trade openness and the ratio of trade volume to reserves are found to be 
significant at the 5% level for 2005.  Three variables are also found to be significant at 
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the 5% level for 2008. They comprise GDP per capita, trade openness and reserves per 
capita. 
 
The chapter provides an interesting outcome for oil exporting economies in general and 
for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in particular. The results for 2005 
show that 17 out of 60 countries are recommended to change their exchange rate 
regime (after excluding economies using managed floating from the sample). 6 out of 
the 17 countries have since changed regime.  A majority of the remaining 11 countries 
that did not move to a different regime were oil producers/exporters and includes all of 
the GCC countries. The same test was then applied to the 2008 sample and similar 
results found.  The same countries are recommended to switch from a fixed to floating 
exchange rate regime. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter is organized as follows.  It begins by considering existing 
research looking at the effects of changing exchange rate regime.  It then reviews the 
different exchange rate regimes identified by the IMF. Data is identified and a 
methodology based on a binary logit model is then explained in detail. Finally, an initial 
recommendation is prepared based on the findings of that analysis. 
 
One of the major objectives of this chapter is to initially identify whether a fixed or 
floating regime is the optimum exchange rate regime for member states of the GCC. It 
is found that the GCC appears to have the capabilities and basic requirements to at 
least make a start by adopting an intermediate exchange rate regime. 
 
External political influences count as one of the main reasons for these economies 
adhering to the fixed peg or “dollarization” regime. By looking at the findings of the logit 
model and previous studies, support is provided to the view that it is possible to float the 
currency or at least start the process by moving to a more flexibly managed regime in 
the GCC. 
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2.1 Literature Review 
Economists have long disagreed on the extent of financial susceptibility brought about 
by the various systems of exchange rate. 
 
Higher local currency financial intermediation and trustworthiness, resulting in higher 
and higher levels of domestic currency debt being issued by organizations and nations, 
are the main benefits arising out of a strong currency according to advocates of fixed 
currency idealism. Through the process of creating a negative covariance among the 
elements of local asset prices and the income process, financial intermediation in 
domestic currency is enhanced by the fixed rate system for economies that are 
confronted with routine trade shocks, according to Hausmann et. al. (1999). Although, 
the said approach would be able to keep a tab on the economic inflation rate and 
affordability of local products, international affordability can be impacted negatively by 
the same. 
 
Ghosh et. al. (1996) argue that pegged exchange rates are associated with significantly 
better inflation performance (lower inflation and reduced variability). However, countries 
that observe frequent parity changes have a lower chance of reaping the full anti-
inflation benefits of a fixed exchange rate system. 
 
Some countries might find that a fixed “dollarization” exchange rate system is 
advantageous. However it cannot be said to be the most suitable regime for all the 
developing nations - a fact pointed out by Velasco (2000). Even though a country might 
be categorized as developing or emerging it can still follow a floating exchange rate 
system approach. Complimentary rules and strategies, which consist of financial 
regulation, capital controls and fiscal institutions, are required by every exchange rate 
system and specifically by the floating exchange rate system. Technical knowledge and 
know-how are the key requirements when moving to a flexible system. 
 
Duttagupta et. al. (2005) have argued along similar lines that the adoption of flexible 
exchange rate systems depends on the effective management of a number of 
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operational and institutional issues.  Many foreign exchange markets are feeble and 
inefficient.  Obstacles that prevent floating include the limited number of participants in 
the foreign exchange market, exchange controls that hinder trading, weak technological 
infrastructure and underdeveloped money markets. 
 
Caramazza et. al. (1998) argue that inflation performance of economies that are still 
developing and operating under pegged exchange rates is historically quite good. 
However it does not hold true for all of the developing countries.  
 
Burnside et. al. (2001) provides a different view to the use of pegged exchange rate 
regimes. According to this view, exchange rate guarantees provided by governments 
influence the borrowing strategies of the banks. As a result banks are more likely to 
expose themselves to risk by borrowing foreign currency and lending out domestic 
currency. This can lead to currency crisis. Unhedged foreign currency denominated 
loans taken out by organizations and private firms would go down, if the floating 
exchange rate system is taken up by the countries, as can be made out from the above 
approach. Private firms would be directed towards hedging as the dynamism in the 
foreign currency and precarious nature of the floating rate system will itself be an 
effective motivator.  
 
The policy making departments of different economies have taken note of this particular 
approach, but the repercussions on logic and policy formulation has not been well 
received by researchers. Certain developing economies are likely to be prone to liability 
dollarization, due to their essential leaning, and the same is embedded into their 
system, which can be described by pegged exchange rate system’s existence 
(Eichengreen et. al. 1999). Thus, the basic cause of financial instability can be attributed 
to incompleteness of markets, and not because banks and other organizations have 
avoided hedging their risks. Eichengreen et.al. (1999) further argue that the belief that 
exposure to currency risk can be reduced by adopting a flexible currency system does 
not hold true 
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In floating exchange rate regimes, the nominal exchange rate acts as a shock absorber 
in that it allows negative external shocks to be safely dealt with.  Put simply, the 
adjustment paths for macroeconomic variables are made smoother.  As a result this 
regime is seen to be a more suitable choice for the emerging market countries 
(Hoffmann, 2007). The time duration for a fixed exchange rate system should be 
specified and must not be eternal.  Klein et. al. (1997) performed a test on the duration 
of exchange rate pegs using a sample of 16 Latin American countries and found that 
openness and trade concentration were important influences on duration.   
 
Whilst pegging to a single currency is acceptable, the question on which country to base 
the peg becomes of paramount importance. Many Asian countries switched during the 
1990’s from a fixed peg against the US dollar to a multi-level currency system that 
targeted the currencies of East Asian countries as well (Giardin, 2011). This move has 
improved the performance of intra-trading between East Asian countries and reduced 
costs associated with the international trading. The results were obtained using a 
Markov-Switching approach applied to the synthesis model of Frankel et. al. (2007).  
 
The current research is focused on binary results and the results of that study do not 
point out whether the fixed rate system with dollar as the peg is appropriate for member 
states of the GCC, or whether they should move to an alternative exchange. For these 
reasons the methodology above is not considered suitable in this case.  
 
In a study of 24 Caribbean and Latin American countries, Collins (1996) was able to 
analyze the losses due to misalignment when a country shifts from a fixed to floating 
exchange rate system.  It was found that over the period 1978 to 1986 that 
misalignment occurred as they moved to flexible regimes. However from 1987 to 1992 
misalignment appeared less important.  This was attributed to the fact that there was a 
reduction in the perceived difficulty in managing a floating exchange rate system.  The 
analysis also found that countries with poor economic growth were likely to choose a 
fixed exchange rate system. 
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Historical evidence of exchange rate transition in which a country switches from one 
exchange rate system to another has been investigated by Masson (2001).  Using a 
Markov chain model he finds that there is no evidence that exchange rate systems 
naturally move to the two polar extremes of fixed and floating. He finds sufficient proof 
that moves to intermediate regimes are both desirable and possible. However, this 
particular approach cannot be applied to the GCC nations as they do not have a history 
of changing regimes and they have been using a fixed “dollarization” exchange rate 
system for almost three decades. 
 
Countries that want to shun transparency are the one’s generally using intermediate 
exchange rate systems according to Frankel et. al. (2001). In such cases it becomes 
difficult for investors to verify if the authorities are actually following the exchange rate 
system they say they are.  Those claiming to use a peg system will often stray away 
from it.  Frankel and Wei (2008) consider the case of China which claimed to be running 
a peg to the US dollar. They found that in 2005 this was the case, but during 2006 this 
changed following a basket of Asian currencies as well. 
2.2 Types of Exchange Rate Regimes 
An exhaustive classification, or taxonomy of exchange rate systems has been provided 
by the IMF It can be noted in passing that in certain countries the de jure (i.e. exchange 
regime that the nation declares), and the de facto (i.e. the exchange regime believed by 
the IMF to be in use) can be different. Fortunately this has no impact on classification! 
 
There are three main types of exchange rate systems followed: 
 Hard Peg 
 Intermediate 
 Floating 
 
The terms hard peg and floating are easy to understand by name alone.  Intermediate 
exchange mechanisms can range from soft peg at one end to tightly managed float at 
the other end. Chart 2.1 provides a graphical view of the various systems in use. Also, 
the details and definitions highlighted below are sourced from the IMF definitions. 
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Chart 2.1: Types of Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 
 
2.2.1 Hard Peg Regimes 
2.2.1.1 No Separate Legal Tender 
In this case the currency of another country circulates as the sole legal tender. It occurs 
when a country has a pegged currency with regards to another nation’s currency. This 
scenario has been termed “dollarization” as many of the countries using it are pegged to 
the US dollar.  This particular situation often holds when the country is a member of a 
currency union, where all the members of the union share the same legal tender. 
Adopting this particular regime results in a complete loss of sovereignty as control over 
domestic monetary policy by the monetary authorities is surrendered. Examples of 
countries using this particular exchange rate system are provided by Ecuador and El 
Salvador (who follow the US dollar), and Montenegro (which follows the Euro). 
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2.2.1.2 Currency Board Arrangements 
This is a regime where there is an explicit legal commitment to exchange domestic 
currency at a fixed exchange rate.  It places restrictions on the monetary authorities to 
ensure that these legal commitments are adhered to. Hong Kong, Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Brunei are some of the nations that have adopted this particular exchange regime. 
2.2.2 Intermediate Regimes 
2.2.2.1 Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements 
In this regime, the currency of a particular country is pegged at a fixed rate to another 
currency or to a basket of currencies.  The basket of currencies often comprises the 
currencies of major trading and financial partners.  As a result the strength of a currency 
is determined on the basis of the geographical spread of trade and capital flows. The 
constituents of the currency can be kept fixed or allowed to vary within a specified 
range. The exchange rate itself can oscillate in a narrow band around the central rate 
with the monetary authorities ready to intervene to maintain the fixed parity.  This 
intervention can be direct or indirect.  There are a number of measures that can be 
utilized by the monetary authorities to maintain the fixed parity. These include: 
 
1. Only allowing the exchange of domestic and foreign currencies at specified rates. 
2. Placing restrictions on those allowed to access foreign exchange markets. This 
can be accomplished through licensing and permit systems. 
3. Aggressive use of interest rate policy. 
4. Intervention by other public authorities. 
 
However there is no commitment to keep the peg parity irrevocably.  Fluctuation or 
movement of a currency is possible in this exchange rate regime, although allowed in a 
narrow range only.  There is also limited flexibility in monetary policy as the monetary 
authorities can, in the limit, adjust the exchange rate.  These, then, are the main 
advantages when compared to the hard peg system.  
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The actual scenario however is somewhat different as economies using the above 
exchange rate regime remain glued to a fixed currency, with no variation within the 
range. Examples of countries following this regime include the UAE, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and Bahrain.  Across the globe, it is the most widely followed exchange rate 
system. 
2.2.2.2 Pegged Exchange Rate within Horizontal Bands 
The currency is maintained within margins of fluctuation of at least ±1% around a fixed 
(central) rate, or the margin between the maximum and minimum value of the exchange 
rate exceeds 2%.  The flexibility of the system is a function of the band width and 
provides a limited degree of monetary policy discretion to those using it.  It also includes 
arrangements of countries in the (European) exchange rate mechanism (ERM) that later 
became known as ERM-II. Three economies that are practicing this particular regime 
are the Slovak Republic, Syria and Tonga. 
2.2.2.3 Crawling Pegs 
Crawling pegs see the exchange rate periodically adjusted on the basis of movements 
in selected economic indicators.  These can include both domestic and foreign 
indicators and include, for instance, the inflation rate and its differential vis-à-vis its main 
trading partners.  The crawling peg can be set to generate inflation adjusted changes in 
the exchange rate (backward looking) or set at a preannounced fixed rate and/or below 
the projected inflation differentials (forward looking).  Monetary policy in the crawling 
peg system is, however, constrained in the same way as a fixed peg system.  There is 
also the need to ensure that the crawling peg remains realistic.  Countries such as 
China, Bolivia, and Iran are examples of nations that have adopted this particular 
exchange rate system. 
2.2.2.4 Crawling Bands 
In this regime the currency is maintained in a similar way to the pegged exchange rate 
within horizontal bands.  The currency is maintained, for instance, within ±1% of the 
central band. Here, however, the horizontal band is allowed to adjust either periodically 
at a fixed rate or in response to changes in selected economic indicators.  Exchange 
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rate flexibility depends on the band width and the commitment to maintain the exchange 
rate within the band constrains the use of monetary policy.   This particular exchange 
regime exists in only two economies – Costa Rica and Azerbaijan. 
2.2.2.5 Tightly Managed Float 
An amalgamation of a floating exchange rate system with that of a fixed rate system 
results in this regime, with floatation taking place in a very narrow margin. None of the 
economies worldwide are currently following this particular exchange rate system.  
2.2.3 Floating Regimes 
2.2.3.1 Managed Floating With No Pre-determined Path for the Exchange Rate 
Here the authorities attempt through direct or indirect intervention to influence the 
exchange rate. Frequently there will be no specific target exchange rate or trajectory 
profile defined and changes will be ad-hoc based on indicators such as the balance of 
payments position and reserve (capital) inflows/outflows.  Active interference by 
monetary authorities to control the exchange rate is now possible as it has control of a 
wide range of monetary tools. 
 
Nations including the Ukraine, Algeria, Singapore, Kenya, Sudan, Egypt, India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and a majority of the countries in Central America use this particular 
exchange rate system.  It is the second most common system followed across the 
world. In this regime a country can easily switch from a pegged to flexible exchange rate 
system based on the demands of market or economy, and is one of the key reasons for 
its widespread acceptance across the globe. 
2.2.3.2 Independently Floating 
Demand and supply of the currency are responsible for the determination of the 
exchange rate in this system. In other words, the exchange rate is market determined.  
Intervention is limited and aimed at preventing excessive fluctuation.  Monetary policies 
at both home and abroad have a direct impact on the exchange rate. The monetary 
authorities in the countries following this regime keep a watchful eye on changes in the 
global economy and can react quickly to them as they have full monetary policy control.  
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The major world economies – the US; countries of the Euro zone such as the UK, 
France and Germany; as well as Japan and Australia are all advocates of the 
independent floating exchange rate regime. 
2.3 Data 
There are two different classifications of exchange rate regimes. The first is the de jure 
exchange rate regime that represents the exchange regime announced officially by a 
given government. The second classification is the de facto exchange rate regime that 
represents the regime that a country actually follows in practice. It is fairly well known 
that the two can differ.  Obstfeld et. al. (1995) for instance found that there was a 
discrepancy between the exchange regimes that governments said they were using and 
what they were actually using.  Calvo et. al. (2002) also coined the phrase “fear of 
floating” to describe the situation where countries that say they allow their exchange 
rates to float mostly do not! 
 
Using the database of IMF members’ de facto exchange rate regimes, a sample of 100 
countries was selected randomly for further statistical analysis4. However, due to data 
availability the number of countries used in the analysis had to be reduced to 86. Each 
exchange rate regime was then allocated a numerical code. The codes are defined in 
Table 2.1 below. The 11 regimes are classified into three major categories: 1) Fixed, 2) 
Managed, and 3) Floating.  The exchange rate arrangements were then identified for 
two separate years - 2005 and 2008. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
4
 The exchange rate regime assumed for each country in 2005 or 2008 is based on the “De facto 
Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Framework” published by the IMF on 31 
December 2005 and 30 April 2008 respectively.  
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Table 2.1: Exchange Rate Regimes Classifications for the Sample 
Code Exchange regime 2005 # 2005% 2008 # 2008% Major regime 
1 
Foreign currency as legal 
tender (formal dollarization) 3 3.5% 3 3.5% 
Fixed 
2 Currency union 10 11.6% 0 0.0% 
3 Currency board 3 3.5% 3 3.5% 
4 
Conventional fixed peg to a 
single currency 21 24.4% 21 24.4% 
5 
Conventional fixed peg to a 
currency basket  2 2.3% 5 5.8% 
6 
Pegged exchange rate within 
horizontal bands 1 1.2% 2 2.3% 
7 Crawling peg 0 0.0% 2 2.3% 
8 Crawling band 0 0.0% 1 1.2% 
9 Tightly managed floating 0 0.0% 1 1.2% 
Managed 
10 Other managed floating 26 30.2% 22 25.6% 
11 Independently floating 20 23.3% 26 30.2% Independently 
        Total 86 100.0% 86 100.0%  
 Source: IMF and data analysis  
 
Chart 2.2 below compares the exchange rate regime distribution between 2005 and 
2008, and summarizes the table above. 
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Chart 2.2: Sample Exchange Rate Regimes Distribution 
 
 
                           Source: IMF and data analysis  
 
Table 2.2: Major Regimes Classifications in the Sample 
Exchange regime 2005 # 2005% 2008 # 2008% 
Fixed regime 40 46.5% 37 43.0% 
Managed floating 26 30.2% 23 26.7% 
Independently floating 20 23.3% 26 30.2% 
Total 86 100.0% 86 100.0% 
                     Source: IMF and data analysis  
 
Major economic indicators were obtained for the sample countries to examine the 
relationship between them and the de facto exchange rate regime. The following 
indicators are used in the statistical analysis that follows: 
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Table 2.3: Major Economic Indicators Used in the Tests 
Economic indicator Code Data source 
GDP Per capita GDPPCAP IMF & World Bank 
Inflation INFLATION World Bank 
(Import + Export) / Reserves IERES IMF & World Bank 
Reserves per capita RESPCAP IMF & World Bank 
Trade openness TRADEOPE IMF & World Bank 
Trade volume per capita TRADEVPCAP IMF & World Bank 
2.4   Methodology 
Two snapshots are modeled in this chapter, where each snapshot assumes that the 
exchange regime used in the year of the snapshot is determined by the annual 
averages of the selected economic indicators in the previous four years. For example, 
annual averages of the major economic indicators over the period 2005–2008 
determine the choice of exchange rate regime in 2008. 
 
Accordingly, economic indicators data for the seven year period (2002–2008) were 
collected and de facto exchange regime obtained from the IMF. 
 
To allow statistical analysis to be used the de facto exchange rate regime had to be 
converted into a numerical value.  Exchange regimes were given a value of 1 if the 
sampled country was following a floating exchange regime and 0 if it was following a 
fixed exchange regime at the time. This was done in order to allow a test using a binary 
logit model to be carried out. Countries following managed floating regimes were 
excluded from the samples allowing analysis to focus on the two extreme cases.  
However, the final estimated logit model can still be used to investigate whether these 
countries should switch to an alternative exchange rate regime. 
 
In the final estimated logit model the dependent variable is defined as a 1/0 and the 
independent variables are as specified in Table 2.3 above 
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Two logit models were estimated. The first modeled the exchange rate regime in 2005 
using data for 2002-2005; whilst the second modeled the exchange rate regime in 2008 
using data for 2005-2008.  
 
The logit model represents the choice probability iP  which has a cumulative logistic 
distribution function: 
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where ii XZ 10     and for   - < X <    P will lie between 0 and 1. 
 
Unfortunately, the logit model cannot be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
However, it is possible to transform (1) in a way that allows OLS estimation to take 
place. 
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is the odds ratio, logarithms of both sides are taken to obtain 
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ii XL 10    (5) 
 
The right hand side of (5) is the model that is estimated. To use it however, the odds 
ratios for each i need to be calculated, and to do that it is essential to re-organise the 
data according to the frequency of iX . 
 
i
i
N
n
P ˆ  (6) 
where in  is the number of occurrences of a certain event and iN  is the total number of 
observations of iX . 
 
In (5) 1  is the slope coefficient and measures the change of the odds. Take the 
exponential of it, subtract one, and multiply by 100 to obtain the percentage change in 
the odds for a unit increase in the regressor. 
 
To calculate the level of probability for a given value of X , equation (5) is estimated 
using OLS to obtain 0ˆ  and 1ˆ . Then the value of X  is substituted into the estimated 
equation and P  is calculated. 
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The marginal change in probability is influenced by the level of probability. 
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Therefore to calculate the change in probability for given value of iX  the probability 
calculated using (11) must be used. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
The tables below show the change in exchange regime adopted in the sample countries 
between 2005 and 2008. The change in regime from 2005 to 2008 is classified in five 
different categories as follows: 
 
1. Extreme move to fixed: When an economy moves from a floating regime to a 
fixed regime; 
2. Tighter: When an economy moves from a floating to a managed floating regime, 
or from a managed floating regime to a fixed regime;  
3. No change: The economy does not change its exchange regime; 
4. More flexible: When an economy moves from a fixed regime to a managed 
floating regime, or from managed floating regime to a floating regime; 
5. Extreme move to floating: When an economy moves from a fixed regime to a 
floating regime. 
 
Only Sri Lanka moved toward an extreme fixed regime between 2005 and 2008 (Table 
2.4). This move was not in accordance with the recommendation of the 2005 model 
(Table 2.11).  However, the 2008 model (Table 2.13), provides support for the new 
regime followed by Sri Lanka. This may be due to implementation of new monetary 
policy that was not captured in the historical data. 
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Table 2.4: Countries within the sample moving towards an extreme fixed regime 
Country Exchange regime in 2005 Exchange regime in 2008 Change status 
    Sri Lanka Floating regime Fixed regime Extreme Fixed 
 
13 countries moved to a tighter regime between 2005 and 2008 (Table 2.5). Four of 
these countries - Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda and Uruguay - moved from a 
floating regime to managed floating. Only Papua New Guinea followed the 
recommendations of the 2005 model (Table 2.11). Tanzania, Uganda and Uruguay 
moved to managed floating which was not in accordance with the model’s 
recommendation. However, moving to managed floating can be justified in these cases 
as they are not extreme. 
 
Table 2.5: Countries within the sample moving towards a tighter regime 
Country Exchange regime in 2005 Exchange regime in 2008 Change status 
    Angola Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Argentina Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Croatia Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Iran Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Kazakhstan Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Papua New Guinea Floating regime Managed floating regime Tighter 
Russia Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Tanzania Floating regime Managed floating regime Tighter 
Tunisia Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Uganda Floating regime Managed floating regime Tighter 
Uruguay Floating regime Managed floating regime Tighter 
Uzbekistan Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
Yemen Managed floating regime Fixed regime Tighter 
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A total of 58 countries - a majority of countries in the sample - did not change their 
exchange rate regime between 2005 and 2008 (Table 2.6). 16 countries were 
employing a managed floating regime in 2005 and were excluded from the estimation 
work. Out of the remaining 42 countries that were included in the 2005 model, 30 
countries followed the recommendation from the model (Table 2.11). The remaining 12 
countries that failed to follow the recommendation include: El Salvador, Kuwait, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Trinidad & Tobago, United 
Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 7 of these countries including Kuwait, Libya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela are major oil 
producers/exporters. In addition, the results from the 2008 model (Table 12.3) suggest 
that these economies should have moved towards a more flexible regime. 
 
Table 2.6: Countries within the sample with no change in regime 
Country Exchange regime in 2005 Exchange regime in 2008 Change status 
    Algeria Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Australia Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Azerbaijan Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Bahrain Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Belarus Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Brazil Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Bulgaria Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Canada Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Colombia Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Dominican Republic Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Ecuador Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Egypt Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
El Salvador Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Equatorial Guinea Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Estonia Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Gabon Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Georgia Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
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Ghana Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
India Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Indonesia Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Israel Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Japan Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Jordan Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Korea, South Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Kuwait Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Latvia Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Libya Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Lithuania Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Mexico Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Morocco Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Nigeria Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Norway Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Oman Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Panama Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Paraguay Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Peru Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Poland Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Qatar Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Romania Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Saudi Arabia Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Senegal Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Serbia Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Singapore Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Slovakia Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
South Africa Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Sudan Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Sweden Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Switzerland Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Syria Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
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Thailand Managed floating regime Managed floating regime No change 
Trinidad and Tobago Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Turkey Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Turkmenistan Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
United Kingdom Floating regime Floating regime No change 
United States Floating regime Floating regime No change 
Venezuela Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
Vietnam Fixed regime Fixed regime No change 
 
Table 2.7 below lists the countries that moved toward a more flexible regime. The 
Czech Republic was excluded from the 2005 model. However, the 2008 model results 
supports a move towards a floating regime (Table 2.13). Only Pakistan was 
recommended to move to a more flexible regime. This became reality in 2008. Malaysia 
and Ukraine were recommended to continue with the fixed regime.  However, and as 
argued previously, the move towards an intermediate regime can be justifiable in some 
cases. For example, in the Ukraine the move is seen as a result of its membership of 
the European Union.  Membership requires more control of domestic monetary policy, 
i.e. moving away from the fixed regime. 
 
Table 2.7: Countries within the sample moving towards a more flexible regime 
Country Exchange regime in 2005 Exchange regime in 2008 Change status 
    Czech Republic Managed floating regime Floating regime More flexible 
Malaysia Fixed regime Managed floating regime More flexible 
Pakistan Fixed regime Managed floating regime More flexible 
Ukraine Fixed regime Managed floating regime More flexible 
 
Table 2.8 below lists countries moving from a fixed to a floating regime. This extreme 
change can be considered amongst the riskiest.  Such a move requires very 
sophisticated monetary policy tools and know-how. In the case of the countries listed 
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below, the move was a result of entering into the Euro zone. However, Table 2.11 
provided later in this chapter shows that economies such as Greece were not ready for 
it.  Greece has, and continues to suffer from a credit crisis, largely the result of the 
international financial crisis and the lack of economic fundamentals needed to deal with 
it. 
 
Table 2.8: Countries within the sample moving towards an extreme flexible 
regime 
Country Exchange regime in 2005 Exchange regime in 2008 Change status 
    Austria Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Belgium Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Finland Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
France Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Germany Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Greece Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Italy Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Netherlands Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Portugal Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
Spain Fixed regime Floating regime Extreme flexible 
 
To summarize: the tables above, and the chart below, show that the majority of 
economies within the sample did not change their exchange regime.  Only one country -
Sri Lanka – changed its regime, moving from a floating regime to a fixed regime during 
the period of study. On the other hand, 10 countries from the Euro zone moved from a 
fixed regime to a floating regime. In general, most of the economies analyzed have 
adopted the long term view that the exchange rate regime should not be altered. Where 
it has occurred, the pace of change has been gradual. 
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Chart 2.3: Change in Exchange Regime between 2005 & 2008 
 
 
In order to be able to quantify the data and implement the proposed methodology 
countries following a managed floating regime were filtered out.  This allows us focus on 
the two extreme regimes - fixed and floating. 
 
As a first step in implementing the proposed methodology, each exchange rate regime 
is given a value of 1 if it is a floating exchange rate regime and 0 if it is a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Obviously, some countries may have different values for 2005 & 2008; and 
some may exist in the 2005 sample but not in the 2008 sample (and vice versa). This 
will be the result of countries changing their exchange rate regimes, for instance, from 
fixed or floating to a managed floating. 
 
The test assumes that economies around the world adopt their optimal exchange rate 
regimes.  The GCC countries are excluded from the test.  The model can then be 
applied to the GCC economies to evaluate if the exchange regime used in these 
countries should be changed. 
 
For each year in the sample (2005 & 2008), a binary choice logit model was estimated.  
It was estimated using the Eviews (v7.0) econometric software package with the 
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in Table 2.3 as independent variables. The objective of the estimation was to calculate 
the odds of adopting a given exchange rate regime in each country. 
 
The GCC countries and those following a managed floating regime are removed from 
the data to obtain the sample data sets for 2005 and 2008.  The 2005 sample contained 
54 observations (countries) whilst the 2008 sample contained 57 observations 
(countries). 
 
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 present the estimation results for 2005 and 2008 after exclusion of 
statistically insignificant variables. 
 
Table 2.9: Logit model - 2005 
 
Dependent Variable: REGIME 
    
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 54       
Included observations: 54     
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations   
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.926017 1.063995 1.810175 0.0703 
GDPPCAP 9.21E-05 4.36E-05 2.11457 0.0345 
IERES -0.109698 0.047136 -2.32729 0.02 
TRADEOPE -3.464521 1.498495 -2.312 0.0208 
          
McFadden R-
squared 
0.326335 
    Mean dependent 
var 
0.37037 
S.D. dependent var 0.487438     S.E. of regression 0.378704 
Akaike info criterion 1.036244     Sum squared resid 7.170838 
Schwarz criterion 1.183576     Log likelihood -23.9786 
Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
1.093064     Restr. log likelihood -35.5942 
LR statistic 23.23129     Avg. log likelihood -0.44405 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000036       
Obs with Dep=0 34      Total obs 54 
Obs with Dep=1 20       
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Table 2.10: Logit model - 2008 
 
Dependent Variable: REGIME 
    
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 57       
Included observations: 57     
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations   
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -5.963127 3.319363 -1.79647 0.0724 
GDPPCAP 0.001818 0.000843 2.156437 0.031 
RESPCAP -0.00737 0.003736 -1.97307 0.0485 
TRADEOPE -6.488025 3.239802 -2.0026 0.0452 
McFadden R-squared 0.82022     Mean dependent var 0.45614 
S.D. dependent var 0.5025     S.E. of regression 0.206743 
Akaike info criterion 0.388193     Sum squared resid 2.265368 
Schwarz criterion 0.531565     Log likelihood -7.06351 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.443913     Restr. log likelihood -39.2898 
LR statistic 64.4526     Avg. log likelihood -0.12392 
Prob(LR statistic) 0       
Obs with Dep=0 31      Total obs 57 
Obs with Dep=1 26       
 
 
The above tables show GDP per capita and trade openness are significant at the 5% 
level in both years.  This indicates that the exchange rate regime adopted in each 
country can be explained by the wealth of the economy (measured by GDP per capita) 
and openness of the economy (measured by trade openness). Table 2.9 shows that 
trade volume as a percentage of central bank reserves is a statistically significant 
variable in the 2005 model. Table 2.10 shows that central bank reserves per capita is a 
significant variable in the 2008 model. 
 
The estimated logit model allows us to calculate the odds probability of adopting each 
exchange regime in the sampled countries.  The same model can then be applied to 
investigate those countries not in the estimation sample. These of course include the 
GCC countries. Table 2.11 shows that the higher the probability, the better it is for the 
economy to adopt a floating exchange regime. For example, the probability of Japan 
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adopting a floating exchange regime in 2005 is 100%. On the other hand, the probability 
of Belarus adopting a floating exchange regime is only 2.5%. This indicates that Belarus 
should stick to a fixed regime. 
 
However, since economies operating under managed floating regimes have been 
excluded from the model, a recommendation to move to a floating regime will only take 
place if the probability is in excess of 90%. This is a subjective probability; however, it 
shows that only countries that have the economic capabilities to adopt a floating regime 
should be recommended to move. 
 
Table 2.11 shows the odds, probability, and exchange rate regime operating in 2005 
(where 1 indicates the given country was following a floating regime and 0 if it was 
following fixed regime).  The recommendation for each country is based on its 
probability. 
 
Table 2.11: Countries included in the 2005 test 
  Country Odds Probability 
Exchange 
regime in 2005 
Recommendation 
1 Australia          2.21  99.7% 1 No change 
2 Brazil          0.95  99.0% 1 No change 
3 Canada        (0.28) 96.5% 1 No change 
4 Israel          1.12  99.1% 1 No change 
5 Japan          4.09  100.0% 1 No change 
6 Korea, South          0.75  98.7% 1 No change 
7 Mexico        (0.28) 96.5% 1 No change 
8 Norway          4.60  100.0% 1 No change 
9 Papua New Guinea        (4.57) 27.5% 1 Move to a tighter regime 
10 Poland        (0.15) 97.0% 1 No change 
11 South Africa        (0.69) 94.9% 1 No change 
12 Sri Lanka        (1.13) 92.2% 1 No change 
13 Sweden          1.50  99.4% 1 No change 
14 Switzerland          3.08  99.9% 1 No change 
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15 Tanzania          0.48  98.3% 1 No change 
16 Turkey          0.44  98.3% 1 No change 
17 Uganda          0.77  98.8% 1 No change 
18 United Kingdom          0.55  98.5% 1 No change 
19 United States          0.29  98.0% 1 No change 
20 Uruguay          0.44  98.3% 1 No change 
21 Austria        (1.84) 85.3% 0 No change 
22 Azerbaijan        (1.43) 89.8% 0 No change 
23 Belarus        (7.27) 2.5% 0 No change 
24 Belgium        (9.13) 0.4% 0 No change 
25 Bulgaria        (1.64) 87.7% 0 No change 
26 Ecuador        (1.61) 88.1% 0 No change 
27 El Salvador        (0.75) 94.6% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
28 Equatorial Guinea        (2.84) 68.3% 0 No change 
29 Estonia        (3.39) 55.3% 0 No change 
30 Finland          1.35  99.3% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
31 France        (0.59) 95.3% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
32 Gabon        (3.63) 49.4% 0 No change 
33 Germany        (1.61) 88.0% 0 No change 
34 Greece        (4.33) 32.6% 0 No change 
35 Italy        (0.25) 96.6% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
36 Jordan        (1.59) 88.2% 0 No change 
37 Latvia        (1.41) 90.0% 0 No change 
38 Libya        (0.76) 94.5% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
39 Lithuania        (1.83) 85.5% 0 No change 
40 Malaysia        (4.46) 29.9% 0 No change 
41 Morocco          0.10  97.6% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
42 Netherlands        (7.56) 1.9% 0 No change 
43 Pakistan          0.38  98.2% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
44 Panama          0.53  98.4% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
45 Portugal        (0.68) 94.9% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
46 Senegal        (0.42) 96.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
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47 Slovakia        (2.67) 71.8% 0 No change 
48 Spain        (1.70) 87.1% 0 No change 
49 Syria        (2.43) 76.4% 0 No change 
50 Trinidad and Tobago        (1.17) 92.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
51 Turkmenistan        (1.93) 84.2% 0 No change 
52 Ukraine        (2.05) 82.5% 0 No change 
53 Venezuela          0.12  97.6% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
54 Vietnam        (2.63) 72.7% 0 No change 
55 Bahrain        (3.64) 49.0% 0 No change 
56 Kuwait          1.06  99.1% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
57 Oman        (0.95) 93.5% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
58 Qatar          1.62  99.5% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
59 Saudi Arabia        (0.15) 97.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
60 United Arab Emirates        (0.89) 93.8% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
 
Table 2.12 lists all the economies that are recommended to change exchange rate 
regime based on the outcome of the logit model. The table shows that 17 countries out 
of 60 are recommended to adopt a different exchange regime. 6 countries had followed 
the recommendation by 2008.  Of the 11 economies that did not change regime, 7 of 
them - Libya, Venzuela, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates are major oil producers. 
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Table 2.12: Countries with a recommendation to adopt a different exchange 
regime based on the 2005 logit model  
# Country Recommendation Action made in 2008 
1 Papua New Guinea Move to a tighter regime Moved to managed floating 
2 Finland Move to a more flexible regime Moved to floating regime 
3 France Move to a more flexible regime Moved to floating regime 
4 Italy Move to a more flexible regime Moved to floating regime 
5 Pakistan Move to a more flexible regime Moved to managed floating 
6 Portugal Move to a more flexible regime Moved to floating regime 
7 Libya Move to a more flexible regime No change 
8 Morocco Move to a more flexible regime No change 
9 Panama Move to a more flexible regime No change 
10 Senegal Move to a more flexible regime No change 
11 Trinidad and Tobago Move to a more flexible regime No change 
12 Venezuela Move to a more flexible regime No change 
13 Kuwait Move to a more flexible regime No change 
14 Oman Move to a more flexible regime No change 
15 Qatar Move to a more flexible regime No change 
16 Saudi Arabia Move to a more flexible regime No change 
17 United Arab Emirates Move to a more flexible regime No change 
 
The 2008 results (Table 2.13) shows that 10 out of 63 countries are recommended to 
adopt a different exchange rate regime.  6 of them are both major oil producers and 
member states of the GCC. 
 
From the logit models it is concluded that all of the GCC countries, with the exception of 
Bahrain are recommended (with probability of 100%) to adopt a floating exchange rate. 
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Table 2.13: Countries included in the 2008 test 
  Country Odd Probability 
Exchange 
regime in 
2008 
Recommendation 
1 Australia     53.4616  100.0% 1 No change 
2 Austria     61.1134  100.0% 1 No change 
3 Belgium     52.9055  100.0% 1 No change 
4 Brazil        1.1465  99.1% 1 No change 
5 Canada     55.5280  100.0% 1 No change 
6 Czech Republic     (1.0370) 92.9% 1 No change 
7 Finland     61.5939  100.0% 1 No change 
8 France     60.3746  100.0% 1 No change 
9 Germany     56.5509  100.0% 1 No change 
10 Greece     40.2594  100.0% 1 No change 
11 Israel        9.4610  100.0% 1 No change 
12 Italy     49.9485  100.0% 1 No change 
13 Japan     22.0669  100.0% 1 No change 
14 Korea, South        1.9280  99.6% 1 No change 
15 Mexico        3.2331  99.9% 1 No change 
16 Netherlands     63.4184  100.0% 1 No change 
17 Norway     77.3156  100.0% 1 No change 
18 Poland        1.8298  99.6% 1 No change 
19 Portugal     25.2728  100.0% 1 No change 
20 South Africa     (2.0754) 82.2% 1 Move to a tighter regime 
21 Spain     45.8360  100.0% 1 No change 
22 Sweden     60.2678  100.0% 1 No change 
23 Switzerland     62.6781  100.0% 1 No change 
24 Turkey        2.4400  99.8% 1 No change 
25 United Kingdom     63.2641  100.0% 1 No change 
26 United States     70.4611  100.0% 1 No change 
27 Angola     (9.1082) 0.4% 0 No change 
28 Argentina     (1.5880) 88.3% 0 No change 
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29 Azerbaijan     (6.1179) 7.5% 0 No change 
30 Belarus     (6.3390) 6.1% 0 No change 
31 Bulgaria   (12.8799) 0.0% 0 No change 
32 Croatia     (0.0666) 97.2% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
33 Ecuador     (4.6879) 25.3% 0 No change 
34 El Salvador     (5.7623) 10.4% 0 No change 
35 Equatorial Guinea     (2.5295) 74.6% 0 No change 
36 Estonia     (0.1172) 97.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
37 Gabon     (1.0308) 92.9% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
38 Iran     (8.5265) 0.7% 0 No change 
39 Jordan   (14.2310) 0.0% 0 No change 
40 Kazakhstan     (4.2456) 34.5% 0 No change 
41 Latvia     (6.7201) 4.2% 0 No change 
42 Libya   (45.9294) 0.0% 0 No change 
43 Lithuania     (2.1696) 80.8% 0 No change 
44 Morocco     (8.8082) 0.5% 0 No change 
45 Panama     (1.6983) 87.1% 0 No change 
46 Russia     (5.4403) 13.8% 0 No change 
47 Senegal     (8.3828) 0.8% 0 No change 
48 Slovakia     (7.3053) 2.4% 0 No change 
49 Sri Lanka     (7.6262) 1.8% 0 No change 
50 Syria     (9.7082) 0.2% 0 No change 
51 Trinidad and Tobago   (11.0806) 0.1% 0 No change 
52 Tunisia     (9.2789) 0.3% 0 No change 
53 Turkmenistan   (12.5650) 0.0% 0 No change 
54 Uzbekistan     (9.7292) 0.2% 0 No change 
55 Venezuela     (0.1157) 97.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
56 Vietnam   (15.7969) 0.0% 0 No change 
57 Yemen   (10.3347) 0.1% 0 No change 
58 Bahrain     (6.9657) 3.4% 0 No change 
59 Kuwait     37.2617  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
60 Oman        3.6553  99.9% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
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61 Qatar     60.6514  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
62 Saudi Arabia     11.4648  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
63 United Arab Emirates     20.0488  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
 
Table 2.14: Countries with a recommendation to adopt a different exchange 
regime based on the 2008 logit model  
  Country Odd Probability 
Exchange 
regime in 
2008 
Recommendation 
1 South Africa     (2.0754) 82.2% 1 Move to a tighter regime 
2 Croatia     (0.0666) 97.2% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
3 Estonia     (0.1172) 97.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
4 Gabon     (1.0308) 92.9% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
5 Venezuela     (0.1157) 97.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
6 Kuwait     37.2617  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
7 Oman        3.6553  99.9% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
8 Qatar     60.6514  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
9 Saudi Arabia     11.4648  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
10 United Arab Emirates     20.0488  100.0% 0 Move to a more flexible regime 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
First, it is quite important to note that the analysis contained in this chapter is not 
sufficient to provide any government with a final recommendation towards selection of 
its exchange rate regime.  The chapter starts by presenting a basic understanding of the 
relationship between major economic indicators (related to wealth and openness of an 
economy), and exchange rate regime.  The models developed can be used to indicate 
whether or not a country should move to an alternative exchange rate regime.  
 
The outcome of this chapter is very interesting for the GCC countries in that they are all, 
except for Bahrain, among the countries recommended to move towards a more flexible 
regime. By applying the same logic to the GCC as a single entity, it is clear that the 
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recommendation for Bahrain to move towards a more flexible exchange rate regime is 
still valid assuming that economic union happens and a single currency is realized. 
 
The charts below shows inflation rates over the period 2001–2008 for the countries that 
followed the recommendations made in Table 2.12. Except for 2008, inflation appears 
stable and less volatile following the change of exchange rate regime in 2005.  It is also 
clear that there is no obvious direction of change in the inflation rate in these countries. 
 
Chart 2.4: Inflation in Countries Following the 2005 Model Recommendation 
 
  
 
  
 
Source: Trading Economics website 
 
On the other hand, the GCC countries listed below were recommended to change their 
exchange rate regime but failed to do so.  Here it is noticed that inflation was rising 
continually upward.  The cause was largely a result of the lack of effective monetary 
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tools in these countries.  However, the fact that the cause of this was the rapid increase 
in oil prices during the period that led to a significant increase in cash liquidity within the 
GCC cannot be excluded. 
 
Chart 2.5: Inflation in Countries Not Following the 2005 Model Recommendations 
 
 
 
Source: Trading Economics website 
 
In summary, this chapter investigated exchange rate policies of the GCC countries. It 
provided recommendations based on the estimation of a logit model linking exchange 
rate regime to a number of important (macro)economic indicators.  The analysis does 
not indicate that a country has to move immediately from one regime to another.  It 
provides an incentive for a country to investigate the advantages of changing its 
exchange rate system based on economic indicators it is able to observe. Taking into 
consideration the outcome of the modeling, it is concluded that the wealthier and more 
open that an economy is, the higher the probability that it should adopt a more flexible 
regime. Accordingly, movement towards a more flexible regime is to be expected when 
forming a currency union that improves economic integration between its members. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STOCK MARKET AND EXCHANGE 
RATE REGIME 
3.1 Introduction  
There are three competing views on the nature of the relationship between the 
exchange rate and stock prices. The first view suggests that there is no relationship 
between the exchange rate and the stock market. Nieh et. al. (2002) found that there 
was no long run relationship in a study of G7 countries. They did find existence of a 
significant short run relationship but it was limited to a single day in a small number of 
the countries.   
 
The second approach argues that the exchange rate Granger causes stock price 
movements. Dornbush et. al. (1980) claim that changes in the exchange rate affect the 
competitiveness of firms, firm’s earnings, net worth and accordingly stock prices. 
 
The third approach according to Frankel (2003) argues that stock prices Granger cause 
exchange rates. This approach suggests that changes in stock prices influence capital 
flows of foreign investors who then substitute local/foreign currency for foreign/local 
currency. Accordingly, changes in stock prices lead to appreciation/depreciation of the 
exchange rate as a result of increases in the demand/supply of foreign currency. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to further investigate the relationship between the stock 
market and domestic exchange rate (against the US dollar) for the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. However, since the GCC countries apart from Kuwait, have 
been following fixed exchange rate regimes for the last 30 years, it is not possible to 
examine this relationship directly. 
 
Accordingly, this study selects countries that have similar characteristics to the GCC 
economies.  The analysis can then be applied to the GCC economies at some point in 
the future, assuming they move to a non-dollarization regime.  
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The main criteria is dependence on the US dollar. In some cases this will occur as the 
result of a country having the US as a main trading partner. In others it will be due to the 
fact that commodities bought and sold are priced in US dollars.  This is the case for all 
of the GCC economies since they are all major exporters of oil and the price of oil is 
measured in USD/barrel. In addition, the selected countries need to have: 
 
 Been following a non-dollarization exchange regime for the last 10 years at least; 
 A stock market index with long historical data available. 
 
As a result, three countries were selected. They comprise: 
 Japan - a major oil importer and major trading partner of the US. 
 Russia - the only major oil exporter with a non-dollarization regime and the 
largest gas exporter in the world. 
 Brazil - the US is Brazil’s main trading partner in terms of both imports and 
exports. 
 
This chapter will evaluate the relationship between the stock market and the foreign 
exchange market using two separate approaches. 
 
The first approach uses economic theory by employing a standard Mundell-Fleming 
model. In this approach, the IS curve, that represents the goods market is assumed to 
move in the same direction as the stock market. This is a common assumption, since 
the goods market is represented by stock market indices. In other words, a change in 
the exchange rate and/or government policy will affect the IS curve and the stock 
market index in the same direction. Hence, the movement of the stock market can be 
concluded from the movement of the IS curve.  
 
The second approach examines the relationship between the domestic exchange rate 
and stock market index for Japan, Russia and Brazil using time series methods.  A unit 
root test is used to investigate stationarity of the data.  This is followed by testing and 
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estimation of cointegration and vector autoregression (VAR) models. Finally Granger 
causality tests are performed to check if causality exists and in which direction it runs.   
 
The empirical work carried out provides evidence of a long-run relationship in Russia 
and Brazil but not in Japan. Estimating a VAR model suggests that there is also a 
minimal short-run relationship in both Russia and Brazil. However, the results of 
Granger Causality testing suggest that there is no Granger causation in either direction 
between the two variables.  
3.2 Literature Review 
Researchers have long been interested in the relationship between the behavior of the 
stock market and key macroeconomic variables. The role of the exchange rate has 
been of particular interest. 
 
Pan et. al. (2002) investigated and found existence of a causal relationship between 
stock market prices and the exchange rate using data for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. Additionally it was found that during the 
1997 Asian financial crisis that the relationship became even stronger.  
 
Bartram et. al. (2012) use a large sample of non-financial organizations from 37 
different countries to study the significance of exchange rate exposure on the stock 
return generation process. They find that there is no unconditional relationship between 
stock returns and exchange rate exposure.  However a conditional relationship does 
exist when the realized change in the exchange rate is used as conditioning variable.  
Furthermore, changes in the exchange rate have a direct correlation with the achieved 
return to exposure. The study established that the return effect is greater for 
organizations in developed economies as compared to those in developing ones, with 
the variation of return effect being in the range of 1.2 to 3.3% per unit of currency 
exposure.  Even though there are issues that some of the individual time series are 
noisy and many exposures are not statistically significant, their research suggests that 
there are noticeable differences in the effect of exchange rate variation on the return of 
firms. 
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In order to determine the association between exchange rate and stock price index, 
data for six Asian economies were analyzed by Tsai (2012).  Theory suggests that 
these two variables should be negatively correlated with each other. Tsai (2012) used a 
quantile regression model as the results obtained from conventional ordinary least 
squares estimation were not encouraging. It was found using this approach that the 
negative relation between the stock market and foreign exchange market is better 
defined when exchange rates are extremely high or low.  
 
Using data for the period  1991 to 2011, Imam et. al. (2012) analyzed the association 
between the Australian/US dollar exchange rate and Australian and US stock indices. 
Using computational intelligence techniques they find that the exchange rate is best 
forecast using a linear forecast model rather than by using nonlinear or intelligent 
systems models.  
 
By segregating export focused nations from import inclined ones, the association 
between the stock market and exchange rate was examined in a more practical manner 
by Ma et. al. (1990). The research established that increases in the exchange rate had 
opposite effects on the stock markets of export and import focused countries.  For an 
export dominant country currency appreciation reduces its competitiveness in export 
markets and has a negative effect on the domestic stock market.  For an import 
dominated country the currency appreciation lowers import costs and impacts positively 
on the domestic stock market.  In passing it can be noted that the outcome of this 
particular study is consistent with the theoretical findings of the Mundell-Fleming model. 
 
In order to examine the effect of financial liberalization in China on the relationship 
between exchange rate and stock market performance, Tian et. al. (2010) employ an 
autoregressive distribute lag (ARDL) cointegration strategy. They find existence after 
1995 of a cointegration relationship between the Shanghai index and renminbi/US dollar 
exchange rate.  It has to be remembered however that this period saw the introduction 
of a truly flexible managed floating exchange rate system.  They further show that stock 
price is positively affected by the exchange rate and money supply. The shift towards a 
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more flexible exchange rate system saw the currency appreciate and resulted in “hot 
money” entering the country.  This increased money supply, pushed stock markets 
higher and saw the currency appreciate even further. 
 
In order to analyze the relationship between the (Chinese) Renminbi (RMB) real 
exchange rate and domestic stock market over the period January 1991 to June 2009, 
Zhao (2012) employs VAR and multivariate GARCH models.  Although the study finds 
that a long term relationship between the exchange rate and stock market exists, it is 
found to be unstable. 
 
In a few economies the presence of a relationship between the exchange rate and stock 
market relationship has been established. However for a number of other nations it has 
not yet been confirmed.  An illustration of this follows from research carried out by Lean 
et. al. (2008). They test for cointegration and Granger causality using a sample 
comprising data from eight South East Asian countries over the time period January 
1991 to June 2005.  They find little evidence of cointegration. Only one country – South 
Korea – shows any sign of cointegration over the full sample period; and even there the 
relationship is very weak with a long run uni-directional Granger causality running from 
exchange rate to stock prices. 
 
Through analysis of the banking sector, Chamberlain et. al. (1997) investigate the 
foreign exposure of a sample of US and Japanese banks.  In particular they attempt to 
relate equity return to exchange rate using a comparative analysis.  The results of the 
research carried out confirm the existence of such a relationship.  Stock returns of a 
significant fraction of US companies move with the exchange rate whilst few of the 
Japanese companies do. In another study the association between the Japanese Yen 
with its domestic stock market was analyzed by He et. al. (1998). It was found that only 
25% of the 171 Japanese multinationals considered, experienced economically 
significant positive effects from exchange rate exposure.  
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The existence of the above association was, however, not found by Barlov et. al. 
(1994). They found that contemporary changes in the US dollar had little explanatory 
power in explaining abnormal stock returns in their sample of 208 US firms. 
 
Long run non-causality, unit-root, and cointegration tests were employed by 
Bhattacharya et. al. (2001) to analyze the association between the Indian stock market 
index and a number of macroeconomic variables over the ten year period 1990/91 to 
2000/01.  No causal relationship was found to exist between stock prices and the three 
macroeconomic variables (real effective exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves and 
value of the trade balance) used. 
 
In order to analyze further the causal linkage between macroeconomic variables and 
the exchange rate, Ali et. al. (2010) investigates the case of Pakistan (for which little 
previous work had been undertaken). Federal Bureau of Statistics of Pakistan data for 
the stock exchange index, inflation, money supply, index of industrial production and 
exchange rate were collected for the period 1990 to 2008. The stock exchange index 
used was the Karachi stock exchange general prices index. A standard Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test was used to check for stationarity.  Johansen’s 
cointegration test was then applied to investigate for cointegration between the 
variables.  Finally, Granger’s causality test was used to investigate the nature of the 
causal relationship.  The study found no evidence of a causal relationship between 
stock prices and the selected macroeconomic variables. It did, however, find a 
cointegration relationship between stock prices and the index of industrial production. It 
was concluded that macroeconomic variables cannot be used to predict stock prices 
 
In analyzing the relationship between the exchange rate and stock market prices in the 
G7 nations, Nieh et. al. (2002) made two discoveries.  First that there is no long run 
significant relationship between the two variables; second that the short run relationship 
was confirmed for one day and only then for a small number of the G7 countries 
considered.  
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The existence of a long run relationship between the exchange rate and stock market 
was not found when the same approach using a Granger causality test was carried out 
by Song et. al. (2007). The research revealed the presence of a short term relationship, 
and confirmed that in the short term, the exchange rate does influence stock market 
prices.  However the converse does not hold true. 
3.3 The Effect of Foreign Exchange on the Stock Market  
This section considers the foreign exchange market and explains its effect on the stock 
market from a theoretical point of view. The main focus will be on the Mundell-Fleming 
model, where the stock market is represented by the goods market IS curve. 
3.3.1 The Foreign Exchange Market 
3.3.1.1 Size and Distribution 
According to the results of a survey carried out by the BIS (Bank for International 
Settlements), foreign exchange market turnover experienced high rates of growth up to 
1998.  From 1998-2001 it declined as a result of the launch of the Euro that caused a 
majority of intra-European transactions to disappear. 
 
Table 3.1: Foreign Exchange Market Growth (1995-2010) 
  1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Average daily turnover (US$ billion) 1,225 1,527 1,239 1,934 3,324 3,981 
Annual Growth %   25% -19% 56% 72% 20% 
       Source: http://www.bis.org/index.htm  
 
Foreign exchange market (FEM) average daily turnover was US$ 1,225 billion in 1995 
compared with US$ 1,934 billion in 2004 - an average annual growth of 6%. High rates 
of growth also occurred between 2004 and 2010 with the market almost doubling over 
the six year, period - resulting in an average annual growth of 18%. 
 
Chart 3.1 below shows that the US dollar is still one of the most widely used 
international currencies with it accounting for more than 40% of total market size 
between 2004 and 2010, though the Euro became its main competitor after 2004, with a 
market share in excess of 19%. 
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Chart 3.1: Market Share by Currency (2004-2010) 
 
 Source: http://www.bis.org/index.htm  
 
In terms of global foreign exchange market turnover the US dollar remains the dominant 
currency with 28% of deals involving the USD/EUR and 14% of deals involving the 
USD/JPY in 2010. 
 
Chart 3.2: Foreign Exchange Market Turnover by Currency Pairs (2010) 
 
Source: http://www.bis.org/index.htm  
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3.3.1.2 Demand for Foreign Currency 
According to IMF researches, there are many factors determining the demand for a 
foreign currency. The major of these are analyzed below: 
3.3.1.2.1 Importation 
The main objective of buying a foreign currency is to buy foreign goods and services. If 
this is the case then what are the reasons for buying goods and services from a foreign 
country? The obvious and textbook answer to this question is relative prices.  If the 
prices of domestic goods are higher relative to foreign goods then there will be an 
incentive to purchase them abroad.  This will increase the demand for foreign goods 
and services and increase the demand for foreign currencies.  In addition, if people 
prefer foreign products more than the locally produced ones, then this will also increase 
the demand for foreign currency. Finally, an increase in individual incomes will increase 
demand for foreign currency since they will cetiris paribus demand more goods and 
services, some of which will be foreign. 
3.3.1.2.2 Portfolio Investment 
Portfolio investment means lending money to someone in another country. Lending 
here means either opening an account in a foreign country, or buying shares and bonds 
from this country. It is well known that this lending is highly related to interest rates. As 
foreign interest rates rise domestic money flows out. This will cause the demand for 
foreign exchange to increase, and vice-versa.  
3.3.1.2.3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
FDI involves owning and controlling a company or part of a company in a foreign 
country. If a local company wants to establish a company in a foreign country it has to 
pay for it in the currency of the foreign country. As a result, the demand for foreign 
currency will increase. 
3.3.1.2.4 Expectations 
The final reason for buying a foreign currency is to undertake currency speculation.  If a 
domestic investor has an expectation that the exchange rate is going to change then 
profit opportunities arise. For instance if a trader believes that the Euro will strengthen 
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(“appreciate”) against the U.S. dollar, then the trader will buy Euros with U.S. dollars. If 
the exchange rate rises and the speculator thinks that the appreciation will taper off, the 
investor can buy U.S. dollars with the Euros that were purchased. The profit is made by 
through arbitrage - the difference between the currency exchange rates. 
3.4 The Mundell-Fleming Model 
The objective of the Mundell-Fleming model is the determination of equilibrium income, 
and deals with the response of income and interest rate to changes in economic policy 
and internal/external shocks that occur within the economy. The model extends the 
simple closed economy IS-LM model to an open economy setting.  Equilibrium occurs 
at the intersection of the IS, LM, and FE curves where the goods market is represented 
by an IS curve (that encompasses the stock market), the money market is represented 
by the LM curve, and the foreign exchange market  is represented by the FE curve. 
 
Dornbusch et. al. (2001) pp.172, defines it more precisely: “the analysis extending the 
standard IS-LM model to the open economy under perfect capital mobility has a special 
name, the Mundell-Fleming model”.  
3.4.1 The effects of fiscal policy in the Mundell-Fleming model 
The effect of fiscal and monetary policy under a non-dollarization exchange rate system 
can be analyzed easily using the Mundell-Fleming model. 
 
The effect of expansionary fiscal policy - increasing government spending (G) or 
decreasing taxes (T) - is shown in Chart 3.3. 
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Chart 3.3: Effects of Expansionary Fiscal Policy on Equilibrium Income 
 
Source: Developed by the Author of the Thesis 
 
Expansionary fiscal policy causes the IS curve to shift upward from IS to IS1. Following 
this there is an increase in the stock market index. At the point labeled “1” equilibrium 
between IS1 and LM is above the FE curve and means that the balance of payments is 
in surplus. At this point the domestic interest rate (r) has increased.  This will induce 
investors to move their money into (domestic) banks. To do this they have to sell their 
own currency and buy the domestic currency. This then leads to an increase in the price 
of the domestic currency.  
 
However, an appreciation of the local currency decreases profits for exporting firms as 
foreign demand for their products fall. In addition fluctuations in the exchange rate also 
affect the transactions exposure of these companies.  It also affects the value of the 
firm’s future payable in foreign currency. This means that the country is less competitive 
in the market, and this causes IS1 to shift downward to IS2.  In the final analysis 
equilibrium is unchanged which means that income (Y) and interest rate (r) remain 
constant. 
 
The conclusion here is that an increase in fiscal policy causes the stock market to grow 
for a period of time. However, this growth causes the exchange rate to increase and this 
increase then affects the stock market causing it to fall until it returns to its previous 
position. 
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The impact of the exchange rate on the stock market depends on the importance of 
international trade and how much this trade contributes to the income of the economy. 
In the words of Pan et. al. (2002) pp. 6, “Countries that have a higher trade to GDP 
ratio, exchange rate fluctuations tend to exhibit significant influence on the equity 
market, regardless of the exchange rate arrangement system and the degree of capital 
control”.  
3.4.2 The effects of monetary policy in the Mundell-Fleming model 
 
Chart 3.4: Effects of a Fall in Money Supply on Equilibrium Income 
 
Source: Developed by the Author of the Thesis 
 
The LM curve moves to the right (from LM to LM1) since the money supply has been 
reduced. Equilibrium between IS and LM1 occurs below the FE curve.  As a result there 
is a deficit on the balance of payments as the interest rate has fallen.  This leads to 
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate and also the real exchange rate. At this point 
the economy becomes more competitive and the IS curve will shift upward to IS1. The 
new equilibrium is now at the point where IS1 intersects with LM1 and FE.  In the final 
position, income (Y) rises whilst the interest rate (r) remains constant.  
 
As a conclusion, monetary policy is useful in an open economy non-dollarization 
exchange rate regime as it can affect the level of output. However it is impotent in 
affecting the interest rate under perfect capital mobility. 
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3.4.3 The Effect of FE Curve Movement on Equilibrium Income 
The movement of the FE curve is a result of shocks in the foreign sector such as 
appreciation/depreciation of the currency, or a change in foreign interest rates. An 
increase in the foreign interest rate will shift the FE curve upward to FE1. At the 
intersection between IS, LM and FE1 there is a deficit on the balance of payments.  The 
size of this deficit is correlated with the increase in the foreign interest rate. The 
increase in the foreign interest rate encourages capital to leave the country. Hence, 
demand for local currency will fall and the currency will depreciate. This depreciation will 
make the country more competitive in export markets. So the goods market expands. 
The IS curve shifts to IS1 to intersect with LM and FE1.  The final effect is that both 
interest rate (r) and income (Y) rise. 
 
Chart 3.5: Effects of a Rise in the Foreign Rate of Interest
 
Source: Developed by the Author of the Thesis 
 
From the above analysis, it is concluded that theoretically at least there is a relationship 
between stock market and exchange rate.  However, this relationship differs from one 
country to another and depends on many external and internal factors. 
3.5 Data 
The objective of this chapter is to support the GCC economies in their possible future 
decision to move away from the dollarization regime. These economies are considered 
among the top oil exporters around the world where oil trading represents the bulk of 
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their international trading volume. Table 3.2 below shows the contribution of oil and gas 
to international trade for the GCC countries. 
 
Table 3.2: Contribution of Oil and Gas Exports to International Trade in 2010 
  Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Net Oil and gas 
exports as % of 
international trade 19% 34% 22% 53% 42% 28% 
Source: Joint Arab Economic Report, Arab Monetary Fund (AMF). April 2011 
 
The table shows that the US dollar is the main currency used in international trade by 
the GCC countries (since oil and gas are priced in US dollars). Since the GCC 
economies except for Kuwait have been following a dollarization exchange regime for 
almost 30 years, it is not possible to directly measure the effects of change in their 
dollar exchange rates on domestic stock indices.  
 
By selecting other economies where the US dollar is used as a major currency in 
international trade, support may be provided to the case of the GCC. If a relationship 
between the exchange rate and the stock market is found to exist in economies that are 
considered similar, then the analysis can be carried over to members of the GCC.  It is 
then possible to observe the expected long-run effect of adopting an alternative 
exchange regime on the local stock markets of GCC member states. 
 
The economies that have been selected for analysis in this chapter have the following 
characteristics: 
 They have not been following a dollarization exchange regime over the last 10 
years; 
 They have a stock market index with long historical data; 
 They use the US dollar as a main currency. 
 
All European Union (EU) countries were excluded from the sample due to their high 
levels of intra-trading.  
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Table 3.3 below lists 12 economies considered in the initial shortlist for economies to be 
benchmarked against those from the GCC. An attempt was made to select major oil and 
gas producers and economies that are highly dependent on the US dollar in their 
trading. 
 
Unfortunately, only three economies met this requirement. Many of the countries in the 
table lacked sufficient data to undertake the analysis. 
    
Table 3.3: Initial List of Countries for Benchmark Selection 
Country 
Stock Market 
Data 
Dollarization 
Regime USD Dependent Comments 
Algeria N N Y Minimal Stock Market data 
Australia Y N N Trading with USA represents 4.8% 
Brazil Y N Y USA is the main trading partner 
Ecuador N N Y Minimal Stock Market data - 2004 onward 
Egypt Y N N Not USD dependent 
Iran N N Y No market data  
Iraq N N Y No market data  
Japan Y Y Y 
Major oil importer; US is a major trading 
partner 
Libya N Y Y No market data and dollarization 
Nigeria N N Y No market data   
Russia Y N Y Major gas exporter  
Venzuela Y Y Y Dollarization regime and no data 
Source: IMF, World Fact Book and World Trade Organization  
 
Based on Table 3.3 above Japan, Russia and Brazil were selected for the following 
reasons: 
 
Japan – one of the world’s major oil importers that relies on the USA as a major 
international trading partner:  
Japan is considered a major oil importer.  Net oil imports account for 13.1% of its total 
trade according to table 3.4 and its assumptions. It is ranked as the 3rd largest oil 
importer after the US and EU according to the World Fact Book in 2012. 13.8% of its 
international trading is with the US. Hence, Japan depends heavily on the US dollar in 
its international trading.  Accordingly it was selected to be used in the tests.  
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Russia – Among the world’s major oil and natural gas exporters: 
Russia is the 2nd largest oil exporter in the world, and net export value from oil 
represents 27% of its total international trade, according to the below table and its 
assumptions. In addition to exporting oil, Russia is also the largest natural gas exporter 
in the world (which is also priced in US dollars). As a result, and although Russia is not 
a major trading partner of the USA, its economy is very sensitive to the US dollar since 
its major trading commodities are priced and traded in US dollars. 
 
Brazil – The USA is its main international trading partner:  
Brazil is a major trading partner of the USA.13.1% of its international trade is with the 
USA. 
 
Table 3.4: Oil and International Trading Data for the Selected Economies (2009) 
  Japan Russia Brazil 
Net oil export value in US$ billion*  (137) 134 (2) 
Net oil export as % of international trading -13.1% 27.0% -0.6% 
Oil export ranking 44 2 27 
Oil Import ranking 3 87 20 
Export from the USA % from total 16.42% 3.50% 10.50% 
Import from the USA % from total 10.96% 4.46% 16.12% 
Trading from USA as % of total trading 13.8% 3.9% 13.1% 
Source: CIA Fact Book 
* Based on an average price of US$ 75 per barrel of oil 
3.6 Methodology 
Two approaches can be used to analyze the relationship between the stock market and 
the exchange rate. The first, as previously outlined, is the theoretical approach that 
employs the Mundell-Fleming model. 
The second approach uses quantitative (time series econometric) methods. The first 
step in examining this relationship is to test for stationarity of the original variables. After 
confirming that the data are stationary using Unite Root Test, Cointegration test is 
examined between the local stock market performance and the domestic currency/USD 
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in the selected countries (Japan, Russian and Brasil). The objective of this test is to 
assess whether a long-run relationship exists between the two variables. The presence 
of long-run relationship supports the effectiveness of monetary policies in affecting the 
market performance. Assuming that this relationship exists, an ECM test is implemented 
to check for short-run relationship. Otherwise, VAR test is applied. After completing the 
long-run and short-run relationship tests, a Granger Causality test is applied between 
the two variables (stock market index and domestic currency/USD) to investigate 
whether any of the two variables can be used to forecast the other variable. 
 
One matter that should be taken into consideration is the number and length of lags 
used.  If the chosen lag length is greater than that necessary it will cause inefficiency in 
estimation. A solution to this problem has been provided by Hsiao (1981) who 
developed a systematic autoregressive method for choosing the optimal lag length by 
using the mean square prediction error.  The mean square prediction error is a 
combination between Granger causality test and Akaike’s Final Predictive Error (FPE). 
Alternatively, a VAR test is implemented using between 2 and 4 lags. 
 
In this thesis, unit root tests are used to examine stationarity of the logarithms of the 
selected stock market and exchange rate variables.  If a time series is found to have a 
unit root then the first differences of that time series are stationary. 
3.6.1 Unit Root Test 
The unit root test is a test used to examine if a data series is stationary or non-
stationary. It is important to check whether a series is stationary or not before using it in 
any regression model or for forecasting. 
 
Stationary series are series of data for which the probability distribution underlying the 
data generating process is time invariant. In other words the probability distribution does 
not change over time. However it is impossible to test this strong definition of 
stationarity. Instead the test used check for “weak” stationarity.  A stationary series has 
a constant mean and variance and a covariance that depends only on the length of time 
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separating the two values (and not the actual times at which the variables are 
observed.) 
 
There are many ways for determining whether a time series is stationary or 
nonstationary. There are three main tests that can be used for this purpose - the 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test. In this study, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test will be used to examine if the 
series are stationary or not. 
 
The basic idea behind the unit root test of stationary can be demonstrated by 
considering the equation of a simple first order autoregressive AR(1) process: 
 
ttt YY   1  (1) 
 
Where 
t  is a white noise error term with mean 0 and constant variance 
2 . 
Textbook analysis highlights that the process is stationary when 1  and 
nonstationary when 1   
 
So to test for stationarity, a hypothesis test on the value of a single coefficient is 
examined.  Normally, a transformation of the model in (1) is undertaken to make the 
analysis easier. 
 
ttttt YYYY    111  (2) 
ttt YY   1)1(  (3) 
ttt YY   1  (4) 
 
This allows to test the hypothesis in one of two ways. 
 
0:1: 00   HH  (5a) 
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0:1: 11   HH  (5b) 
 
Note that the null hypothesis is that the series is nonstationary. In other words, if the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, it is concluded that the data comes from a nonstationary 
process. 
 
Of course the AR(1) model is a very simple representation. 
 
More often test models of the following form are found 
 
ttt YY   1  (6) 
or 
ttt tYY   1  (7) 
 
In these cases, testing for nonstationarity is carried out in exactly the same way as 
before.  it is tested whether 0  (or 1 ). If null hypothesis that 0  is rejected, it is 
concluded that the data series is stationary! 
 
Unfortunately, a standard t-test of 0  cannot be used as the calculated t statistic no 
longer has a t distribution. If the null hypothesis is true, tY  is nonstationarity and its 
variance increases as the sample size increases. 
 
To recognize for this, the statistic is often called the  (tau) statistic.  This statistic is then 
compared to specially calculated critical values that were generated originally by Dickey 
and Fuller using Monte Carlo methods. 
 
An important extension of the Dickey-Fuller tests allows for the possibility that the error 
term is autocorrelated.  Such autocorrelation is likely to occur if the model does not 
have sufficient lag terms to capture the full dynamic nature of the data generating 
process. As a result the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) was born. 
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Using the model, for instance, described in (6), a further lagged terms are added to 
ensure that the residuals are not autocorrelated. This is equivalent to estimating: 
 
t
m
s ststt
YaYY      11  (8) 
 
The number of lagged terms can be determined by examining the autocorrelation 
function of the residuals or the significance of the coefficients of the estimated lag 
coefficients.  The ADF test is simply a test of 0  in (8).  In the following analysis, use 
is made of the ADF test. 
3.6.2 Cointegration 
After confirming stationarity using an ADF unit root test, a cointegration test is then 
applied to investigate cointegration between the stock market index and domestic 
exchange rate (against the US dollar) for each of the selected countries - Japan, Russia 
and Brazil. 
 
Cointegration means that despite two data series being individually nonstationary, a 
linear combination of the two may, in fact, be stationary. Cointegration of two or more 
time series suggests that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two 
time series – that they share similar stochastic trends. 
 
This can be defined more precisely.  If t
Y
 and t
X
 are I(1) then expect their difference or 
any other linear combination of them such as ttt
XYe  
 to be I(1) as well.  
However there is an important case when ttt
XYe  
 is a stationary I(0) process. 
In this case it is concluded that t
Y
 and t
X
 are cointegrated. More generally, if t
Y
 and t
X
 
are I(a) and ttt
XYe  
 is I(b) then t
Y
 and t
X
 are integrated of order ),( ba . The 
most common case occurs when 1a  and 0b . 
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The common test of whether two variables are cointegrated is to perform OLS 
regression estimation of ttt
eXY  
 and test for stationarity of the residuals using 
Dickey-Fuller or Augmented Dickey-Fuller test as follows: 
 
ttt vee  ˆˆ   (9) 
Where t
v
 is a white noise random error. 
 
The hypotheses tested are: 
0:0 H . That is, t
e
 is I(1) and there is no cointegration. 
0:1 H . That is, t
e
 is I(0) and there is cointegration. 
 
The critical values for the test are identical to those used in the DF test described 
earlier. 
3.6.3 Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Vector Error Correction (VEC) Models 
In the analysis above, it is assumed that one variable, say t
Y
, is the dependent variable 
and the other, say t
X
, is the independent variable. However unless there is good 
reason, it could be assumed that t
Y
, is the independent variable and t
X
, is the 
dependent variable. It can be further argued that the two variables X and Y are, in fact, 
simultaneously determined.  With two variables the result is a bivariate system.  
 
For instance the set of equations: 
 
Y
tttt vXYY   11211110   (10a) 
X
tttt vXYX   12212120   (10b) 
 
is known as a vector autoregressive VAR(1) model as it only involves the first lag of 
each variable and a random error. 
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Econometric theory confirms that to find that Y and X are stationary I(0) variables then 
simple ordinary least squares can be applied (OLS) to estimate each of the equations 
separately.  
 
If Y and X are nonstationary I(1) and not cointegrated then it would be worked with first 
differences.  
 
However if Y and X are I(1) and cointegrated then analysis should be modified to allow 
for it. The resulting model is known as a Vector Error Correction model (that is often 
abbreviated to VEC, VECM or more often ECM). 
 
Estimation of an ECM, which is the main interest, is carried out straightforwardly using a 
two stage procedure due to Engle and Granger (date?). 
 
Step 1:  
Estimate 
ttt eXY    by OLS to obtain the residuals teˆ  where ttt XYe 
ˆˆˆ   
 
Step 2: Estimate the ECM equations using: 
Y
ttt veY  11110 ˆ  (11a) 
X
ttt veX  12120 ˆ  (11b) 
 
In the empirical work carried out a VAR model is applied to check the short-term 
relationship between each stock market index and its associated domestic exchange 
rate (against the US$). 
3.6.4 Granger Causality Test 
The study of causality is one of the most important objectives of empirical econometrics 
and the work carried out by Granger (1969) provides a comprehensive testing 
framework for investigating the relationship between the stock market index and the 
exchange rate. 
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Consider the following VAR model representation. 
 
Y
tit
n
i
iit
n
i
it YXY   




11
 (12a) 
X
tit
n
i
iit
n
i
it YXX   




11
 (12b) 
 
Where, for instance, t
Y
 is defined as the exchange rate, t
X
 is the stock market index 
and the white noise error terms 
Y
t  and 
X
t  are uncorrelated.  This model confirms that 
the exchange rate is related to its own past history and the past history of the stock 
market index. Similarly, the stock market index is related to its own past history and the 
past history of the exchange rate. As there are two variables, this is a bivariate VAR (n) 
model. 
 
A question that may be askd is the following: does the exchange rate cause the stock 
market index, or does stock market index cause the exchange rate?  Using the model 
above, four cases are identified: 
 
1. Unidirectional causality from X  to Y  is indicated if the estimated coefficients of 
the lagged X  in equation 12a are statistically different from 0 as a group (i.e. 
)0
1


n
i
i  and the set of estimated coefficients on the lagged Y  in equation 12b 
are not statistically different from 0 (i.e. )0
1


n
i
i  
 
2. Unidirectional causality from Y  to X  is indicated if the set of lagged X  
coefficients in equation 11a are not statistically different from 0 (i.e. )0
1


n
i
i  
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and the set of coefficients on the lagged Y  coefficients in equation 12b are not 
statistically different from 0 (i.e. )0
1


n
i
i  
 
3. Bilateral causality occurs when the sets of Y  and X  coefficients are statistically 
significant from zero in both equations 12a, 12b. 
 
4. Independence occurs when the sets of Y  and X  coefficients are not statistically 
significant in both equations 12a, 12b 
 
So to test for Granger causality from X  to Y  (or vice versa) all what should be done is 
to run a simple F test.  Equation 12a is estimated using least squares excluding the 
lagged X  variables and obtain the restricted residual sum of squares. Then the 
regression is run again including the lagged terms to obtain the unrestricted residual 
sum of squares.  The null hypothesis to be tested is 0:
1
0 

n
i
iH  , that is, lagged X  
terms do not belong in the regression.  The F statistic is calculated using the restricted 
and unrestricted residual sums of squares and test against a critical value obtained from 
table. If the computed value exceeds the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
which case the lagged X  terms belong in the equation. In other words “ X  (Granger) 
causes Y ”. 
 
Using a similar procedure, equation 12b is checked to find whether Y  (Granger) causes 
X ! 
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3.7 Empirical Work 
This section presents the results of the tests that were carried out to investigate the 
relationship between the stock market index and domestic exchange rate for each of the 
selected countries. 
 
The empirical work will start by applying a unit root test on the level and the first 
difference to check for stationarity. Checking for cointegration at the level then takes 
place. If the series are cointegrated, an error correction model is then estimated; if not a 
VAR model is estimated using the first difference. Finally, Granger causality testing is 
applied to examine the nature of causality. 
 
The data series used are as follows: 
 
 JPY/USD – the exchange rate between the Japanese Yen and US dollar 
 RRB/USD – the exchange rate between the Russian Rouble and US dollar 
 BRR/USD – the  exchange rate between the Brazilian Real and US dollar 
 NIKKEI – the Japanese [Tokyo] stock exchange index 
 RTS  the Russian [Moscow] stock exchange index 
 BOVESPA - theBrazilian [Sao Paolo] stock exchange index 
3.7.1 Results of the ADF Test 
The starting point in the empirical work is to test for stationarity by applying an ADF test 
to the logarithm of each variable. The following shorthand notation is used: 
 
LJU  = )/log( USDJPY  
LRU  = )/log( USDRRB  
LBU  = )/log( USDBRR  
LNIK  = )log(NIKKEI  
LRTS  = )log(RTS  
LBOV  = )log(BOVESPA  
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The results of the ADF tests are provided in full in Appendix A1 Tables 1-6. A summary 
is provided in Table 3.5 below. Together they show that all the series except for LRU 
are nonstationary. 
 
The calculated values of the   (tau) statistic are all on the right hand side of the critical 
values except in the case of LRU. It means that in each case it is failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of nonstationarity. 
 
Table 3.5: Summary of ADF Tests - Levels 
Series Value 5% critical value 1% critical value 
LJU -0.3457 -2.8804 -3.4736 
LRU -3.1788 -2.8804 -3.4736 
LBU -2.4807 -2.8804 -3.4736 
LNIK -2.0067 -2.8804 -3.4736 
LRTS -1.8808 -2.8804 -3.4736 
LBOV -1.3535 -2.8804 -3.4736 
 
It is also possible to test stationarity of the log return instead.  The following shorthand 
notation is used: 
 
])/log[]/(log[100 1 tt USDJPYUSDJPYRJU  
])/log[]/(log[100 1 tt USDRRBUSDRRBRRU  
])/log[]/(log[100 1 tt USDBRRUSDBRRRBU  
])log[](log[100 1 tt NIKKEINIKKEIRNIK  
])log[](log[100 1 tt RTSRTSRRTS  
])log[](log[100 1 tt BOVBOVRBOV  
 
The results of the ADF test are provided in full in Appendix A1 Tables 7-12.  A summary 
is provided in Table 3.6 below. The calculated values of the   (tau) statistic are all less 
than their 1% and 5% critical values. It means that the null hypothesis is rejected and all 
of these series are stationary.  
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Table 3.6: Summary of ADF Tests - Log Returns 
Series Value 5% critical value 1% critical value 
RJU -7.3799 -2.8805 -3.4739 
RRU -6.8876 -2.8805 -3.4739 
RBU -5.1545 -2.8805 -3.4739 
RNIK -5.2701 -2.8805 -3.4739 
RRTS -5.5216 -2.8805 -3.4739 
RBOV -5.7733 -2.8805 -3.4739 
 
3.7.2 Cointegration Test Results 
Cointegration tests were applied to confirm the presence of a  relationship between LJU 
and LNIK; LRU and LRTS; LBU and LBOV. The full results are provided in Appendix A1 
Tables 13-15. Analysis is carried out by considering the results of the Trace and 
Maximum Eigenvalue tests. 
3.7.2.1 Trace Test 
The trace test determines the number of cointegrating equations (r). The trace statistic 
that is used tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relationships against the 
alternative of k cointegrating relationships where k is the number of endogenous 
variables, for r=0,1,…,k-1. To complete the test the calculated trace statistic against its 
5% critical value are compared. 
 
First the logarithms of JPY/USD and NIKKEI index are considered. Table 3.7 shows that 
both trace statistics are less than their critical values. Put another way, the p value for 
the trace statistics are both insignificant at the 5% level of significance. It means that it 
is failed to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there are no cointegrating 
equations between the two variables. 
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Table 3.7: Trace Test 
Between Log(JPY/USD) and Log(NIKKEI) (1998-2011) 
Hypothesized   Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None  0.032497  5.214631  15.49471  0.7856 
At most 1  0.001269  0.193034  3.841466  0.6604 
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 
 
Secondly the logarithms of RRB/USD and RTS index are considered. Table 3.8 shows 
that both trace statistics are greater than their critical values. Looking at the p values it 
is found that both trace statistics are significant at the 5% level. It means that the 
hypothesis is rejected and there is one cointegrating equation between the two 
variables. 
 
Table 3.8: Trace Test 
Between Log(RRB/USD) and Log(RTS) (1998-2011) 
Hypothesized   Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.095589  22.72512  15.49471  0.0034 
At most 1 *  0.047853  7.453400  3.841466  0.0063 
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 
 
Finally, the case of the logarithms of BRR/USD and BOVESPA index is considered.  
Table 3.9 shows that only one of the trace statistics is significant at the 5% level.  It 
means that the hypothesis is rejected and there is one cointegrating equation.  
 
Table 3.9: Trace Test 
Between Log(BRR/USD) and Log(BOVESPA) (1998-2011) 
Hypothesized   Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.146307  26.38660  15.49471  0.0008 
At most 1  0.015294  2.342673  3.841466  0.1259 
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
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3.7.2.2 Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
The Maximum Eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegration 
relationships against the alternative of r+1 cointegration relationships. To complete the 
test the calculated maximum eigenvalue statistic is compared against its 5% critical 
value. 
 
First the logarithms of JPY/USD and NIKKEI index are considered. Table 3.10 shows 
that the maximum eigenvalue statistic is insignificant in both cases.  The test concludes 
that there are no cointegrating equations between the two series. 
 
Table 3.10: Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
Between Log(JPY/USD) and Log(NIKKEI) (1998-2011) 
 
Hypothesized   Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None  0.032497  5.021596  14.26460  0.7391 
At most 1  0.001269  0.193034  3.841466  0.6604 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 
Secondly the logarithms of RRB/USD and RTS index are considered. Table 3.11 
confirms the results of the trace test and suggest the presence of 2 cointegrating 
equations. The two maximum eigenvalue statistics both exceed their critical values.  
They are both significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, the hypothesis is rejected and 
there is one cointegrating equation. 
  
Table 3.11: Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
Between Log(RRB/USD) and Log(RTS) (1998-2011) 
Hypothesized   Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.095589  15.27172  14.26460  0.0345 
At most 1 *  0.047853  7.453400  3.841466  0.0063 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
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Finally, the case of the logarithms of BRR/USD and BOV index is considered.  Table 
3.12 confirms the results of the trace test. . Only in one case is the critical value 
exceeded. It indicates existence of 1 cointegrating equation. 
 
Table 3.12: Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
Between Log(BRR/USD) and Log(BOVESPA) (1998-2011) 
Hypothesized   Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.146307  24.04393  14.26460  0.0011 
At most 1  0.015294  2.342673  3.841466  0.1259 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
3.7.3 Vector Autoregression Results 
The objective of applying the VAR test is to check if there is any kind of relationship 
between the variables in the short-run. Accordingly, a VAR test was applied to the log of 
return of the JPY/USD and NIKKEI index, since there was no cointegration found. On 
the other hand, an Error Correction Model (ECM) was estimated for Russia and Brazil, 
due to the presence of cointegration. The full results of all the tests are shown in 
Appendix A1 Tables 16-24. 
 
The VAR test was applied to the first difference of the JPY/USD exchange rate and 
NIKKEI index (at 4 lags).  The results – Appendix A1 Tables 16-18 – show that there is 
no relationship between the two variables since the t-value at the four lags level is less 
than 2 for both RUJ and RNIK.  The R square values for RJU and RNIK are 0.059 and 
0.075 respectively.  Both are extremely small and indicate that there is no relationship 
between the two variables.  The same result is found when applying the test using 2 
and 3 lags instead 
 
In the case of the RRB/USD and RTS, an error correction model (ECM) was estimated.  
The results – Appendix A1 Tables 19-21 – show that there is a relationship only at 4 
lags between the D(RRTS) and D(RRU(-1)), since the t-statistic value of 2.36 is greater 
than 2. However, the low R square values of 0.43 and 0.29, provide little support that 
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such a relationship exists. The same ECM model was restimated using 2 and 3 lags 
and a similar conclusion resulted. 
 
An error correction model was also estimated for the log return of the BRR/USD and 
BOV. The results – Appendix A1 Tables 22-24 – show that there is no evidence of any 
relationship at either the 2 or 4 lags levels. However, at the 3 lags level there is support 
for the presence of a relationship since the t-statistic values between D(RBOV) & 
D(RBU(-1)), D(RBOV) & D(RBU(-2)) and D(RBU) & D(RBOV(-1)) are all greater than 2. 
The R-square value for D(RBU) is 0.56 and 0.45 for D(RBOV). Both of these are 
sufficiently large to suggest that it is not possible to reject the presence of this 
relationship. Accordingly, it is concluded that there is a short-run relationship between 
the BRR/USD and BOV at the 3 lags level.  
3.7.4 Granger Causality Test Results 
The result of Granger causality tests on the first differences suggests that their is no 
unidirectional causality in either direction. It indicates that there is no evidence, even in 
the short-run, of a relationship between the stock market and the foreign exchange 
market in Japan, Russia and Brazil (Appendix A1, Tables 25-27). 
3.8 Conclusions 
The current investigation examines the relationship between stock return and exchange 
rates in Japan, Russia and Brazil using monthly data for the period 1998 to 2011. 
 
Theoretical analysis utilising a Mundell-Fleming model and a large amount of empirical 
evidence provides support for this relationship. However, this relationship is not 
constant in all economies and it may exist in some countries and disappear in others. 
 
The findings of the statistical research carried out in this chapter suggest that in the 
case of Japan there is little evidence in support of a short or long-run relationship 
between the JPY/USD exchange rate and NIKKEI index.  On the other hand, 
cointegration tests show that there is a long-run relationship between the RRB/USD & 
RTS and BRR/USD & BOV. However, Granger Causality testing does not support the 
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hypothesis that any unidirectional causalty between the variables is present. This 
indicates that these variables are moving in the same direction in the long-run.  It also 
means that it is not possible to predict either of these variables (using historical data) 
knowing the movement of the other. In addition, the results obtained from estimation of 
the error correction models show that there is a short-run relationship between stock 
market return and foreign exchange market in both Russia and Brazil. However, this 
relationship is not constant and is of little use in forecasting one of the variables using 
the other, even in the short-run. 
 
In order to confirm that the outcomes are not due to sample selection the analysis was 
then performed on two half-samples. The full results for the two half samples are 
contained in Appendices A2 and A3 respectively. 
 
Since Russia is a major oil exporter and Brazil is an economy that depends heavily on 
the US as a trading partner they share a similarity to the GCC.  Based on the outcome 
of this chapter, the following advice is provided to the GCC economies (assuming they 
move to a non-dollarization regime in the future): 
 
 GCC countries’ domestic currency/US dollar exchange rate and domestic stock 
index are expected to move in the same direction;  
 GCC economies, assuming they decide to unpeg their currencies should 
consider a gradual move, since a shock to the domestic exchange rate may 
cause a shock to their stock markets and indirectly to the whole economy; and 
 Monetary policy, which does not exist at the moment due to the dollarization 
regime, may influence stock market movement in the long-run, assuming it is 
used in the objective of appreciating/depreciating the currency against the US 
dollar. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GCC CURRENCY UNION: LEARNING FROM THE EURO EXPERIENCE 
4.1 Introduction  
Recent political events in the Middle East have brought into question the need for better 
economic cooperation between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  This 
need was discussed as part of a wider call for a more advanced economic, political and 
military union at the Bahrain summit of GCC leaders in December 2012. The proposed 
GCC currency union that was to have been launched in 2010 has still not been 
achieved. This chapter evaluates the current position and the likelihood and readiness 
of GCC countries to form a currency union. 
 
The foundations for complete economic union were laid down at the second meeting of 
the GCC Supreme Council. At the meeting an economic agreement was agreed upon 
by the GCC member states. In order to accomplish coordination, integration and 
collaboration among GCC member states on a number of different economic issues, a 
set of broad outlines were established.  A free trade area, customs and economic union 
and a common market for member states are some of the steps that have been 
proposed (and in some cases taken) by the Council to achieve total economic 
integration across the region. 
 
In 1983, the first foundations for economic integration were laid down with the creation 
of a free trade zone.  In 1999, the setting up of a customs union marked the second 
stage of economic integration with acceptance of a schedule for it to be operational by 
2005 accepted. Adoption of a common peg for a number of  GCC member states 
currencies followed acceptance of it by GCC leaders attending the 2000 Bahrain 
summit meeting. It was seen by many as the first step in the creation of the single 
currency. This was seen as a necessary foundation for accomplishing complete 
economic integration. 
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According to the AMF, a uniform customs tariff of 5% targeted for 2003 by the GCC 
nations in 2001 was achieved in 2005.  
 
As a move towards adoption of the common currency in 2010 it was also agreed that 
member states would peg their currencies to the US dollar. Various reasons, both 
internal and external, resulted in this target being missed.  
 
Oman announced in December 20065 that it would not be able to meet the target date. 
Following the announcement that the central bank for the monetary union would be 
located in Riyadh and not in Abu Dhabi, the UAE announced in May 2009 that they 
would be withdrawing from the monetary union project. If realized, the GCC monetary 
union will be the second largest supranational monetary union in the world, as 
measured by GDP of the common-currency area. 
 
Table 4.1: GCC Chronology 
Year Achievement  
1981 Formation of the GCC 
1981 Adoption of an Economic Agreement 
1983 Launch a Free Trade Zone 
1999 Decision made to form a Custom Union 
2000 Agreement to adopt a common peg and CU 
2001 Agreement to form a Joint Custom Tariff 
2003 Implementation of Joint Custom Tariff  
2005 Formation of Custom Union 
2010 Deadline to form a Currency Union (not achieved) 
Source: Different publications by Arab Monetary Fund  
 
Although the authorities in the GCC are working towards the diversification of industry, 
they still rely on the oil sector to a significant extent, with oil and gas contributing around 
                                            
5
 Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research (January 2007), 
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39% of total GDP (of US$ 848 billion) in 20096. If the interdependence of other 
industries with oil and gas are taken into consideration then this figure would be far 
higher than 39%. About 80% of public expenditures are financed by income emanating 
from the oil sector. With the GCC owning 42% of worldwide oil assets and 23% of 
established gas assets7, the member states of the GCC are crucial to the global 
economy.  
 
The population of the region in 2011 was approximately 40 million and average GDP 
per capital was around USD 24,000. Biggest among the GCC countries in terms of 
GDP, size and population, is Saudi Arabia. Its population alone accounts for almost  
70% of the total population of the region. In terms of wealth per capita, Qatar and UAE 
are ranked among the top, while Bahrain and Oman are at the bottom. The situation of 
Bahrain and Oman is worse than meets the eye as they have small oil reserves that  
are expected to run out in the next twenty years. If the GCC is compared to the EU, 
then Bahrain and Oman can be compared to the likes of Greece and Portugal. Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE on the other hand have large oil reserves that will provide 
streams of revenue well into the next century. Imports into the GCC are mainly from the 
EU, while export markets (for oil and gas) are generally located in South and East Asia. 
Even though GCC economies are quite transparent, with the minimum ratio being 60% 
of trade to GDP, but still the figures for intra-trade at 6% of the total trade was quite low 
in 2010, and this figure can climb up to 17% if oil trading8 is not included in the figures. 
 
In the 20 year period up to 2006 GCC inflation was kept well under control at 5%. Since 
2006 it has climbed up to 10%. The initial low inflation rate can be attributed to the 
restricted ability to use monetary policy and pegging of currencies to the dollar. Ample 
foreign currency assets have been the key reason behind the almost constant fiscal 
policy. According to Marzovilla et. al. (2010), the currencies of 5 GCC member states 
                                            
6
 Arab Monetary Fund, Economic Statistics Bulletin of Arab Countries 2011 
7
European Central Bank, 2005. International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2007 
Volume 6, pp 11-43 
8
International Trade Statistics 2010 
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were pegged to the dollar.  Only in Kuwait did this different, where it was pegged to a 
basket of currencies.  As a result GCC exchange rates have been relatively stable and 
most of the GCC member states have been confronted with similar problems in reacting 
to economic shocks as they share very similar economic backgrounds. 
 
The presence of ample foreign exchange assets has also safeguarded the exchange 
rate. Accordingly, GCC member countries also have similar interest rates structures as 
well. The role of monetary policy has been restricted due to both these factors.  As a 
result there has been a dependence on fiscal policy. Within the GCC nations, de facto 
monetary policy harmonization has been made possible through exchange, interest and 
inflation rate constancy. 
 
Asymmetrical performance has been showcased by public debt among the GCC 
nations, even though the economic constitution is almost same. Disparity in the 
magnitude and elements of public expenditures and income, in the acceptance of fiscal 
policy, and in the amount of prior shortfall or excess, are some of the reasons which can 
be seen to be responsible for the asymmetrical debt performance. The ratio of public 
debt to GDP in Saudi Arabia was 55% in 2010, while that for Bahrain and Qatar was 
50%.  Oman and UAE by comparison fared quite well with the ratio being around 30%9.  
 
The foreign oil market plays a significant role in the budgets of many GCC member 
states. As oil prices (and revenues) have declined, the authorities have had to reduce 
their expenditure and use money out of their foreign exchange reserves.  
 
The lack of progress in adopting currency union has occurred for two main reasons.  
First is the tension in the Middle East, particularly between Iran and GCC nations; and 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Second is the evidence of problems affecting the 
European Union. After observing the problems affecting the European Union and the 
Euro, GCC member states have been trying to decide whether currency union is still a 
                                            
9
 www.cia.gov/library/ - 2012 data 
82 
 
good idea. Each nation needs to believe that it has a part to play and that it still has a 
degree of sovereignty over its own affairs. Comparing the GCC and the EU, it can be 
seen that Bahrain and Oman are likely to behave in a  similar way to Spain, Italy, 
Portugal or Greece.  Economies such as Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are likely to more 
be self-reliant. And just like the case of Greece and the EU it will be the case that there 
will be economies amongst the GCC nations that will need the support of the others (in 
the GCC).  Saudi Arabia may well have to play the part played by Germany in the EU in 
coming to the rescue of distressed GCC economies. Will they be prepared to take on 
that role; and will the other member states be happy with it? 
 
Total integration of product and factor markets, according to the GCC nations, can be 
accomplished if transaction costs and doubts arising due to the presence of separate 
currencies are eradicated.  This would pave the path for a common currency and 
accomplish monetary assimilation (Laabas et. al. 2002). 
 
The economic gains from adopting a single currency over a large geographical region 
have been extensively investigated.  The theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) 
developed by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) amongst others, sets 
out the conditions needed to guarantee success.  The theory is often used to argue 
whether or not a group of countries are ready to form a currency union. Currency union 
is seen as one of the final stages of economic integration.  
 
The way in which the member nations behave towards each other with regards to labor 
(and also capital) market regulation is critical in determining labor mobility and price and 
wage flexibility.  These are crucial requirements for an OCA.  Also important are 
redistribution systems so that all members of the OCA feel equally treated. In theory, 
this is achieved using tax systems. However it rarely works in practice and breakdowns 
in currency unions frequently occur because the “richer” nations are not prepared to 
hand over monies to the “poorer” nations. This leads to resentment between members. 
It is often the case that this resentment arises because one country’s economy is 
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stronger and at a different point in the business cycle. The case of Greece in the 
European Union is a case in point with many of its partners refusing to help.  
 
The degree to which an OCA is acceptable is that it enables fixing of exchange rates. 
This facilitates trade and investment as any ambiguity over the exchange rates is 
eliminated.  
 
Analysis of the prerequisites needed for currency union and the investigation of how 
ready member states of GCC members are to undertake currency union are the main 
purpose of this chapter. Extensive use will be made of evidence from the European 
Union.  Learning from the Euro zone will reduce costly mistakes being made. Two 
approaches are taken. A formal statistical approach is undertaken using a model based 
on Generalised Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP) theory. A second, informal approach 
is also carried out. In both cases, recommendations based on the analysis of published 
statistical data are presented. 
 
The contents of this chapter can be summarized as follows: 
 
 A literature review defining the concept of an optimal currency area (OCA) and 
analysis of the criteria needed for successful implementation of it 
 Explanation of the methodology that underlies the statistical analysis 
 Comparison of intra-trading in the GCC with that in the Euro zone  
 GCC and OCA: a formal statistical approach using Generalised Purchasing 
Power Parity (G-PPP) theory 
 GCC and OCA: an informal approach using published statistical data and 
observation of other attempts at currency union to evaluate the readiness of GCC 
member states as a group to form an OCA. 
 Discussion of the impact of the Euro on the likelihood of adoption of currency 
union in the GCC 
 A recommendation on the way forward for the GCC. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
Monetary or currency union are all synonymous with OCA. Monetary amalgamation, 
one currency, and a common central bank responsible for the management of the 
foreign exchange reserve pool and governing the union’s monetary policy, are some of 
the features of an OCA. 
 
Mundell (1961) was one of the first researchers to look at optimal currency areas. His 
seminal paper in the American Economic Review laid out much of the theory now taken 
for granted by economists. McKinnon (1963) was the second paper, while the last paper 
of the series was by Kenen (1969). The attributes which the probable partners of a 
monetary union must have, for the purpose of making it possible to create a nationwide 
customized monetary policy and the modifications to the exchange rate of the national 
currency, are pointed out by these two authors.  
 
An OCA is desirable in that it allows exchange rates to be fixed. This reduces some of 
the uncertainties affecting trade and investment. Laabas et. al. (2002) also argues that it 
reduces the transaction charges associated with maintaining multiple exchange rates. 
Costs of monitoring exchange rate movements, costs of obtaining data needed to 
forecast changes in the exchange rate, costs associated with currency conversion and 
costs associated with managing reserves for intra-regional trade are all reduced. 
Additional benefits achieved from OCA are the creation of economies of scale by 
liberating unused reserves, and increasing the part played by money as a means of unit 
of account and payment.  Willet (2001) also suggests that the role that speculators  
have on influencing price is also controlled as a result of formation of an OCA 
 
Pisani-Ferry (2012) believes that the authority and reliability of monetary policy, 
particularly in nations that are inflation prone, can be aided by membership of an OCA. 
By linking monetary policy to a low inflation anchor currency, the trustworthiness of 
monetary policy can be increased. An illustration of this occurred during the 1970s when 
Italy, Spain and Portugal which had high inflation rates, wanted to anchor their 
exchanges to that of Germany, which had the image of being able to fight inflation. In 
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this scenario, weaker economies take up a common currency, peg their currencies to 
another stronger currency and gain the reliability of a fixed exchange rate system.  
However they lose the authority to modify their exchange rate. They concede that to the 
authorities of the stronger currency. 
 
The growth of bilateral trade between members is one of the major advantages of 
currency union. Rose (2000) suggests that under currency union, bilateral trade among 
member nations can increase threefold. Yeyati (2001) using a gravity model based on 
Rose (2000) found similar results.  Of perhaps more interest is the finding that the link 
between a common currency and bilateral trade flows is significantly stronger for 
common currency pairs comprising unilaterally dollarized countries than for members of 
a multilateral currency union.  However, Tenreyro (2001) argues that the magnitude of 
gain from currency union has been overstated. Sample selection (endogeneity) issues 
and omitted variable problems has result in flawed econometric estimation. Correcting 
for them, Tenreyro (2001) finds that that the enhancement effect is much reduced.. Data 
from Eurostat shows that intra-trading in the EU has gone up more than twice in the 
past decade.  This establishes the fact that Rose (2000) was justified in his assessment. 
 
The loss of control over monetary and exchange rate policy is one of the main 
drawbacks when forming an OCA. However, this particular element is not given that 
much attention as research has not been able to identify any negative influence on 
fluctuations in the exchange rate.  
 
The role of stabilizer which is quite significant in the economic modification is played by 
the instruments of monetary and exchange rate. Nations tend to do away with such 
significant policy tools, which leads to vital job and output losses, when they are 
occupied with hand-tying institutional planning like that of OCA.  
 
In the case of countries that rely on fiscal income, the price of policy freedom can be 
quite high, especially for nations with weak tax mechanisms. The cost of synchronizing 
policies is one of the most likely reasons for currency union breakdown. Levying 
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sanctions on violating nations is also expensive and difficult to achieve.  An OCA 
agreement can help ensure that member nations do not move outside or break the 
rules.  
 
Various lapses in the discussion above on the OCA theory have been pointed out by 
Corden (1972). It is definitely true that price stability results from monetary integration, 
and that openness of the economy further enhances it.  However an insulating role is 
played by the exchange rates. The earlier discussions presumed that the international 
prices and micro-oriented supply and demand movements were stagnant. However, 
they were shocks starting off in the foreign land and are macro type movements of 
exchange rate that are in a position to alienate the local currency from international 
shocks, enhancing the liquidity. As such the advantages to be acquired from monetary 
amalgamation are reliant on the suppositions done with regards to the disturbances to 
the system. These disturbances are structural micro shocks to the domestic economy. 
As per Corden, McKinnon’s argument for monetary amalgamation is relevant. The 
expenses of monetary amalgamation are likely to go up for greater openness, where 
they stand for international macro movements in expenses and prices. 
 
Ishiyama (1975) has, however argued that OCA theory is mainly an academic dialogue 
that has so far provided little contribution to exchange rate policy and monetary reform 
issues in the real world. 
 
The points raised by Mundell (1961) regarding the function of money illusion in finding 
out the efficiency of changes of exchange rate in keeping the internal balance, are 
simplified by Corden (1972). The said function of flexible exchange rates relies on the 
presumptions of actual wage flexibility and the money wage inflexibility. In the case of 
an exceptionally open economy, the real-wage flexibility might not be existing, and in 
such a situation the theory of money illusion becomes unacceptable to a large extent, 
which brings down the usefulness of exchange rate in managing the price control.    
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The expenses and advantages to the nation from various big aspects, which are of 
definite significance, are elaborated in detail by Tower et. al. (1976). The relative 
advantages of a flexible exchange rate regime, in comparison with the fixed exchange 
rate regime of an OCA are summarized using a graphical synthesis. It is shown that as 
openness increases the advantages from OCA also increase indicating that the two are 
directly related. The flexible exchange rate system and currency area determinants are 
varied and connect with the factors elaborated in the past. These factors include 
disturbance origination and size, efficacy of correction brought in by monetary policy, 
mobility of labor and capital, and elasticity of price. 
 
The above discussion has pointed out some of the advantages that currency union 
and/or optimum currency areas provide. The more important question concerns the 
requirements needed for formation of a currency union or optimum currency area. This 
analysis turns to discussion of the following criteria: 
 
 Factor mobility 
 Price and wage flexibility 
 Openness 
 Sources of external shocks 
 Product diversification 
 Production structures 
 Inflation convergence 
 
A significant role is also played by political elements in the success of a single currency 
area  
 
Agenor et. al. (2011) shows how within and cross-country capital market imperfections 
affect the welfare of forming a currency union. The study is based on the situation of a 
bank-only world, where the banks compete in Cournot fashion and where the expense 
of monitoring and state verification is high. The best possible number of banks before 
becoming a part of the union, and the credit market stability are found out in the first 
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part, while the advantages of becoming a part of currency union are debated in the next 
part.  
 
Lee et. al. (2012) considers the empirical desirability to East Asian nations of monetary 
union. The advantage of monetary union is that it provides exchange rate stability and 
credibility across the region. A particular qualification for formation of an OCA is that 
there should be symmetry in macroeconomic disturbances. It is found that the East 
Asian nations satisfy this. Using an approach based on a Bayesian State-Space based 
methodology they are the able to evaluate the suitability of monetary union. An 
economic model in which output is affected by three types of shock (international, 
regional and country specific) is used. The basis for a common regional currency will 
emerge from the significance of common regional shock. Regional and country specific 
cycles can be analysed along with the global business cycle, in this particular model. 
The significance of the shock’s disintegration is that analyzing a subset of nations can 
make a person suppose that the examined co-movement is specific to the subset of 
nations only, whereas the same might hold true for a bigger number of economies as 
well. For the purpose of taking decisions on policies, it is significant to comprehend the 
origin of movements in the global economy. The situation for creation of monetary union 
is ripe in East Asia, as the region factor role is going up, while that of country specific 
one is coming down. The expense of doing away with country specific currency and 
moving towards monetary union in the region of East Asia could be quite high, as the 
country specific factor still as a notable share and cannot be ignored.  
4.3 Methodology 
The first approach used for assessing the viability of forming an OCA is through the use 
of Generalized Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP) theory. This econometric time series 
based approach was first developed by Enders et. al. (1994). The main idea behind the 
approach starts from the fact that real exchange rates of countries that are potential 
candidates for currency union are non-stationary. This is due to the fact that 
macroeconomic variables that determine real exchange rates are also non-stationary. 
For countries to qualify for a successful currency area, they should experience 
convergence and symmetrical shocks to their fundamentals. The latter should move 
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together and be sufficiently interrelated so that the real exchange rates have common 
stochastic trends. Therefore, the theory advocates that real exchange rates within a 
currency area should be cointegrated. This means that bilateral real exchange rates of 
countries in the currency area should have at least one linear combination that is 
stationary. 
 
The G-PPP test consists of finding whether there are cointegrating vectors between the 
exchange rates of the members of the currency union. Put slightly differently, this 
chapter needs to test whether an equilibrium relationship exists between the different 
bilateral real exchange rates. It implies, for instance that: 
 
tntntt RERRERRER   111313012   (1) 
 
Where itRER1  is the real exchange rate between the base country and country i  in 
period t ; 0  is a constant term; ij  are the parameters of the cointegrating vector and 
represent linkages among the economies of the currency area, and t  is a white noise 
disturbance term. 
 
The real exchange rate series are constructed using two alternative base countries 
namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America (USA). 
The choice of KSA as a base country is obvious given the economic importance of the 
Saudi economy to the GCC.  It may also represent the dominant country in forming a 
successful currency area. However, the choice of the USA is also important and is 
chosen as the US dollar is closely  related with all of the GCC member state currencies 
 
The real exchange rates used are defined as follows: 
 
t
tt
t
P
PS
RER
*
  (2) 
90 
 
where tS  is the nominal exchange rate expressed as the number of national currency 
units exchanging for one unit of the currency of the base country. *tP  and tP  are the 
consumer price index in the base and home country respectively.  
 
The second approach is an informal one. This approach is based on defining the criteria 
that allow a country or group of countries to form an OCA. This approach analyses 
published statistics for the GCC economies and provides subjective recommendations 
on the way forward by evaluating the similarities and differences between them. The 
literature review above defined the different criteria that should be considered prior to 
forming a currency union. The following criteria are considered here: 
 
1. Trade openness 
2. Factor mobility 
3. Commodity diversification 
4. Similarity of production structure 
5. Price and wage flexibility 
6. Similarity of inflation rates 
7. Political factors 
4.4 European Economic Community vs. GCC Economic Community 
Since intra-trading is one of the main factors in defining whether a group of economies 
are ready to form a currency union it is important to review the GCC Economic 
Community (GCCEC) and compare it with the European Economic Community (EEC). 
 
The EEC has already gone through the process of monetary union.  As a result it can 
be used as a benchmark. 
 
The GCC countries in considering economic and monetary union initially compared 
themselves with member nations of the European Economic Community. The Arab 
Economic Community (AEC) was established in 1964 with the main objective of 
liberating intra-Arab trade.  A secondary objective was to liberate labor and capital 
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markets. However, as the AEC did not include all the Arab countries it lacked the ability 
to achieve its objectives. This was mainly due to the huge gap in financial and legal 
infrastructure existing between the different economies. Accordingly, the 1964 
experience was not a success for most of the Arab Countries10. 
 
In 1974, after revising oil prices and observing large increases in oil revenues, the Arab 
countries changed to a different approach based on economic cooperation. As a result 
various joint projects were undertaken between the Arab countries. The funding for 
these projects came mainly from the GCC with labor coming from all of the Arab 
countries. However these projects failed to deliver what was required.  During the 
1980’s the move toward political as well as economic union came with the creation of 
the GCC11.  Although political factors were the main driver for the establishment of the 
GCC, it was the economic development of GCC member nations, especially in terms of 
financial and legal infrastructure, that would be responsible for its success, at least 
when compared with previous experiences. 
 
The success of the EEC has forced the rest of the world, including the GCC, to 
reconsider the wisdom of undertaking economic and monetary union. The EEC 
experience is considered the best example of a fully functioning economic and 
monetary union since the Second World War and accordingly it will be uses as a basis 
for comparison. 
4.4.1 European Economic Community 
As a start, this chapter analyses the historical background behind formation of the 
European currency union. The euro became the common currency of the 11 Member 
States of the European Union (EU) in 1999 – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain - to be 
joined by Greece in 2000. The 12 were joined by Slovenia on January 1, 2007, Malta 
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and Cyprus on January 1, 2008, and Slovakia on January 1, 2009. Estonia was 
included as the 17th member of the Eurozone on January 1, 2011, and was admitted to 
it in September 2010. Following Slovenia and Slovakia, Estonia is the third former 
Communist state to join the Euro regime. It is, however, the first former Soviet republic 
to earn this honor. The remaining East European countries that were provided with EU 
membership by the Treaty of Rome in 2004 will become full members of the Eurozone 
after a process of scrutiny. Each must satisfy the terms of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, three of the original EU-15 countries, 
continue to be outside the Eurozone. However, Sweden and Denmark have limited 
exchange rate fluctuations with the euro. The United Kingdom has a different story. Its 
economic structure and its relatively small share of world GDP have become an issue. 
The declining share of the United Kingdom's pound sterling as an international reserve 
currency warrants much critical evaluation.12 
 
The modern European Union was formed initially on the basis of economic needs and 
was the vision of Robert Schumann and Jean Monnet. This vision led to the formation of 
the EEC - European Economic Community (or Common Market) in 1958. Through the 
Treaty of Rome. In 1993 came the European Community with the Maastricht Treaty; 
and in 2009 the European Union with the Lisbon Treaty. The European Union (EU) now 
is now involved in a wide range of political as well as economic matters13. 
 
The EU is considered the most developed economic community in the world and it has 
managed to promote intra-trading between its members to such a level that it now 
represents the bulk of trading for these economies. It is also by far the largest when 
compared to other economic communities. Intra-trading activities represented around 
66% of total foreign trading of the EU in 2008. The EU is currently considered the 
largest exporter in the world accounting for 15.9% of total international exports in 2009.  
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At the same time, it was also the largest importer accounting for 18.3% of total 
international imports according to the WTO. 
 
Table 4.2: Intra-Trading Activities for Selected Economic Communities (2009) 
Economic Community 
Intra-Exports as 
a % of Total 
Exports 
Intra-Imports as 
a % of Total 
Imports 
European Union 67.40% 63.50% 
GCC 6.00% 6.20% 
Arab  Economic Community 8.30% 11.10% 
MERCOSUR 15.10% 17.10% 
ASEAN 25.50% 24.40% 
 Source: International Trade Statistics 2010 
 
At the same time, and in order to maximize intra-trading between EU member states, 
the EU imposed stringent restrictions on the quality of industrial and agriculture products 
imported from outside the EU. According to the World Bank GEP 2005, this increased 
intra-trading between the EU member states by reducing international trading with non-
EU countries. However, the EU has been forced to reduce these under the pretense 
that by so doing it is liberating international trade. This has been none more than in 
agricultural products that affect the wellbeing of small and medium economies, and the 
developing countries in particular. 
4.4.2 GCC Economic Community 
Economic integration between a group of countries is achieved after a number of steps 
have taken place. The first and initial step is the creation of a free trade zone. This 
liberates trade between members of the group and those outside the group. To achieve 
it requires the removal of customs duties and tariffs levied on goods and services levied 
especially on those within fellow members of the group. The free trade zone is usually 
followed by creation of an economic community.  
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4.4.2.1 Movement of products and output; 
Although the value of intra-trading between GCC member states increased five-fold 
between 1982 and 2009 its share in intra-trading remained at 6% for most of the period. 
However, over the same period, non-oil intra-exports between the GCC almost tripled in 
size compared to intra-exports of oil. Chart 4.1 below shows this relationship for 200914. 
 
Chart 4.1: GCC Non-oil Intra-Exports as a % of Total Exports (2009) 
 
Source: UNSTATS 2010 
 
Another indication of the development of intra-trading within the GCC can be obtained 
by looking at import penetration.  Chart 4.2 shows total imports as a percentage of GDP 
over the period 1981-2008.  The chart shows that the ratio was consistently in excess of 
20% from 1981 to 2003; and rose steadily beyond that level during the boom period 
2003 to 2008. However, intra-import trade between GCC member states has remained 
fixed at 2-3% for the last 30 years. 
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 IMF, Direction of Trade statistics and Arab Economic Report  
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Chart 4.2: Comparison of GCC International Imports as a % of GDP  
and GCC Intra-imports as a % of GDP (1981 - 2008) 
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade statistics. Arab Economic Report 
 
4.4.2.2 Movement of services 
Restriction on the movement of services has been reduced to some extent by allowing 
banks, financial institutions and other organizations of one GCC member state to 
operate in another GCC member state without facing severe restriction. However, the 
licensing needed by GCC nationals to operate in another GCC nation has increased 
rapidly during the last few years with government and other discretionary measures 
(such as negative lists that limit investment by companies across the member states of 
the GCC) becoming more prevalent. 
 
At the same time, policies concerned with nationalization and reducing public sector 
monopoly have improved the competition environment in the GCC. This has also 
encouraged intra-investment between the GCC countries in sectors, such as 
telecommunication, education, infrastructure and healthcare. 
4.4.2.3 Movement of capital 
Capital movement between GCC member states has not been an issue over the last 
few decades. The GCC has, however, been required through international regulation, to 
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enforce more stringent rules on those moving capital. This has taken place in an 
attempt to reduce money laundering which has affected a number of GCC member 
states during the last few years. In addition one of the major items on the radar of the 
GCC economic council for the last ten years has been the movement of foreign capital 
between the GCC member states.  Agreement on a single framework for regulation of 
foreign investment in the GCC has been a top priority. 
4.4.2.4 Movement of labor 
Although there is no restriction on the movement of GCC nationals between GCC 
member states, the movement of labor within the GCC is still one of the most awkward 
issues in moving towards an efficient economic community. All the GCC countries are 
heavily dependent on foreign workers. Foreign workers represent around 32% of the 
labor force in Saudi Arabia15; and almost 85% in the UAE16. Liberating the movement of 
labor within the GCC requires the consideration of foreign workers as well as GCC 
nationals. At the same time there is a major difficulty in that GCC member states vary 
widely in terms of their labor law, pension fund and social security arrangements. It all 
indicates that serious work still has to be done to achieve unrestricted, free movement 
of labor within the GCC. 
 
The objective of the above analysis has been to evaluate the basic requirements 
needed to reach full economic integration.  By looking at what the GCC has achieved to 
date it is concluded that the GCC has already achieved a lot.  However it is still a long 
way away from delivering what is required. 
 
The trading structure of the GCC, where oil and gas exports to industrialised countries 
outside the GCC, represents the bulk of exports has forced the GCC to rely heavily on 
imports for most of their needs and especially for heavy industrial products. Accordingly, 
intra-trading between member states of the GCC remains limited and a long way away 
from reaching the standards attained by the EU. 
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Some of the GCC member states have worked hard since its inception to diversify their 
export portfolios.  Some have actually managed to achieve it in a limited way by adding 
petrochemicals, aluminum, steel and cement to their export portfolios, as per the AMF.  
 
By the beginning of this century, the GCC leaders had taken a series of major decisions 
towards moving to full economic integration and economic union taking into 
consideration the establishments of major Economic Union as a main driver toward the 
formation of a union that will include the GCC.  
 
These major decisions can be summarised as follows: 
 The proposed formation of a customs union in 2003, which has since been 
achieved.  It is currently working properly in terms of allowing the management of 
trade between the GCC and international market; 
 Another decision was to form the GCC Economic Community in 2008. The legal 
establishment of the community has been delivered, but the expected outcome 
from it is still a long way off. A clear example of this is that the ratio of GCC intra-
trading to total international trading is still below 10% as per table 4.2.  Compare 
that with the EU where the ratio is in excess of 60%.The GCC Economic 
Community still has a long way to go to reach what is required. 
 Full currency union by 2010.  To date it has not been achieved, and still requires 
further serious work if it is to be achieved.  
4.4.3 Comparison of the EEC experience with the GCCEC experience  
There are major differences between the EEC and GCCEC in terms of reasons behind 
the formation of the two communities, methods for liberating intra-trading between the 
member countries, the legal framework and managing the integration.  
 
The major points of comparison that need to be discussed in this chapter are the 
following: 
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4.4.3.1 Reasons behind the formation of the Economic Community 
The EEC, founded in 1957 was based on economic drivers and designed to achieve 
political stability in Europe. It had started with creation of the European Steel and Coal 
Community in 1951. This saw an alliance between German and French coal and steel 
producers.  The member states granted powers to the authorities in charge to prevent 
the resources of the two countries being used to manufacture military products and 
weapons of mass destruction17. On the other hand, the objective of forming the GCC 
was based on pure political drivers in order to achieve economic objectives. Taking into 
consideration the political situation in the Middle East, the rationale behind formation of 
the GCCEC was to gain strength in the wake of the Arab spring and GCC-Iran conflict. 
In both cases the motivation was always political, but in the case of the EEC the 
economic integration that followed saw the growth of product diversification while in the 
case of the GCCEC diversification and integration of products has not occurred. 
 
The above indicates that the EEC was established to become a successful experience 
after achieving political stability in Europe, taking into consideration the integration 
between the member countries. In contrast, the GCCEC is taking a risk by assuming 
that the political needs of its member states will lead to economic integration. 
4.4.3.2 Differences in intra-trading structure  
The EEC’s main objective was to free the movement of goods between its member 
states. This was an eminently achievable target as intra-trading between member states 
prior to the formation of the EEC was already heavily dependent on intra-industry 
trading. The objective then of forming the European Custom Union (ECU) was to 
facilitate the (free) movement of goods between member states – which is one of the 
prime motives for establishment of a customs union! On the other hand the GCC 
member states took the decision to try and free the movement of goods and services 
between member states in order to encourage the development of the industrial sector.  
Hopefully, increases in intra-trading would lead to further diversification.  Revenues 
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would no longer depend on the export of oil and gas. Intra-trading between  GCC 
member states was minimal at that time and even after the formation of the GCC 
Custom Union in 2003, intra-trading between GCC member states failed to grow much.  
This experience has not been comparable to the European case. This indicates that the 
GCC member states have failed to reduce their dependence on oil production and 
diversify by expanding production elsewhere. 
 
As highlighted above, the European experience is not the only benchmark to be used as 
a basis of analysis in measuring the benefits of union. Freeing the movement of goods 
is a very important indicator to the success of any union, but it is not the only factor that 
should be taken into consideration in deciding whether it is successful or not. For the 
GCC and taking into consideration the economic structure of its member states, it is 
better that they focus on freeing services, labor and financial markets without waiting for 
policy changes affecting the goods market to bear fruit. 
4.4.3.3 Economic Integration management and regulations 
This is one of the major factors differentiating the European experience from the GCC 
experience. In both cases, the nations involved have shown serious commitment to 
economic community, integration, economic and even currency union. In the European 
case, that commitment was translated into action by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that 
saw the creation of various supervising authorities. The objective of establishing these 
authorities was not only to manage and enhance cooperation between member states 
but also to convert these supervising authorities into supranational institutions. It 
indicates that the power invested in these authorities exceeds the national power of the 
member states. For example, the European Union includes execution, political and 
jurisdiction authorities as represented by the European Commission, European Council 
and European Court of Justice. These authorities have played a major role in allowing 
the EEC and EU to achieve full economic integration. 
 
On the other hand, GCC member states have not relinquished their powers.  There is 
no single independent entity that acts as a supranational institution. The GCC member 
states have only ceded negotiation rights to the GCC to negotiate on their behalf.  This 
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then reflects the main difference between the GCC experience and EU experience. In 
both cases it has been the differences in legislation that have led to this 
 
If the GCC is keen to achieve its economic and political objectives through economic 
union and progress to the stage of launching a single currency then it will need to form 
independent authorities that can enforce decisions made by them on all GCC member 
states. These authorities will also have to be provided with realistic, achievable targets 
that enforceable action can deliver.  Only then will it be able to reach and achieve the 
objective of the economic and political union. 
4.4.3.4 Political conditions during the formation of the Economic Community 
The political power of the European Union has helped it enforce tough sanctions on all 
member states attempting to conduct trade outside its jurisdiction.  The sanctions 
available are designed to encourage intra-trading between member states. For 
example, the EU has imposed stringent conditions on agricultural products imported 
from outside the EU, and especially from the developing countries. This has led EU 
member states to rely heavily on, and expand their intra-trading with other members of 
the EU rather than with the rest of the world.  
4.5 Empirical Work 
There has not been much movement in GCC member states exchange rates over the 
last thirty years as they have largely operated under fixed exchange rate systems 
pegged to the US dollar. Fluctuations in the currencies of a majority of GCC member 
states have not occurred.  For instance, the Bahraini Dinar has remained stagnant since 
1981 at 0.377 BD to the US dollar.  By way of a comparison, the Kuwaiti Dinar, fixed to 
a basket of currencies, has seen some movement but only then over a very small 
range. 
 
Testing whether the exchange rates of GCC member states have fluctuated significantly 
can be achieved using the General Purchasing Parity Power (G-PPP) methodology 
described earlier.  Chart 4.3 shows real exchange rates for GCC member states over 
the period 1960-2010.  The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are presented in 
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Table 4.3 for both nominal and real exchange rates. They show that on applying the test 
to the first differences of nominal and real exchange rates, it is rejected at 5% level. 
Hence the two series are integrated at order one.  
 
On applying the ADF stationarity test to a bigger sample size, it is found out that the 
GCC nominal rates are fluctuating, although from 1980s onwards there appears that the 
GCC nominal exchange rates are constant. It can be attributed to the movement in 
nominal exchange rates before the 1980s. In comparison to the US dollar, the 
fluctuation of GCC currencies is quite less with regards to the SAR. In comparison to 
the nominal exchange rates, the real exchange rates determined for both the base 
economies i.e. USA and KSA, demonstrate greater fluctuation.  
 
Table 4.3: ADF Stationarity Tests of GCC Exchange Rates 
Country 
Base Country USA Base Country KSA 
Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Level 
1st 
Difference 
Level 
1st 
Difference 
Level 
1st 
Difference 
Level 
1st 
Difference 
Bahrain 
           
(0.98) 
           
(3.62) 
           
(0.51) 
           
(2.88) 
           
(0.32) 
           
(2.72) 
           
(0.65) 
           
(4.12) 
Kuwait 
           
(0.72) 
           
(3.98) 
              
0.75  
           
(4.92) 
              
0.12  
           
(5.21) 
           
(0.59) 
           
(3.31) 
Oman 
              
0.14  
           
(3.38) 
           
(1.02) 
           
(3.29) 
              
1.33  
           
(4.21) 
           
(0.41) 
           
(6.52) 
Qatar 
           
(1.40) 
           
(3.44) 
              
0.82  
           
(2.77) 
           
(0.62) 
           
(2.44) 
           
(0.19) 
           
(1.98) 
KSA 
           
(0.69) 
           
(3.52) 
           
(1.30) 
           
(2.08) 
                  
-    
                  
-    
                  
-    
                  
-    
UAE 
           
(1.56) 
           
(3.72) 
              
1.44  
           
(3.66) 
           
(0.61) 
           
(3.12) 
           
(0.51) 
           
(3.12) 
Source: Computed using Eviews 
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Chart 4.3: GCC Real Exchange Rate to the US$ 
(1960–2010) 
 
Bahrain Kuwait 
  
Qatar Oman 
  
Saudi Arabia UAE 
  
Source: Nominal GDP from Arab Monetary Fund statistics – Real GDP calculated by the author 
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Having established stationarity or nonstationarity, cointegration analysis is then carried 
out. The procedure used is similar to that used in Chapter 3 above. 
 
In determining the parameters of the cointegration relationships, the lag length of the 
VAR or Vector Autoregressive model fundamental to the long-run relationship exhibited 
by equation (1) in the methodology needs to be determined. Testing with higher order 
VAR models could not be carried out because of the small sample size and data 
availability problems. It was found that a VAR (1) appears most appropriate. 
 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of relevant cointegration test results.  The presence of 
three cointegrating vectors is confirmed by the trace test.  If the maximum eigenvalue 
statistic (λ) is used instead then four cointegrating vectors are confirmed.  This disparity 
(or conflict) between test results is not unknown.  The hypothesis that there are three 
cointegrating vectors or less is accepted (since the tests were carried out at a 
significance level of 90%.) 
Table 4.4: Testing for Cointegration 
 
                
      Trace           
H0 H1 Stat. 90% CV H0 H1 Stat. 90% CV λ 
r = 0 r > 0 
     
194.40  
        
96.20  r = 0 r = 1 
     
100.43  
        
25.25  0.995 
r ≤ 1 r > 1 
        
93.97  
        
70.94  r = 1 r = 2 
        
39.23  
        
21.52  0.876 
r ≤ 2 r > 2 
        
54.74  
        
49.41  r = 2 r = 3 
        
25.23  
        
17.85  0.739 
r ≤ 3 r > 3 
        
29.50  
        
31.56  r = 3 r = 4 
        
16.13  
        
13.95  0.576 
r ≤ 4 r > 4 
        
13.37  
        
17.61  r = 4 r = 5 
          
8.42  
        
10.19  0.361 
r ≤ 5 r > 5 
          
5.00  
          
7.50  r = 5 r = 6 
          
5.00  
          
7.50  0.231 
 
Based on the above results, there are two cointegrating vectors. The estimates of the 
cointegrating vectors (β) and the associated adjustment coefficients vectors (α) are 
presented in Table 4.5 below. 
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Table 4.5: Cointegration and Adjustment Vectors* 
  Constant Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE 
β1 -1.593 -0.453 -1.593 -1.593 -1.593 -1.593 -1.593 
α1 - 
-0.277 -0.164 -0.006 -0.118 -0.415 -0.057 
-7.656 -2.258 -0.024 -4.201 -13.217 -1.113 
β2 1.865 -0.304 1.550 -0.573 -0.639 1.000 -1.455 
α2 - 
-0.056 -0.047 0.620 0.010 0.129 0.171 
-1.808 -0.752 3.090 0.393 4.789 3.842 
                
 * The cointegration vectors are normalized so that Saudi Arabia’s exchange rate is the reference. 
T-values are highlighted in grey 
 
While the β coefficients may be interpreted as long-term elasticity, the α’s are 
adjustment coefficients indicating the speed of adjustment toward long-term equilibrium. 
 
Overall, the presence of cointegrating relationships is a formal proof that G-PPP holds 
and that member states of the GCC meet the requirements necessary for formation of a 
currency union. However, cointegration is a statistical concept and it is often very 
difficult to provide a sound economic interpretation to all of the cointegrating 
relationships. In the above case, the first cointegrating vector on the grounds that all 
adjustment coefficients have the appropriate negative sign. The exchange rates of all 
GCC member states except Oman enter this cointegrating relationship significantly. The 
zero restriction Likelihood Ratio test for the Omani exchange rate could not be rejected 
at the 95% level. This may reflect the fact that Oman is the least favorable candidate for 
currency union. This interpretation is compatible with the relatively low correlation 
between the macroeconomic fundamentals of Oman and those of the other GCC 
member states. 
 
Furthermore, the α’s for Oman and the UAE are very small and show that there is a 
slow adjustment to equilibrium in the sense that deviations from G-PPP can persist for a 
relatively long period of time. Differences in the adjustment speed may also reflect 
differences in country circumstances that would call for different policy measures. From 
this perspective, Oman and UAE may be considered less homogeneous than the rest of 
the GCC member states. 
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It should be noted that many G-PPP-based tests in the literature reject the OCA 
hypothesis. This occurs despite having stronger correlations between forcing variables 
than those observed in the case of GCC.  
4.6 CC Countries and OCA 
There are many reasons for the formation of an OCA. An OCA provides the member 
states under that OCA a number of advantages. But are member states of the GCC 
ready for it? The analysis below provides some of the answers. 
4.6.1 Trade openness 
The GCC member states are considered among some of the largest oil exporters in the 
world. At the same time, all GCC member states are heavily reliant on imported goods 
and services, due to the limited availability of domestic produced substitutes, and 
inability or unwillingness of consumers to pay the higher prices needed to purchase 
them. This has resulted in member states of the GCC being among some of the most 
open economies around the world. Table 4.6 shows more detail. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, market openness is one of the most important criteria in determining 
whether a country or a group of countries are ready to form an OCA. Accordingly, and 
since most of the GCC member states are ranked at the top end of the scale, it is 
concluded that it is favorable for these countries to enter into currency union. 
 
Table 4.6: GCC Market Openness and Benchmarks (1980-2010) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011 & Global Finance Magazine 2010 
Year Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE USA Germany France
1980 226.5      90.0         84.6         90.9         89.0         96.1         
1985 169.0      75.6         77.1         68.9         52.7         69.3         
1990 164.2      56.5         67.7         70.0         65.5         83.3         
1995 131.9      77.5         68.7         84.5         61.1         85.4         
2000 109.4      72.5         70.0         74.2         55.5         87.0         
2005 95.6         69.4         69.0         71.0         68.3         81.2         
2010 73.6         67.7         67.7         69.0         64.1         67.3         78.0         71.1         64.2         
Average 138.6      72.7         72.1         75.5         65.2         81.4         
2010 Ranking 12            43            44            39            65            47            8               23            62            
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4.6.2 Factor mobility 
Factor mobility as discussed earlier consists of adjusting and removing restrictions on 
factor markets – especially capital and labor – so that they work more efficiently. Much 
of the legal framework is in place for the capital market. The labor market is, however, 
more problematic. Implementation of regulations and creation of the appropriate 
authorities/infrastructure within GCC member states has largely been neglected.  
 
One concern is that factor mobility is considered one of the most important factors 
defining whether or not an OCA is achievable.  If it is not possible to reform factor 
markets sufficiently then it may stop any idea of currency union dead in its tracks. What 
can be said is that there is still a long way to go for the GCC member states in order to 
satisfy the conditions needed to form and join a currency union. 
4.6.3 Commodity diversification 
Although most of the GCC member states have been trying hard over the last ten years 
to diversify their export portfolios, oil and gas still represent the bulk of exports for most 
of them. On average around 70% of the exports of these economies are oil related. 
Saudi Arabia has worked to encourage its manufacturing sector; the UAE has become a 
leisure and hospitality center (especially after the 2008 crisis.) However, oil is still the 
dominant commodity.  Table 4.7 below shows that export concentration is still very high 
when compared with the rest of the world. 
 
Table 4.7: Export Concentration Indices (1995 & 2010) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (1999) & Arab Monetary Fund (2011) 
Country 1995 2010
Bahrain 0.629    0.559    
Kuwait 0.940    0.826    
Oman 0.765    0.642    
Qatar 0.731    0.796    
Saudi Arabia 0.743    0.824    
United Arab Emirates 0.619    0.583    
Turkey 0.112    0.103    
Brasil 0.088    0.093    
Korea 0.148    0.124    
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4.6.4 Similarity of production structure 
In general, the GCC member states have an almost identical production structure where 
oil and gas dominate. The non-oil sector is limited to trade and financial services. GDP 
distribution by sector is detailed in Table 4.8 below and shows the degree of similarity in 
economic activity between GCC member states. Since these economies are dominated 
by oil, a shock in the price of oil will result in similar outcomes across all of the GCC 
member states.  As a result almost identical (common) policy reactions will follow. This, 
actually, is a factor working in favor of currency union for the GCC member states, as it 
encourages formation of an overarching financial regulator and Central Bank to manage 
overall policy.  The GCC is well placed in this regard as the GCC central bank was 
established in Riyadh in 2010. However it is not yet effective in terms of setting and 
controlling monetary policy. 
 
Table 4.8: GDP Components By Sector (2009) 
GDP components Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE 
Agriculture and fishing 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.1 3.1 1.1 
Mining and quarrying 21.6 45.5 41.3 46.7 43.0 23.5 
Manufacturing 16.0 5.4 10.3 8.0 10.7 14.9 
Electricity, gas and water 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.8 
Construction 5.3 1.9 6.8 7.3 5.1 8.0 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels 
10.8 4.4 10.2 6.8 6.1 21.4 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
7.5 8.4 6.1 6.4 4.1 6.3 
Financial institutions  13.2 9.9 2.3 4.8 3.1 5.4 
Real estate and business 
services 
6.7 6.2 5.2 5.0 4.7 10.2 
Community social and 
Government services 
12.3 13.4 7.3 12.6 16.6 5.1 
Other services 4.9 3.4 7.8 1.2 2.5 2.2 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Economic Statistics Bulletin of Arab Countries 2011 
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4.6.5 Price and wage flexibility 
One of the main reasons for the GCC member states countries to consider a more 
flexible exchange regime is the lack of useful monetary tools under the current pegged 
regime. During the period between 2004 and 2008 the only way for the GCC 
governments to respond to rapid inflation, caused by excess liquidity resulting from 
increases in oil prices, was to increase the wages of public sector employees. 
Accordingly, wages in the public sector doubled, possibly tripled, between 2004 and 
2008. The private sector was then forced to follow suit in order to stay competitive. 
Since the 2008 crisis most private sector companies have cut their costs. They also 
responded to changes in their markets.  However the public sector did not react in the 
same way and a large gap between the wages paid to workers in the two sectors 
developed. In general, it is concluded that the GCC member states do not 
systematically adjust prices and wages in response to external shocks, especially oil 
prices. The adjustment is mainly related to the way the shocks affect the private sector  
4.6.6 Similarity of inflation rates 
In general and taking into consideration the similarity between GCC member states it is 
obvious that oil prices have a direct impact on the rate of inflation. Inflation rates pick up 
when oil prices rise; and decrease when oil prices fall. However, the internal economic 
policies within the GCC countries affect the speed with which oil price changes affect 
inflation. This is clear from analysis of Table 4.9 below. 
 
 Table 4.9: GCC Inflation Correlation Coefficients (2000–2010) 
 
Source: Computed by the author using excel. Raw data sourced from Economic Statistics Bulletin for 
Arab Countries, Arab Monetary Fund (2011) 
  Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE 
Bahrain       1.00        0.70  
     
(0.12)       0.55        0.78        0.51  
Kuwait         1.00        0.70        0.56        0.51        0.92  
Oman           1.00        0.16        0.38        0.95  
Qatar             1.00        0.49        0.84  
Saudi               1.00        0.58  
UAE                 1.00  
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4.6.7 Political factors 
Taking into consideration the current political status of the Middle East in general and 
the GCC in particular, the leaders of the GCC member states are definitely moving 
toward a more inclusive economic and political integration. This was clearly stated by 
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia during the GCC committee meeting in 2012. He 
confirmed the commitment towards full integration at both an economic and political 
level; and called on the leaders of GCC member states to consider a union rather than a 
cooperative council in order to prevent external threats on the GCC, especially from 
neighboring Iran. The leaders of the GCC believe that the road map that was set out in 
2003 to reach economic integration is working well, since the necessary legal and 
structural framework is in place. However, it seems that there is still a long way to go in 
order to achieve what is required. 
 
Assuming that the above seven factors are considered as an informal test for the 
eligibility of GCC member states to form a currency union, the current status can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Table 4.10: Eligibility for Currency Union 
Eligibility Criteria for Currency Union Decision 
Trade openness Eligible 
Factor mobility Not eligible 
Commodity diversification Not eligible 
Similarity of production structure Eligible 
Price and wage flexibility Not eligible 
Similarity of inflation rates Not eligible 
Political factors Eligible 
 
Table 4.10 above provides sufficient evidence to show that GCC member states are still 
not ready to move to a currency union. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
In the formal, empirical approach using time series econometric methods, it is found that 
G-PPP holds for the case of the GCC. This rather unconventional result can be 
rationalized putting aside data limitations and modeling difficulties, by the fact that GCC 
represent a rare case where exchange rates are stable and anchored strongly to the US 
dollar and inflation rates are relatively similar. This result, however, does not prevent 
forcing variables from drifting apart and should not be interpreted as a sign of 
convergence among the economies of the GCC. The success of GCC monetary union 
requires greater policy coordination and synchronization to be undertaken, and further 
steps taken to create a single market where all restrictions on the movement of goods 
and factors of production are removed. 
 
At the same time, the informal approach suggests that the GCC countries are not yet 
ready to form a currency union or become an OCA.  As highlighted above, being unable 
to liberate the movements of good, services, labor and capital might be a major obstacle 
to the creation of a lasting currency union. 
 
In the case of the European Union, which is still the best benchmark for other future 
economic unions, the resulting economic performance of some of the EU countries such 
as Greece, Spain and Portugal post 2008 was largely the result of insufficient 
monitoring and supervision by the authorities in charge. Although the infrastructure for 
the supervisory and monitoring authorities was in place and considered effective, the 
performance of some of the economies within the EU has threatened the very existence 
of it! 
 
This having been said, it will be quite risky for the GCC countries to go ahead and form 
a currency union or OCA without having the required framework and authorities to 
monitor, supervise and enforce the mutual and common requirements of all the states 
making up the union. Some economists believe that since Saudi Arabia is the leading 
economy by far when compared to the other member states, it will be able to bail out 
the poorer performing members of the GCC.  This could be close to reality, but it may 
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not be sustainable and it may prevent healthy relationships between member states 
developing. 
 
Accordingly, and based on all the above, it is recommended that the GCC countries 
improve their infrastructure prior to consideration of the final step of full union.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this research was to provide an initial recommendation to the GCC 
member states on alternative regime policies that could be adopted, taking into account 
the effects that changing the dollarization regime would have on the private sector. 
Another aim of this research was to evaluate the eligibility of GCC member states to 
form an OCA and assess their preparedness in respect of the single currency that was 
due to have been launched in 2010. 
 
At the start, an overview of each of the economies of the GCC member states and a 
comparison to other nations was presented to make the research more attractive to 
readers not familiar with the Middle East and the GCC in particular. 
 
The research has also provided taxonomy of the different exchange regimes as 
categorized by the IMF.  It carefully distinguished between de facto and de jure 
exchange rate regimes. 
 
The research has provided answers to the initial questions asked by using both formal 
statistical approaches and informal statistical approaches. The outcome of these 
questions is summarized in this chapter.  
5.2 Summary and Recommendations of the Research 
The chapters of this thesis provide answers to each of the questions asked earlier. In 
Chapter 2, the question was whether member states of the GCC should move to a 
different exchange rate regime. A logit model was constructed to provide 
recommendations based on two different snapshots in time. The view of Velasco (2000) 
that a dollarization regime may not necessarily be the most suitable for all developing 
nations is validated. Also, the view of Duttagupta et. al. (2005) confirmed that assuming 
technical knowhow and infrastructure are available, a decision to float is recommended. 
Hoffman (2007) view as well was proved that a floating regime is better to manage 
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external shocks. This was clear following the 2008 financial crisis and its effects on the 
GCC.  
 
On the other hand, views like Hausmann et. al. (1999), Ghosh et. al. (1996), Burnside 
et. al. (2001) and Caramazza et. al. (1998) that support a fixed regime for small 
economies in order to manage inflation and be under the umbrella of a major currency, 
with no monetary tools, are rejected in this research. It is essential that the exchange 
regime used by economies with special characteristics, such as the member states of 
the GCC, are evaluated differently. This is exactly what Chapter 2 delivered. 
 
In Chapter 3 standard time series methodology was adopted. However it was very 
challenging as there has been very little published research looking into the relationship 
between the stock market and exchange rate for the Gulf nations.  Even though the 
selection of economies to be tested and used as benchmarks was done in a way that 
can be challenged as being subjective, the main finding is that variations in the 
exchange rate affect the stock market. In the short run, the effect is minimal, and in the 
long run the effects are manageable. This outcome was in accordance with Frankel et. 
al. (2007), Tian et. al. (2010) and Dornbush et. al. (1980). On the other hand, the 
outcome didn’t comply with other researchers such as Bartram et. al. (2012), Nieh et. al. 
(2002) and Tsai (2012) who are of the view that this relation between the stock market 
and exchange rate doesn’t exist 
 
In Chapter 4, a contradiction between the two approaches was found.  A formal 
statistical approach using General Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP) theory provides 
the recommendation that the GCC member states should form an optimal currency area 
(OCA). This move is supported by researchers like Laabas et. al. (2002), Rose (2000) 
and Pisani-Ferry (2012) who believe that a single currency union will increase intra-
trading, liberate reserves, and increase the trust of the union economies. On the other 
hand, the informal approach based on the work of Mundell (1961) looks at the 
conditions necessary to achieve the OCA and reaches the reverse conclusion.  
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Assuming that the outcome of the research needs to be summarized in a few lines for 
senior officials and decision makers in the GCC, the following can be concluded: 
 
1. The GCC current dollarization regime policy has to be reconsidered, as it is the 
least efficient exchange rate regime currently available to GCC member states. 
2. There are many alternative exchange rate regimes available that should be 
considered.  It is not necessary to accept either extremes - fixed or floating. 
3. Further investigations will be required for all types of intermediate floating and 
fully floating regime to evaluate which is the most appropriate for GCC member 
states. 
4. The possibility of currency union will need to be taken into account when 
evaluating plans relating to the choice of a future exchange rate regime. 
5. Assuming a more flexible regime is adopted, domestic exchange rates of GCC 
member states are expected to change. This change will have a minimal short-
run and positive long-run effect on local stock markets. 
6. It is very important to manage properly announcements of decisions relating to 
the adoption of a different exchange rate regime.  After 30 years of using the 
same fixed exchange rate regime such announcements can have unexpected 
effects.  Instability may result in the flight of capital which is damaging. This will 
have a negative influence on GCC member states’ economies in the long-run. 
7. The political motivation to form a currency union has to provide economic 
benefits to the member states of the GCC in order for it to be successful and 
sustainable. 
8. It is essential to have the required infrastructure in place before forming a 
currency union rather than rushing into it and having to set it up afterwards. 
9. The Euro experience is still a fresh experience that has been into different 
economic cycles. Unnecessary failures and mistakes in the future can be 
avoided by digging into the details of the Euro experience. 
10. The benefits of currency union are expected to differ across member states. This 
may cause problems if a feeling of unfairness arises. However, the long-run 
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political and economic outcomes from currency union are well worth the 
sacrifices that member states may suffer at the start. 
5.3 Limitation of the Study 
The limitations of this research can be summarized as follows: 
1. Political influence in determining the choice of exchange rate regime of a 
developing economy can play a significant role. In some cases the economic 
benefits from adoption of a new exchange regime are very clear.  However the 
political repercussions from taking such a decision may be unbearable. 
2. One of the main obstacles in this research was data availability for the GCC 
member states. As many of the member states are developing economies, with 
minimal track record in historical data, and may lack the means to arrange the 
efficient collection and validation of data, reliability of data become an issue.  
Whilst official government sources were uses at all times, the researcher also 
had to use data from non-governmental sources as well. This may have an 
impact on the findings reported in this research. 
3. The limited options available for benchmarking other economies with the GCC in 
Chapter 3 gave a preference to economies that may not be considered ideal. 
The initial objective was to have developing economies with similar 
characteristics to the GCC economies, especially in terms of being heavily 
dependent on oil as a source of income. However, none of these economies 
managed to meet the requirements to be among the benchmark countries. 
4. The recommendation made in the Chapter 4 is heavily dependent on the 
informal approach rather than the formal empirical work. This might create 
confusion to the reader of this research if he/she is not familiar with the 
economic (and political) landscape of the Middle East and the GCC member 
states in particular. 
5.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
Each chapter in this research, other than the introduction and conclusion, is considered 
by itself a contribution to knowledge. In the same time, some additions and/or 
alternatives are recommended for further studies in relation to the same subject.  
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In Chapter Two, a statistical approach is developed using basic economic indicators to 
determine whether the existing exchange rate regime of an economy is optimal or not. 
The equation used in this Chapter allows any economy, even from outside the sample, 
to test whether they should follow a fixed or a floating regime. This equation is 
changeable on yearly basis and accordingly the outcome might change subject to the 
significant variables and their coefficients. The technique and methodology used in this 
Chapter, in terms of linking some economic indicators to the exchange regime decision, 
are original and used for the first time in a research or a publication. 
 
This approach assumes that the country or group of countries tested make their 
decisions on choice of optimal exchange rate regime by assuming that the rest of the 
sampled countries are following their optimal regimes. The limitation of this approach is 
that it takes into consideration large and influential economies in the sample as well as 
some very small ones. Whilst the sample is still random, this may influence results since 
no weighting is considered for any of the countries based on economy size. 
 
Chapter Three has tested the relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the 
domestic stock market indices in GCC member states, although the nominal exchange 
rate is pegged to the USD for more than 30 years. A comparison approach has been 
adopted in this Chapter with economies that have similar economic criteria with the 
GCC in order to conclude on the relationship for the GCC. 
 
In Chapter Four, the contribution to knowledge comes in the form of a recommendation 
whether the GCC countries should enter formal currency union or not. Investigation of 
whether prerequisites for currency union are satisfied and analysis of how well placed 
the GCC member nations are undertaken. The contribution to knowledge in this Chapter 
was developed by using the G-PPP approach in economies that are adopting 
“dollarization” regime since the early 1980’s. This approach was used for the first time in 
this research for economies with no fluctuation in nominal exchange rate. 
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For further studies in relation to the same subject, a further expansion in the number of 
economic indicators used is recommended. In this research, six economic indicators 
were used to praise the exchange regime, where three indicators were significant in 
each snapshot. The used approach was helpful and managed to recommend an initial 
strategy for the research. However, assuming additional indicators that are reflective of 
wealth and openness are used, a better granular recommendation can be concluded 
from the research.  
 
Also and for further studies in the future, it will be recommended to limit the sample 
selections in Chapter Two to countries with similar economic criteria rather than 
increasing the number of the sampled countries and randomly select the sample. For 
sure, further data availability is recommended at an early stage. 
 
In Chapter Three, it is recommended for further studies to evaluate the relationship 
between real exchange rate and the stock market in the GCC, rather than evaluating 
this relationship in other economies with similar criteria with the GCC. The risks 
associated with this recommendation are related to data accuracy when calculating real 
exchange rate for the GCC economies, especially that historical inflation data are 
scattered for the GCC countries, and discrepancies have appeared when collecting 
these data. 
 
Overall, this research provides general recommendations for the GCC economies on 
the way forward, without the absolute confirmation that unpegging the currency and/ or 
the currency union decision is the sole option available. Accordingly and for further 
studies in the future, further qualitative meetings with decision makers in the GCC are 
recommended. 
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Table A1.1: Unit Root Test - Log of JPY/USD (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LJU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.345763  0.9139 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473672  
 5% level  -2.880463  
 10% level  -2.576939  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LJU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:22   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07  
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LJU(-1) -0.007127 0.020612 -0.345763 0.7300 
D(LJU(-1)) -0.034113 0.083381 -0.409123 0.6830 
D(LJU(-2)) 0.123259 0.076259 1.616335 0.1082 
D(LJU(-3)) 0.047220 0.075347 0.626705 0.5318 
D(LJU(-4)) -0.121083 0.075281 -1.608421 0.1099 
C -0.030391 0.096737 -0.314157 0.7539 
     
     R-squared 0.038062    Mean dependent var 0.003060 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005119    S.D. dependent var 0.029258 
S.E. of regression 0.029183    Akaike info criterion -4.191753 
Sum squared resid 0.124345    Schwarz criterion -4.072389 
Log likelihood 324.5732    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.143263 
F-statistic 1.155383    Durbin-Watson stat 1.948895 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.334076    
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Table A1.2: Unit Root Test - Log of RRB/USD (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LRU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.178866  0.0232 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473672  
 5% level  -2.880463  
 10% level  -2.576939  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LRU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 04:16   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07  
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LRU(-1) -0.063895 0.020100 -3.178866 0.0018 
D(LRU(-1)) 0.382991 0.079640 4.809046 0.0000 
D(LRU(-2)) -0.089189 0.075089 -1.187776 0.2369 
D(LRU(-3)) 0.153988 0.052819 2.915403 0.0041 
D(LRU(-4)) -0.001854 0.044952 -0.041254 0.9671 
C -0.214112 0.067277 -3.182536 0.0018 
     
     R-squared 0.366381    Mean dependent var -0.002659 
Adjusted R-squared 0.344682    S.D. dependent var 0.027756 
S.E. of regression 0.022469    Akaike info criterion -4.714672 
Sum squared resid 0.073710    Schwarz criterion -4.595308 
Log likelihood 364.3151    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.666182 
F-statistic 16.88446    Durbin-Watson stat 2.006723 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1.3: Unit Root Test - Log of BRR/USD (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LBU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.480715  0.1222 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473672  
 5% level  -2.880463  
 10% level  -2.576939  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LBU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07  
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LBU(-1) -0.060846 0.024528 -2.480715 0.0142 
D(LBU(-1)) 0.000562 0.081417 0.006898 0.9945 
D(LBU(-2)) 0.026438 0.081318 0.325113 0.7456 
D(LBU(-3)) -0.014616 0.081328 -0.179710 0.8576 
D(LBU(-4)) 0.061451 0.081314 0.755725 0.4510 
C -0.048412 0.019641 -2.464840 0.0149 
     
     R-squared 0.044135    Mean dependent var -0.001701 
Adjusted R-squared 0.011400    S.D. dependent var 0.068893 
S.E. of regression 0.068499    Akaike info criterion -2.485320 
Sum squared resid 0.685050    Schwarz criterion -2.365956 
Log likelihood 194.8843    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.436830 
F-statistic 1.348247    Durbin-Watson stat 2.006155 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.247390    
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Table A1.4: Unit Root Test - Log of NIKKEI (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNIK has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.006721 0.2838 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473672  
 5% level  -2.880463  
 10% level  -2.576939  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNIK)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:53   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07  
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LNIK(-1) -0.039475 0.019671 -2.006721 0.0466 
D(LNIK(-1)) 0.114414 0.081042 1.411784 0.1601 
D(LNIK(-2)) 0.076940 0.081484 0.944240 0.3466 
D(LNIK(-3)) 0.127446 0.081535 1.563082 0.1202 
D(LNIK(-4)) 0.028412 0.080000 0.355153 0.7230 
C 0.369901 0.185454 1.994565 0.0480 
     
     R-squared 0.055237 Mean dependent var -0.002727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022882 S.D. dependent var 0.058960 
S.E. of regression 0.058281 Akaike info criterion -2.808399 
Sum squared resid 0.495919 Schwarz criterion -2.689035 
Log likelihood 219.4383 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.759909 
F-statistic 1.707226 Durbin-Watson stat 1.956912 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.136480    
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Table A1.5: Unit Root Test - Log of RTS (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LRTS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.880832 0.3406 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473672  
 5% level  -2.880463  
 10% level  -2.576939  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LRTS)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:53   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07  
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LRTS(-1) -0.017721 0.009422 -1.880832 0.0620 
D(LRTS(-1)) 0.228311 0.081073 2.816129 0.0055 
D(LRTS(-2)) -0.043031 0.082319 -0.522738 0.6019 
D(LRTS(-3)) 0.009442 0.079903 0.118171 0.9061 
D(LRTS(-4)) 0.100566 0.069478 1.447455 0.1499 
C 0.129154 0.061204 2.110230 0.0365 
     
     R-squared 0.086550 Mean dependent var 0.021803 
Adjusted R-squared 0.055268 S.D. dependent var 0.119135 
S.E. of regression 0.115796 Akaike info criterion -1.435304 
Sum squared resid 1.957664 Schwarz criterion -1.315940 
Log likelihood 115.0831 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.386814 
F-statistic 2.766722 Durbin-Watson stat 1.943933 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.020301    
     
     
 
 
 
 
136 
 
Table A1.6: Unit Root Test- Log of BOVESPA (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LBOV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.353532 0.6036 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473672  
 5% level  -2.880463  
 10% level  -2.576939  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LBOV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:54   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07  
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LBOV(-1) -0.013327 0.009846 -1.353532 0.1780 
D(LBOV(-1)) 0.067693 0.080615 0.839713 0.4024 
D(LBOV(-2)) 0.037876 0.080528 0.470344 0.6388 
D(LBOV(-3)) 0.011216 0.080602 0.139153 0.8895 
D(LBOV(-4)) 0.119348 0.072353 1.649531 0.1012 
C 0.145238 0.100461 1.445714 0.1504 
     
     R-squared 0.033758 Mean dependent var 0.012626 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000668 S.D. dependent var 0.083021 
S.E. of regression 0.082994 Akaike info criterion -2.101429 
Sum squared resid 1.005643 Schwarz criterion -1.982065 
Log likelihood 165.7086 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.052939 
F-statistic 1.020183 Durbin-Watson stat 1.839600 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.408000    
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Table A1.7: Unit Root Test - Log of return on JPY/USD (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RJU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.379902 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473967  
 5% level  -2.880591  
 10% level  -2.577008  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RJU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07  
Included observations: 151 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RJU(-1) -1.236938 0.167609 -7.379902 0.0000 
D(RJU(-1)) 0.200227 0.146751 1.364400 0.1746 
D(RJU(-2)) 0.253366 0.125294 2.022179 0.0450 
D(RJU(-3)) 0.285500 0.105004 2.718941 0.0073 
D(RJU(-4)) 0.155920 0.072948 2.137423 0.0342 
C 0.343062 0.236400 1.451192 0.1489 
     
     R-squared 0.544302 Mean dependent var -0.027137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.528589 S.D. dependent var 4.121573 
S.E. of regression 2.829848 Akaike info criterion 4.957247 
Sum squared resid 1161.165 Schwarz criterion 5.077139 
Log likelihood -368.2721 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.005953 
F-statistic 34.63868 Durbin-Watson stat 1.980054 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1.8: Unit Root Test - Log of return on RRB/USD (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RRU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.887600 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473967  
 5% level  -2.880591  
 10% level  -2.577008  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RRU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07  
Included observations: 151 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RRU(-1) -0.603014 0.087551 -6.887600 0.0000 
D(RRU(-1)) -0.022430 0.086045 -0.260675 0.7947 
D(RRU(-2)) -0.057902 0.079403 -0.729215 0.4670 
D(RRU(-3)) -0.007956 0.047583 -0.167211 0.8674 
D(RRU(-4)) 0.004694 0.045020 0.104270 0.9171 
C -0.052277 0.189915 -0.275265 0.7835 
     
     R-squared 0.375611 Mean dependent var 0.109709 
Adjusted R-squared 0.354080 S.D. dependent var 2.855178 
S.E. of regression 2.294683 Akaike info criterion 4.537990 
Sum squared resid 763.5074 Schwarz criterion 4.657882 
Log likelihood -336.6183 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.586697 
F-statistic 17.44538 Durbin-Watson stat 2.015972 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1.9: Unit Root Test - Log of return on BRR/USD (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RBU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.154574 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473967  
 5% level  -2.880591  
 10% level  -2.577008  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RBU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:57   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07  
Included observations: 151 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RBU(-1) -0.972941 0.188753 -5.154574 0.0000 
D(RBU(-1)) -0.048493 0.169480 -0.286129 0.7752 
D(RBU(-2)) -0.039801 0.145472 -0.273602 0.7848 
D(RBU(-3)) -0.073581 0.118717 -0.619805 0.5364 
D(RBU(-4)) -0.027378 0.083125 -0.329357 0.7424 
C -0.159263 0.572061 -0.278402 0.7811 
     
     R-squared 0.513139 Mean dependent var 0.007042 
Adjusted R-squared 0.496350 S.D. dependent var 9.883485 
S.E. of regression 7.014139 Akaike info criterion 6.772657 
Sum squared resid 7133.731 Schwarz criterion 6.892549 
Log likelihood -505.3356 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.821363 
F-statistic 30.56522 Durbin-Watson stat 1.608065 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1.10: Unit Root Test - Log of return on NIKKEI (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RNIK has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.270030 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473967  
 5% level  -2.880591  
 10% level  -2.577008  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RNIK)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:57   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07  
Included observations: 151 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RNIK(-1) -0.806427 0.153021 -5.270030 0.0000 
D(RNIK(-1)) -0.077452 0.142277 -0.544374 0.5870 
D(RNIK(-2)) -0.011636 0.128240 -0.090734 0.9278 
D(RNIK(-3)) 0.091593 0.107722 0.850278 0.3966 
D(RNIK(-4)) 0.083387 0.080162 1.040240 0.3000 
C -0.184652 0.479369 -0.385199 0.7007 
     
     R-squared 0.450605 Mean dependent var 0.049186 
Adjusted R-squared 0.431660 S.D. dependent var 7.788661 
S.E. of regression 5.871741 Akaike info criterion 6.417103 
Sum squared resid 4999.214 Schwarz criterion 6.536995 
Log likelihood -478.4913 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.465810 
F-statistic 23.78532 Durbin-Watson stat 2.005137 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1.11: Unit Root Test - Log of return on RTS (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RRTS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.521636 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473967  
 5% level  -2.880591  
 10% level  -2.577008  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RRTS)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:57   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07  
Included observations: 151 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RRTS(-1) -0.796750 0.144296 -5.521636 0.0000 
D(RRTS(-1)) 0.051934 0.134567 0.385933 0.7001 
D(RRTS(-2)) 0.034289 0.115883 0.295894 0.7677 
D(RRTS(-3)) 0.006817 0.088630 0.076912 0.9388 
D(RRTS(-4)) 0.064259 0.069775 0.920951 0.3586 
C 1.856889 0.998411 1.859844 0.0649 
     
     R-squared 0.388055 Mean dependent var 0.147623 
Adjusted R-squared 0.366953 S.D. dependent var 14.58767 
S.E. of regression 11.60657 Akaike info criterion 7.779944 
Sum squared resid 19533.32 Schwarz criterion 7.899836 
Log likelihood -581.3858 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.828651 
F-statistic 18.38984 Durbin-Watson stat 2.037040 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1.12: Unit Root Test - Log of return on BOVESPA (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RBOV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.773373  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.473967  
 5% level  -2.880591  
 10% level  -2.577008  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RBOV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 03:58   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07  
Included observations: 151 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     RBOV(-1) -0.917383 0.158899 -5.773373 0.0000 
D(RBOV(-1)) 0.039554 0.147031 0.269019 0.7883 
D(RBOV(-2)) 0.079202 0.125824 0.629469 0.5300 
D(RBOV(-3)) 0.095119 0.102619 0.926919 0.3555 
D(RBOV(-4)) 0.109495 0.070714 1.548432 0.1237 
C 1.298815 0.695216 1.868218 0.0637 
     
     R-squared 0.470178    Mean dependent var 0.120338 
Adjusted R-squared 0.451908    S.D. dependent var 10.90423 
S.E. of regression 8.072753    Akaike info criterion 7.053790 
Sum squared resid 9449.554    Schwarz criterion 7.173682 
Log likelihood -526.5612    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.102497 
F-statistic 25.73537    Durbin-Watson stat 1.900074 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1.13: Cointegration test - Log of JPY/USD and Log of NIKKEI (1998-2011) 
 
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 19:10   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07   
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LJU LNIK     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None  0.032497  5.214631  15.49471  0.7856 
At most 1  0.001269  0.193034  3.841466  0.6604 
     
      Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None  0.032497  5.021596  14.26460  0.7391 
At most 1  0.001269  0.193034  3.841466  0.6604 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
     
     LJU LNIK    
 1.289781  4.345787    
 9.214638  0.974802    
     
          
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
     
     D(LJU) -0.000638 -0.001000   
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D(LNIK) -0.009333  0.000807   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  556.2193  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LJU LNIK    
 1.000000  3.369398    
  (1.47994)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LJU) -0.000823    
  (0.00306)    
D(LNIK) -0.012037    
  (0.00603)    
     
     
 
 
Table A1.14: Cointegration test - Log of RRB/USD and Log of RTS (1998-2011) 
 
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 19:15   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07   
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LRU LRTS     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.095589  22.72512  15.49471  0.0034 
At most 1 *  0.047853  7.453400  3.841466  0.0063 
     
      Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
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None *  0.095589  15.27172  14.26460  0.0345 
At most 1 *  0.047853  7.453400  3.841466  0.0063 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
     
     LRU LRTS    
-10.56792  0.587386    
-4.114159 -1.036753    
     
          
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
     
     D(LRU)  0.006766 -0.000266   
D(LRTS)  0.014944  0.022374   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  499.8572  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LRU LRTS    
 1.000000 -0.055582    
  (0.02880)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LRU) -0.071502    
  (0.01849)    
D(LRTS) -0.157926    
  (0.09945)    
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Table A1.15: Cointegration test - Log of BRR/USD and Log of BOVESPA  
(1998-2011) 
 
Date: 08/27/11   Time: 19:19   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07   
Included observations: 152 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LBU LBOV     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.146307  26.38660  15.49471  0.0008 
At most 1  0.015294  2.342673  3.841466  0.1259 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.146307  24.04393  14.26460  0.0011 
At most 1  0.015294  2.342673  3.841466  0.1259 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
     
     LBU LBOV    
-4.209546  1.593946    
 2.743507  0.880326    
     
          
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
     
     D(LBU)  0.024622 -0.000862   
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D(LBOV)  0.007464 -0.009683   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  388.9437  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LBU LBOV    
 1.000000 -0.378650    
  (0.07742)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LBU) -0.103649    
  (0.02115)    
D(LBOV) -0.031419    
  (0.02838)    
     
     
 
Table A1.16: VAR test (4 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Date: 08/28/11   Time: 03:19 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07 
 Included observations: 152 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) -0.009443 -0.096124 
  (0.08576)  (0.17137) 
 [-0.11011] [-0.56091] 
   
RJU(-2)  0.109864 -0.206109 
  (0.07801)  (0.15589) 
 [ 1.40828] [-1.32217] 
   
RJU(-3)  0.055480  0.296710 
  (0.07677)  (0.15340) 
 [ 0.72268] [ 1.93421] 
   
RJU(-4) -0.130194 -0.154679 
  (0.07806)  (0.15598) 
 [-1.66783] [-0.99163] 
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RNIK(-1)  0.048880  0.116011 
  (0.04283)  (0.08559) 
 [ 1.14112] [ 1.35539] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.050030  0.021992 
  (0.04206)  (0.08405) 
 [-1.18938] [ 0.26165] 
   
RNIK(-3)  0.018164  0.151964 
  (0.04190)  (0.08373) 
 [ 0.43346] [ 1.81484] 
   
RNIK(-4)  0.030381 -0.036809 
  (0.04151)  (0.08295) 
 [ 0.73189] [-0.44376] 
   
C  0.312346 -0.180338 
  (0.24177)  (0.48311) 
 [ 1.29191] [-0.37329] 
   
    R-squared  0.059615  0.075339 
 Adj. R-squared  0.007006  0.023609 
 Sum sq. resids  1215.587  4853.674 
 S.E. equation  2.915580  5.825957 
 F-statistic  1.133174  1.456400 
 Log likelihood -373.6904 -478.9131 
 Akaike AIC  5.035400  6.419909 
 Schwarz SC  5.214446  6.598954 
 Mean dependent  0.306009 -0.272710 
 S.D. dependent  2.925848  5.895973 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  265.4324 
 Determinant resid covariance  234.9302 
 Log likelihood -846.2632 
 Akaike information criterion  11.37188 
 Schwarz criterion  11.72998 
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Table A1.17: VAR test (3 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:28 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M11 2011M07 
 Included observations: 153 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) -0.077228  0.030853 
  (0.07884)  (0.15682) 
 [-0.97961] [ 0.19674] 
   
RJU(-2)  0.072014 -0.161004 
  (0.07745)  (0.15406) 
 [ 0.92987] [-1.04510] 
   
RJU(-3)  0.070209  0.285266 
  (0.07765)  (0.15446) 
 [ 0.90418] [ 1.84682] 
   
RNIK(-1)  0.031489  0.124323 
  (0.04212)  (0.08379) 
 [ 0.74753] [ 1.48367] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.039122  0.021807 
  (0.04237)  (0.08428) 
 [-0.92339] [ 0.25874] 
   
RNIK(-3)  0.034766  0.119246 
  (0.04156)  (0.08267) 
 [ 0.83658] [ 1.44249] 
   
C  0.251412 -0.197715 
  (0.24376)  (0.48489) 
 [ 1.03140] [-0.40775] 
   
    R-squared  0.035410  0.054060 
 Adj. R-squared -0.004230  0.015186 
 Sum sq. resids  1276.486  5051.141 
 S.E. equation  2.956865  5.881909 
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 F-statistic  0.893283  1.390646 
 Log likelihood -379.3868 -484.6129 
 Akaike AIC  5.050808  6.426312 
 Schwarz SC  5.189456  6.564959 
 Mean dependent  0.269678 -0.210268 
 S.D. dependent  2.950631  5.927086 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  277.6760 
 Determinant resid covariance  252.8490 
 Log likelihood -857.4538 
 Akaike information criterion  11.39155 
 Schwarz criterion  11.66885 
   
   
 
Table A1.18: VAR test (2 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:29 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M10 2011M07 
 Included observations: 154 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) -0.037024  0.025252 
  (0.08317)  (0.15480) 
 [-0.44519] [ 0.16313] 
   
RJU(-2)  0.059158 -0.169408 
  (0.08305)  (0.15458) 
 [ 0.71232] [-1.09591] 
   
RNIK(-1)  0.026247  0.113184 
  (0.04513)  (0.08399) 
 [ 0.58164] [ 1.34753] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.076036  0.029556 
  (0.04422)  (0.08232) 
 [-1.71933] [ 0.35906] 
   
C  0.340495 -0.110611 
  (0.25988)  (0.48371) 
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 [ 1.31022] [-0.22867] 
   
    R-squared  0.031569  0.024120 
 Adj. R-squared  0.005571 -0.002079 
 Sum sq. resids  1504.665  5212.873 
 S.E. equation  3.177802  5.914873 
 F-statistic  1.214290  0.920659 
 Log likelihood -394.0282 -489.7054 
 Akaike AIC  5.182185  6.424746 
 Schwarz SC  5.280787  6.523348 
 Mean dependent  0.368557 -0.201289 
 S.D. dependent  3.186691  5.908736 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  334.2097 
 Determinant resid covariance  312.8601 
 Log likelihood -879.4563 
 Akaike information criterion  11.55138 
 Schwarz criterion  11.74859 
   
   
 
Table A1.19: Vector ECM (4 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS  
(1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:31 
 Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07 
 Included observations: 151 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   RRU(-1)  1.000000  
   
RRTS(-1) -0.125979  
  (0.03870)  
 [-3.25501]  
   
C  0.548476  
   
   Error Correction: D(RRU) D(RRTS) 
   
   CointEq1 -0.735512 -1.294846 
  (0.09962)  (0.56629) 
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 [-7.38346] [-2.28652] 
   
D(RRU(-1))  0.022575  1.239677 
  (0.09232)  (0.52481) 
 [ 0.24453] [ 2.36213] 
   
D(RRU(-2)) -0.070471  0.474591 
  (0.08116)  (0.46137) 
 [-0.86831] [ 1.02866] 
   
D(RRU(-3)) -0.088738 -0.009714 
  (0.05508)  (0.31310) 
 [-1.61117] [-0.03103] 
   
D(RRU(-4)) -0.059302 -0.133762 
  (0.05002)  (0.28436) 
 [-1.18553] [-0.47040] 
   
D(RRTS(-1)) -0.076602 -0.747622 
  (0.01906)  (0.10835) 
 [-4.01924] [-6.90036] 
   
D(RRTS(-2)) -0.046426 -0.546332 
  (0.01915)  (0.10884) 
 [-2.42488] [-5.01963] 
   
D(RRTS(-3)) -0.000955 -0.351586 
  (0.01776)  (0.10098) 
 [-0.05376] [-3.48157] 
   
D(RRTS(-4))  0.005231 -0.138588 
  (0.01532)  (0.08709) 
 [ 0.34146] [-1.59128] 
   
C  0.134226  0.047714 
  (0.18292)  (1.03983) 
 [ 0.73381] [ 0.04589] 
   
    R-squared  0.429611  0.293861 
 Adj. R-squared  0.393204  0.248788 
 Sum sq. resids  697.4750  22539.98 
 S.E. equation  2.224102  12.64350 
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 F-statistic  11.79999  6.519713 
 Log likelihood -329.7888 -592.1950 
 Akaike AIC  4.500514  7.976093 
 Schwarz SC  4.700334  8.175913 
 Mean dependent  0.109709  0.147623 
 S.D. dependent  2.855178  14.58767 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  709.2161 
 Determinant resid covariance  618.3907 
 Log likelihood -913.7670 
 Akaike information criterion  12.39427 
 Schwarz criterion  12.83387 
   
   
 
Table A1.20: Vector ECM (3 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS  
(1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:32 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07 
 Included observations: 152 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   RRU(-1)  1.000000  
   
RRTS(-1) -0.253400  
  (0.04029)  
 [-6.28893]  
   
C  0.921847  
   
   Error Correction: D(RRU) D(RRTS) 
   
   CointEq1 -0.567756  0.357299 
  (0.08464)  (0.46964) 
 [-6.70786] [ 0.76079] 
   
D(RRU(-1)) -0.110616  0.243202 
  (0.08066)  (0.44758) 
 [-1.37132] [ 0.54337] 
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D(RRU(-2)) -0.196878 -0.073353 
  (0.05422)  (0.30086) 
 [-3.63102] [-0.24381] 
   
D(RRU(-3)) -0.078076 -0.020884 
  (0.05162)  (0.28642) 
 [-1.51252] [-0.07291] 
   
D(RRTS(-1)) -0.109137 -0.502945 
  (0.02149)  (0.11921) 
 [-5.07963] [-4.21882] 
   
D(RRTS(-2)) -0.068040 -0.341614 
  (0.01923)  (0.10672) 
 [-3.53769] [-3.20111] 
   
D(RRTS(-3)) -0.018538 -0.200042 
  (0.01616)  (0.08967) 
 [-1.14713] [-2.23089] 
   
C  0.166104 -0.005486 
  (0.18861)  (1.04654) 
 [ 0.88067] [-0.00524] 
   
    R-squared  0.390209  0.298819 
 Adj. R-squared  0.360566  0.264734 
 Sum sq. resids  765.1679  23557.91 
 S.E. equation  2.305139  12.79049 
 F-statistic  13.16377  8.766838 
 Log likelihood -338.5110 -598.9722 
 Akaike AIC  4.559355  7.986477 
 Schwarz SC  4.718507  8.145628 
 Mean dependent  0.072372 -0.122720 
 S.D. dependent  2.882699  14.91643 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  713.3664 
 Determinant resid covariance  640.2513 
 Log likelihood -922.4587 
 Akaike information criterion  12.37446 
 Schwarz criterion  12.73255 
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Table A1.21: Vector ECM (2 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
 (1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:33 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M11 2011M07 
 Included observations: 153 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   RRU(-1)  1.000000  
   
RRTS(-1) -0.328348  
  (0.04101)  
 [-8.00744]  
   
C  1.172775  
   
   Error Correction: D(RRU) D(RRTS) 
   
   CointEq1 -0.392889  1.069378 
  (0.06433)  (0.34311) 
 [-6.10760] [ 3.11668] 
   
D(RRU(-1)) -0.099236  0.447554 
  (0.05435)  (0.28989) 
 [-1.82588] [ 1.54387] 
   
D(RRU(-2)) -0.193852 -0.202293 
  (0.05075)  (0.27069) 
 [-3.81975] [-0.74732] 
   
D(RRTS(-1)) -0.090375 -0.273500 
  (0.01955)  (0.10430) 
 [-4.62175] [-2.62228] 
   
D(RRTS(-2)) -0.050596 -0.130762 
  (0.01657)  (0.08838) 
 [-3.05338] [-1.47946] 
   
C  0.169808 -0.101886 
  (0.19485)  (1.03930) 
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 [ 0.87148] [-0.09803] 
   
    R-squared  0.345687  0.286157 
 Adj. R-squared  0.323432  0.261877 
 Sum sq. resids  843.7536  24004.57 
 S.E. equation  2.395792  12.77875 
 F-statistic  15.53264  11.78553 
 Log likelihood -347.7154 -603.8481 
 Akaike AIC  4.623731  7.971870 
 Schwarz SC  4.742572  8.090711 
 Mean dependent  0.033732 -0.158494 
 S.D. dependent  2.912684  14.87387 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  733.5029 
 Determinant resid covariance  677.1013 
 Log likelihood -932.8085 
 Akaike information criterion  12.37658 
 Schwarz criterion  12.65388 
   
   
 
Table A1.22: Vector ECM (4 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA  
(1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:34 
 Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2011M07 
 Included observations: 151 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   RBU(-1)  1.000000  
   
RBOV(-1) -0.977237  
  (0.13236)  
 [-7.38320]  
   
C  1.454495  
   
   Error Correction: D(RBU) D(RBOV) 
   
   CointEq1 -0.648873  0.533066 
  (0.15267)  (0.19412) 
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 [-4.25029] [ 2.74608] 
   
D(RBU(-1)) -0.428258 -0.577997 
  (0.14556)  (0.18509) 
 [-2.94205] [-3.12279] 
   
D(RBU(-2)) -0.294223 -0.511306 
  (0.13390)  (0.17026) 
 [-2.19731] [-3.00308] 
   
D(RBU(-3)) -0.195866 -0.445913 
  (0.11257)  (0.14313) 
 [-1.74003] [-3.11543] 
   
D(RBU(-4)) -0.088077 -0.242179 
  (0.07888)  (0.10030) 
 [-1.11656] [-2.41453] 
   
D(RBOV(-1)) -0.296535 -0.206831 
  (0.14495)  (0.18431) 
 [-2.04580] [-1.12221] 
   
D(RBOV(-2)) -0.215537 -0.048289 
  (0.12635)  (0.16066) 
 [-1.70583] [-0.30056] 
   
D(RBOV(-3)) -0.237214  0.054604 
  (0.10183)  (0.12948) 
 [-2.32951] [ 0.42172] 
   
D(RBOV(-4)) -0.197418  0.115222 
  (0.06608)  (0.08402) 
 [-2.98779] [ 1.37142] 
   
C  0.019864  0.071798 
  (0.55659)  (0.70772) 
 [ 0.03569] [ 0.10145] 
   
    R-squared  0.551138  0.403791 
 Adj. R-squared  0.522487  0.365735 
 Sum sq. resids  6576.946  10633.59 
 S.E. equation  6.829715  8.684210 
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 F-statistic  19.23642  10.61049 
 Log likelihood -499.2002 -535.4739 
 Akaike AIC  6.744373  7.224820 
 Schwarz SC  6.944193  7.424640 
 Mean dependent  0.007042  0.120338 
 S.D. dependent  9.883485  10.90423 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  2778.745 
 Determinant resid covariance  2422.887 
 Log likelihood -1016.869 
 Akaike information criterion  13.75986 
 Schwarz criterion  14.19946 
   
   
 
Table A1.23: Vector ECM (3 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA  
(1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:34 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2011M07 
 Included observations: 152 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   RBU(-1)  1.000000  
   
RBOV(-1) -0.060731  
  (0.11983)  
 [-0.50680]  
   
C  0.264602  
   
   Error Correction: D(RBU) D(RBOV) 
   
   CointEq1 -0.955560 -0.823658 
  (0.17127)  (0.22162) 
 [-5.57934] [-3.71656] 
   
D(RBU(-1)) -0.146322  0.582102 
  (0.15317)  (0.19820) 
 [-0.95527] [ 2.93689] 
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D(RBU(-2)) -0.074490  0.368996 
  (0.12598)  (0.16302) 
 [-0.59126] [ 2.26347] 
   
D(RBU(-3)) -0.055304  0.115066 
  (0.08435)  (0.10915) 
 [-0.65563] [ 1.05420] 
   
D(RBOV(-1))  0.166885 -0.799281 
  (0.06270)  (0.08113) 
 [ 2.66175] [-9.85186] 
   
D(RBOV(-2))  0.122928 -0.541261 
  (0.07253)  (0.09386) 
 [ 1.69482] [-5.76698] 
   
D(RBOV(-3))  0.016929 -0.298148 
  (0.05684)  (0.07355) 
 [ 0.29783] [-4.05363] 
   
C  0.020280 -0.160107 
  (0.54538)  (0.70572) 
 [ 0.03718] [-0.22687] 
   
    R-squared  0.556047  0.449906 
 Adj. R-squared  0.534466  0.423165 
 Sum sq. resids  6505.020  10892.09 
 S.E. equation  6.721142  8.697096 
 F-statistic  25.76551  16.82476 
 Log likelihood -501.1688 -540.3439 
 Akaike AIC  6.699589  7.215051 
 Schwarz SC  6.858741  7.374203 
 Mean dependent  0.007352 -0.172264 
 S.D. dependent  9.850705  11.45113 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3144.747 
 Determinant resid covariance  2822.433 
 Log likelihood -1035.204 
 Akaike information criterion  13.85795 
 Schwarz criterion  14.21604 
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Table A1.24: Vector ECM (2 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA  
(1998-2011) 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 09/01/11   Time: 00:35 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M11 2011M07 
 Included observations: 153 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   RBU(-1)  1.000000  
   
RBOV(-1) -0.415112  
  (0.09048)  
 [-4.58790]  
   
C  0.790344  
   
   Error Correction: D(RBU) D(RBOV) 
   
   CointEq1 -1.109809 -0.101683 
  (0.15940)  (0.23375) 
 [-6.96231] [-0.43500] 
   
D(RBU(-1)) -0.046109 -0.076326 
  (0.12619)  (0.18505) 
 [-0.36540] [-0.41246] 
   
D(RBU(-2)) -0.019851 -0.102188 
  (0.08216)  (0.12048) 
 [-0.24162] [-0.84815] 
   
D(RBOV(-1)) -0.111899 -0.596719 
  (0.07676)  (0.11256) 
 [-1.45783] [-5.30134] 
   
D(RBOV(-2)) -0.021324 -0.185378 
  (0.05864)  (0.08599) 
 [-0.36366] [-2.15590] 
   
C  0.010647 -0.043424 
  (0.54119)  (0.79362) 
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 [ 0.01967] [-0.05472] 
   
    R-squared  0.550837  0.291981 
 Adj. R-squared  0.535560  0.267899 
 Sum sq. resids  6581.353  14152.79 
 S.E. equation  6.691122  9.812110 
 F-statistic  36.05514  12.12431 
 Log likelihood -504.8568 -563.4306 
 Akaike AIC  6.677866  7.443538 
 Schwarz SC  6.796707  7.562378 
 Mean dependent  0.007168 -0.082142 
 S.D. dependent  9.818248  11.46771 
   
    Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3753.503 
 Determinant resid covariance  3464.883 
 Log likelihood -1057.703 
 Akaike information criterion  14.00919 
 Schwarz criterion  14.28649 
   
   
 
Table A1.25: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI  
(1998-2011) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 08/28/11   Time: 03:28 
Sample: 1998M07 2011M07 
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     RNIK does not Granger Cause RJU  152  0.84932 0.4962 
 RJU does not Granger Cause RNIK  1.78466 0.1351 
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Table A1.26: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS  
(1998-2011) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 08/28/11   Time: 03:29 
Sample: 1998M07 2011M07 
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     RRTS does not Granger Cause RRU  152  2.83750 0.0266 
 RRU does not Granger Cause RRTS  1.10039 0.3588 
    
    
 
Table A1.27: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(1998-2011) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 08/28/11   Time: 03:30 
Sample: 1998M07 2011M07 
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     RBOV does not Granger Cause RBU  152  4.30262 0.0026 
 RBU does not Granger Cause RBOV  1.02790 0.3950 
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Appendix (A2) 
 
Sample (07:1998 – 01:2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Table A2.1: Unit Root Test - Log of JPY/USD (1998-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LJU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.849012 0.3544 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.521579  
 5% level  -2.901217  
 10% level  -2.587981  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LJU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:17   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01  
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LJU(-1) -0.097113 0.052521 -1.849012 0.0688 
D(LJU(-1)) 0.001365 0.118165 0.011556 0.9908 
D(LJU(-2)) 0.203584 0.099114 2.054042 0.0438 
D(LJU(-3)) 0.175445 0.096845 1.811605 0.0745 
D(LJU(-4)) -0.146443 0.099067 -1.478225 0.1440 
C -0.459461 0.249514 -1.841423 0.0699 
     
     R-squared 0.155973 Mean dependent var 0.002332 
Adjusted R-squared 0.093912 S.D. dependent var 0.029992 
S.E. of regression 0.028549 Akaike info criterion -4.196769 
Sum squared resid 0.055424 Schwarz criterion -4.009953 
Log likelihood 161.2805 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.122246 
F-statistic 2.513223 Durbin-Watson stat 1.954644 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.037939    
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Table A2.2: Unit Root Test - Log of RRB/USD (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LRU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.657871 0.4483 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.521579  
 5% level  -2.901217  
 10% level  -2.587981  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LRU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:19   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01  
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LRU(-1) -0.043709 0.026365 -1.657871 0.1020 
D(LRU(-1)) 0.066365 0.116427 0.570012 0.5705 
D(LRU(-2)) -0.008816 0.082360 -0.107046 0.9151 
D(LRU(-3)) 0.190350 0.042757 4.451912 0.0000 
D(LRU(-4)) 0.062993 0.044860 1.404214 0.1648 
C -0.147661 0.088949 -1.660066 0.1015 
     
     R-squared 0.666694 Mean dependent var -0.005647 
Adjusted R-squared 0.642186 S.D. dependent var 0.024464 
S.E. of regression 0.014634 Akaike info criterion -5.533401 
Sum squared resid 0.014561 Schwarz criterion -5.346585 
Log likelihood 210.7358 Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.458878 
F-statistic 27.20332 Durbin-Watson stat 1.805802 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A2.3: Unit Root Test - Log of BRR/USD (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LBU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.664113 0.0852 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.521579  
 5% level  -2.901217  
 10% level  -2.587981  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LBU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:19   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01  
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LBU(-1) -0.103238 0.038751 -2.664113 0.0096 
D(LBU(-1)) -0.078776 0.115551 -0.681740 0.4977 
D(LBU(-2)) -0.065323 0.115915 -0.563547 0.5749 
D(LBU(-3)) -0.063384 0.116331 -0.544859 0.5876 
D(LBU(-4)) 0.009038 0.116089 0.077853 0.9382 
C -0.102709 0.035344 -2.906019 0.0049 
     
     R-squared 0.107747 Mean dependent var -0.010534 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042140 S.D. dependent var 0.088660 
S.E. of regression 0.086772 Akaike info criterion -1.973459 
Sum squared resid 0.511999 Schwarz criterion -1.786643 
Log likelihood 79.01798 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.898936 
F-statistic 1.642314 Durbin-Watson stat 2.010204 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.160682    
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Table A2.4: Unit Root Test - Log of NIKKEI (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNIK has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.260283 0.6439 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.521579  
 5% level  -2.901217  
 10% level  -2.587981  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNIK)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:20   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01  
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LNIK(-1) -0.033121 0.026280 -1.260283 0.2119 
D(LNIK(-1)) 0.027156 0.116842 0.232415 0.8169 
D(LNIK(-2)) 0.156230 0.117592 1.328577 0.1884 
D(LNIK(-3)) 0.110867 0.117616 0.942624 0.3492 
D(LNIK(-4)) -0.056469 0.112318 -0.502760 0.6168 
C 0.309073 0.247917 1.246677 0.2168 
     
     R-squared 0.055394 Mean dependent var -0.003618 
Adjusted R-squared -0.014062 S.D. dependent var 0.055246 
S.E. of regression 0.055633 Akaike info criterion -2.862483 
Sum squared resid 0.210460 Schwarz criterion -2.675667 
Log likelihood 111.9119 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.787960 
F-statistic 0.797540 Durbin-Watson stat 1.882783 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.555260    
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Table A2.5: Unit Root Test - Log of RTS (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LRTS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.600473 0.4773 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.521579  
 5% level  -2.901217  
 10% level  -2.587981  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LRTS)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:21   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01  
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LRTS(-1) -0.034604 0.021621 -1.600473 0.1141 
D(LRTS(-1)) 0.079278 0.118005 0.671818 0.5040 
D(LRTS(-2)) -0.154958 0.117577 -1.317932 0.1919 
D(LRTS(-3)) -0.088832 0.109238 -0.813194 0.4189 
D(LRTS(-4)) 0.119613 0.092841 1.288365 0.2020 
C 0.224928 0.120757 1.862650 0.0668 
     
     R-squared 0.100504 Mean dependent var 0.029567 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034365 S.D. dependent var 0.126995 
S.E. of regression 0.124794 Akaike info criterion -1.246695 
Sum squared resid 1.059006 Schwarz criterion -1.059879 
Log likelihood 52.12773 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.172172 
F-statistic 1.519586 Durbin-Watson stat 1.952740 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.195295    
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Table A2.6: Unit Root Test- Log of BOVESPA (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LBOV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.606645 0.4742 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.521579  
 5% level  -2.901217  
 10% level  -2.587981  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LBOV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:21   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01  
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LBOV(-1) -0.064296 0.040019 -1.606645 0.1128 
D(LBOV(-1)) 0.046841 0.118723 0.394543 0.6944 
D(LBOV(-2)) 0.034149 0.116325 0.293566 0.7700 
D(LBOV(-3)) -0.015412 0.116415 -0.132392 0.8951 
D(LBOV(-4)) 0.153950 0.101944 1.510147 0.1356 
C 0.625830 0.381620 1.639928 0.1056 
     
     R-squared 0.056540 Mean dependent var 0.014016 
Adjusted R-squared -0.012832 S.D. dependent var 0.095412 
S.E. of regression 0.096023 Akaike info criterion -1.770861 
Sum squared resid 0.626983 Schwarz criterion -1.584045 
Log likelihood 71.52186 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.696338 
F-statistic 0.815032 Durbin-Watson stat 1.794860 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.543118    
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Table A2.7: Unit Root Test - Log of return on JPY/USD (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RJU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.575103 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.522887  
 5% level  -2.901779  
 10% level  -2.588280  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RJU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:23   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2005M01  
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RJU(-1) -1.213838 0.217725 -5.575103 0.0000 
D(RJU(-1)) 0.152949 0.191406 0.799083 0.4271 
D(RJU(-2)) 0.246452 0.164954 1.494065 0.1399 
D(RJU(-3)) 0.375731 0.140315 2.677774 0.0093 
D(RJU(-4)) 0.184741 0.097265 1.899344 0.0618 
C 0.211490 0.331975 0.637066 0.5263 
     
     R-squared 0.597707 Mean dependent var -0.130832 
Adjusted R-squared 0.567685 S.D. dependent var 4.230028 
S.E. of regression 2.781272 Akaike info criterion 4.962311 
Sum squared resid 518.2769 Schwarz criterion 5.150568 
Log likelihood -175.1243 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.037334 
F-statistic 19.90903 Durbin-Watson stat 1.954574 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A2.8: Unit Root Test - Log of return on RRB/USD (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RRU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.964808 0.0027 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.522887  
 5% level  -2.901779  
 10% level  -2.588280  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RRU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:24   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2005M01  
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RRU(-1) -0.430841 0.108666 -3.964808 0.0002 
D(RRU(-1)) -0.400865 0.097059 -4.130118 0.0001 
D(RRU(-2)) -0.079188 0.088763 -0.892127 0.3755 
D(RRU(-3)) 0.021638 0.049485 0.437274 0.6633 
D(RRU(-4)) 0.137710 0.041790 3.295276 0.0016 
C -0.074298 0.169388 -0.438626 0.6623 
     
     R-squared 0.654427 Mean dependent var 0.198009 
Adjusted R-squared 0.628637 S.D. dependent var 2.250990 
S.E. of regression 1.371743 Akaike info criterion 3.548658 
Sum squared resid 126.0724 Schwarz criterion 3.736915 
Log likelihood -123.5260 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.623681 
F-statistic 25.37612 Durbin-Watson stat 1.920459 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
Table A2.9: Unit Root Test - Log of return on BRR/USD (1998-2005) 
Null Hypothesis: RBU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.882054 0.0035 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.522887  
 5% level  -2.901779  
 10% level  -2.588280  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RBU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:25   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2005M01  
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RBU(-1) -1.216687 0.313413 -3.882054 0.0002 
D(RBU(-1)) 0.128205 0.277236 0.462439 0.6453 
D(RBU(-2)) 0.059049 0.232791 0.253658 0.8005 
D(RBU(-3)) -0.003920 0.182715 -0.021455 0.9829 
D(RBU(-4)) 0.010256 0.123114 0.083306 0.9339 
C -1.305353 1.137262 -1.147803 0.2551 
     
     R-squared 0.543658 Mean dependent var 0.027894 
Adjusted R-squared 0.509602 S.D. dependent var 13.11739 
S.E. of regression 9.185897 Akaike info criterion 7.351833 
Sum squared resid 5653.507 Schwarz criterion 7.540089 
Log likelihood -262.3419 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.426856 
F-statistic 15.96393 Durbin-Watson stat 1.506630 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A2.10: Unit Root Test - Log of return on NIKKEI (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RNIK has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.375234 0.0151 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.522887  
 5% level  -2.901779  
 10% level  -2.588280  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RNIK)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:25   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2005M01  
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RNIK(-1) -0.785462 0.232713 -3.375234 0.0012 
D(RNIK(-1)) -0.152720 0.211784 -0.721116 0.4733 
D(RNIK(-2)) -0.003653 0.188643 -0.019365 0.9846 
D(RNIK(-3)) 0.059027 0.157311 0.375225 0.7087 
D(RNIK(-4)) -0.071865 0.111883 -0.642322 0.5229 
C -0.191061 0.656427 -0.291062 0.7719 
     
     R-squared 0.501526 Mean dependent var 0.087263 
Adjusted R-squared 0.464327 S.D. dependent var 7.591742 
S.E. of regression 5.556373 Akaike info criterion 6.346385 
Sum squared resid 2068.510 Schwarz criterion 6.534642 
Log likelihood -225.6431 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.421409 
F-statistic 13.48206 Durbin-Watson stat 1.956459 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A2.11: Unit Root Test - Log of return on RTS (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RRTS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.769023 0.0002 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.522887  
 5% level  -2.901779  
 10% level  -2.588280  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RRTS)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:26   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2005M01  
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RRTS(-1) -1.269317 0.266159 -4.769023 0.0000 
D(RRTS(-1)) 0.364508 0.234060 1.557329 0.1241 
D(RRTS(-2)) 0.211567 0.187247 1.129884 0.2626 
D(RRTS(-3)) 0.042462 0.128065 0.331568 0.7413 
D(RRTS(-4)) 0.077341 0.093223 0.829641 0.4097 
C 4.147319 1.684639 2.461845 0.0164 
     
     R-squared 0.492817 Mean dependent var 0.314675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.454967 S.D. dependent var 16.95054 
S.E. of regression 12.51396 Akaike info criterion 7.970184 
Sum squared resid 10492.15 Schwarz criterion 8.158441 
Log likelihood -284.9117 Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.045207 
F-statistic 13.02044 Durbin-Watson stat 2.072701 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A2.12: Unit Root Test - Log of return on BOVESPA (1998-2005) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RBOV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.428737 0.0006 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.522887  
 5% level  -2.901779  
 10% level  -2.588280  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RBOV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:26   
Sample (adjusted): 1999M01 2005M01  
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RBOV(-1) -1.091511 0.246461 -4.428737 0.0000 
D(RBOV(-1)) 0.174287 0.224330 0.776920 0.4399 
D(RBOV(-2)) 0.180704 0.186132 0.970838 0.3351 
D(RBOV(-3)) 0.143189 0.147741 0.969188 0.3359 
D(RBOV(-4)) 0.114762 0.097452 1.177627 0.2431 
C 1.846534 1.160017 1.591816 0.1161 
     
     R-squared 0.503262 Mean dependent var 0.229752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.466192 S.D. dependent var 12.75717 
S.E. of regression 9.320666 Akaike info criterion 7.380962 
Sum squared resid 5820.613 Schwarz criterion 7.569219 
Log likelihood -263.4051 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.455986 
F-statistic 13.57600 Durbin-Watson stat 1.814982 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A2.13: Cointegration test - Log of JPY/USD and Log of NIKKEI (1998-2005) 
 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:29   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01   
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LJU LNIK    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.071506 7.701615 15.49471 0.4978 
At most 1 0.029442 2.211424 3.841466 0.1370 
     
     Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.071506 5.490190 14.26460 0.6791 
At most 1 0.029442 2.211424 3.841466 0.1370 
     
     Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
     
     LJU LNIK    
-17.76356 2.733904    
-2.875570 -3.693372    
     
          
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
     
     D(LJU) 0.006158 0.002313   
D(LNIK) -0.006475 0.007382   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 283.5401  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LJU LNIK    
1.000000 -0.153905    
 (0.10353)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LJU) -0.109383    
 (0.05765)    
177 
 
D(LNIK) 0.115020    
 (0.10867)    
     
     
 
 
Table A2.14: Cointegration test - Log of RRB/USD and Log of RTS (1998-2005) 
 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:31   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01   
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LRU LRTS    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.065124 7.223607 15.49471 0.5518 
At most 1 0.029821 2.240309 3.841466 0.1345 
     
     Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.065124 4.983297 14.26460 0.7439 
At most 1 0.029821 2.240309 3.841466 0.1345 
     
     Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
     
     LRU LRTS    
-4.214816 1.639330    
-18.28324 -1.730247    
     
          
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
     
     D(LRU) 0.003120 0.001139   
D(LRTS) -0.010523 0.018742   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 268.9369  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LRU LRTS    
1.000000 -0.388945    
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 (0.22317)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LRU) -0.013150    
 (0.00713)    
D(LRTS) 0.044353    
 (0.06092)    
     
     
 
Table A2.15: Cointegration test - Log of BRR/USD and Log of BOVESPA 
(1998-2005) 
 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:31   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01   
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LBU LBOV    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.136431 13.85264 15.49471 0.0871 
At most 1 0.039707 2.998223 3.841466 0.0834 
     
     Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.136431 10.85442 14.26460 0.1616 
At most 1 0.039707 2.998223 3.841466 0.0834 
     
     Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
     
     LBU LBOV    
-2.944568 2.119129    
-2.800958 -3.437114    
     
          
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
     
     D(LBU) 0.029029 0.003296   
D(LBOV) 0.002173 0.018210   
     
     
179 
 
     
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 161.7098  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LBU LBOV    
1.000000 -0.719674    
 (0.42197)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LBU) -0.085478    
 (0.02756)    
D(LBOV) -0.006400    
 (0.03370)    
     
     
 
Table A2.16: VAR test (4 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:34 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01 
Included observations: 74 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) -0.081263 -0.288345 
 (0.11843) (0.21912) 
 [-0.68616] [-1.31593] 
   
RJU(-2) 0.170526 -0.332870 
 (0.09849) (0.18223) 
 [ 1.73135] [-1.82667] 
   
RJU(-3) 0.167534 0.471500 
 (0.09603) (0.17767) 
 [ 1.74460] [ 2.65378] 
   
RJU(-4) -0.243741 -0.103167 
 (0.10407) (0.19255) 
 [-2.34202] [-0.53579] 
   
RNIK(-1) 0.127106 0.094283 
 (0.06327) (0.11706) 
 [ 2.00894] [ 0.80543] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.015359 0.148590 
 (0.06219) (0.11505) 
 [-0.24698] [ 1.29148] 
   
RNIK(-3) 0.063858 0.099233 
 (0.06008) (0.11116) 
 [ 1.06290] [ 0.89274] 
   
RNIK(-4) 0.055610 -0.066743 
 (0.05832) (0.10790) 
 [ 0.95350] [-0.61854] 
180 
 
   
C 0.282640 -0.276260 
 (0.34078) (0.63050) 
 [ 0.82938] [-0.43816] 
   
   R-squared 0.197717 0.190596 
Adj. R-squared 0.098975 0.090977 
Sum sq. resids 526.8276 1803.372 
S.E. equation 2.846935 5.267275 
F-statistic 2.002352 1.913248 
Log likelihood -177.6254 -223.1553 
Akaike AIC 5.043928 6.274469 
Schwarz SC 5.324153 6.554693 
Mean dependent 0.233165 -0.361814 
S.D. dependent 2.999225 5.524570 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 224.8037 
Determinant resid covariance 173.4469 
Log likelihood -400.7702 
Akaike information criterion 11.31811 
Schwarz criterion 11.87856 
   
   
 
Table A2.17: VAR test (3 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:35 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M11 2005M01 
Included observations: 75 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) -0.178996 -0.032746 
 (0.09895) (0.18440) 
 [-1.80889] [-0.17758] 
   
RJU(-2) 0.102760 -0.222022 
 (0.09654) (0.17990) 
 [ 1.06446] [-1.23417] 
   
RJU(-3) 0.182961 0.468245 
 (0.09867) (0.18387) 
 [ 1.85427] [ 2.54658] 
   
RNIK(-1) 0.083188 0.081702 
 (0.06225) (0.11600) 
 [ 1.33634] [ 0.70430] 
   
RNIK(-2) 0.031402 0.108559 
 (0.06131) (0.11426) 
 [ 0.51216] [ 0.95015] 
   
RNIK(-3) 0.085337 0.009945 
 (0.05916) (0.11025) 
 [ 1.44236] [ 0.09020] 
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C 0.182885 -0.255119 
 (0.34820) (0.64887) 
 [ 0.52523] [-0.39317] 
   
   R-squared 0.148209 0.124830 
Adj. R-squared 0.073051 0.047609 
Sum sq. resids 584.6302 2030.191 
S.E. equation 2.932150 5.464042 
F-statistic 1.971971 1.616532 
Log likelihood -183.4263 -230.1103 
Akaike AIC 5.078035 6.322941 
Schwarz SC 5.294334 6.539240 
Mean dependent 0.160020 -0.233244 
S.D. dependent 3.045498 5.598947 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 256.6630 
Determinant resid covariance 210.9884 
Log likelihood -413.5334 
Akaike information criterion 11.40089 
Schwarz criterion 11.83349 
   
   
 
Table A2.18: VAR test (2 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:36 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M10 2005M01 
Included observations: 76 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) -0.078099 0.043023 
 (0.11597) (0.18402) 
 [-0.67343] [ 0.23379] 
   
RJU(-2) 0.113869 -0.249384 
 (0.11602) (0.18409) 
 [ 0.98148] [-1.35468] 
   
RNIK(-1) 0.042014 0.029070 
 (0.07326) (0.11625) 
 [ 0.57347] [ 0.25007] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.056773 0.099653 
 (0.07056) (0.11195) 
 [-0.80466] [ 0.89013] 
   
C 0.326137 -0.060684 
 (0.41521) (0.65884) 
 [ 0.78547] [-0.09211] 
   
   R-squared 0.033550 0.037372 
Adj. R-squared -0.020897 -0.016861 
Sum sq. resids 887.6696 2234.951 
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S.E. equation 3.535872 5.610542 
F-statistic 0.616194 0.689102 
Log likelihood -201.2382 -236.3265 
Akaike AIC 5.427322 6.350697 
Schwarz SC 5.580660 6.504035 
Mean dependent 0.361823 -0.214746 
S.D. dependent 3.499496 5.563833 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 390.6773 
Determinant resid covariance 340.9634 
Log likelihood -437.2861 
Akaike information criterion 11.77069 
Schwarz criterion 12.07736 
   
   
 
Table A2.19: Vector ECM (4 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:36 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01 
Included observations: 74 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RRU RRTS 
   
   RRU(-1) 0.053544 -0.551364 
 (0.12059) (1.00796) 
 [ 0.44400] [-0.54701] 
   
RRU(-2) 0.077058 -1.522938 
 (0.08784) (0.73417) 
 [ 0.87727] [-2.07437] 
   
RRU(-3) 0.183607 0.073042 
 (0.04544) (0.37982) 
 [ 4.04038] [ 0.19231] 
   
RRU(-4) 0.078029 0.533839 
 (0.04706) (0.39332) 
 [ 1.65814] [ 1.35726] 
   
RRTS(-1) 0.007785 0.073341 
 (0.01444) (0.12067) 
 [ 0.53923] [ 0.60779] 
   
RRTS(-2) 0.003358 -0.098494 
 (0.01438) (0.12016) 
 [ 0.23360] [-0.81972] 
   
RRTS(-3) 0.023908 -0.149183 
 (0.01404) (0.11732) 
 [ 1.70331] [-1.27163] 
   
RRTS(-4) 0.010644 0.029432 
 (0.01350) (0.11285) 
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 [ 0.78831] [ 0.26080] 
   
C -0.176534 3.163887 
 (0.20456) (1.70971) 
 [-0.86301] [ 1.85054] 
   
   R-squared 0.673165 0.152737 
Adj. R-squared 0.632939 0.048458 
Sum sq. resids 142.7878 9975.107 
S.E. equation 1.482139 12.38803 
F-statistic 16.73463 1.464701 
Log likelihood -129.3214 -286.4414 
Akaike AIC 3.738415 7.984903 
Schwarz SC 4.018639 8.265127 
Mean dependent -0.564667 2.956705 
S.D. dependent 2.446357 12.69955 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 331.3119 
Determinant resid covariance 255.6232 
Log likelihood -415.1200 
Akaike information criterion 11.70595 
Schwarz criterion 12.26639 
   
   
 
Table A2.20: Vector ECM (3 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:37 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M11 2005M01 
Included observations: 75 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RRU RRTS 
   
   RRU(-1) 0.279187 -0.168104 
 (0.08250) (0.68229) 
 [ 3.38403] [-0.24638] 
   
RRU(-2) -0.044096 -0.594545 
 (0.04548) (0.37615) 
 [-0.96949] [-1.58059] 
   
RRU(-3) 0.226620 0.421745 
 (0.03949) (0.32655) 
 [ 5.73923] [ 1.29151] 
   
RRTS(-1) 0.005732 0.085769 
 (0.01466) (0.12122) 
 [ 0.39107] [ 0.70755] 
   
RRTS(-2) -0.004936 -0.142622 
 (0.01418) (0.11728) 
 [-0.34805] [-1.21610] 
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RRTS(-3) 0.017697 -0.092041 
 (0.01356) (0.11218) 
 [ 1.30469] [-0.82050] 
   
C -0.128011 3.425131 
 (0.20044) (1.65764) 
 [-0.63865] [ 2.06627] 
   
   R-squared 0.700579 0.114405 
Adj. R-squared 0.674160 0.036264 
Sum sq. resids 156.9200 10732.26 
S.E. equation 1.519094 12.56293 
F-statistic 26.51755 1.464085 
Log likelihood -134.1047 -292.5524 
Akaike AIC 3.762791 7.988065 
Schwarz SC 3.979090 8.204364 
Mean dependent -0.690013 3.206159 
S.D. dependent 2.661230 12.79711 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 357.9602 
Determinant resid covariance 294.2592 
Log likelihood -426.0081 
Akaike information criterion 11.73355 
Schwarz criterion 12.16615 
   
   
 
Table A2.21: Vector ECM (2 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:38 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M10 2005M01 
Included observations: 76 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RRU RRTS 
   
   RRU(-1) 0.091798 0.116457 
 (0.06558) (0.36728) 
 [ 1.39972] [ 0.31708] 
   
RRU(-2) 0.178515 -0.375200 
 (0.05228) (0.29278) 
 [ 3.41461] [-1.28151] 
   
RRTS(-1) -0.036271 0.061137 
 (0.02017) (0.11295) 
 [-1.79835] [ 0.54127] 
   
RRTS(-2) -0.043405 -0.171067 
 (0.01882) (0.10540) 
 [-2.30634] [-1.62309] 
   
C -0.070651 3.082410 
 (0.28217) (1.58019) 
 [-0.25039] [ 1.95066] 
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   R-squared 0.344545 0.132147 
Adj. R-squared 0.307618 0.083254 
Sum sq. resids 351.1460 11012.84 
S.E. equation 2.223897 12.45433 
F-statistic 9.330440 2.702770 
Log likelihood -165.9971 -296.9305 
Akaike AIC 4.499925 7.945540 
Schwarz SC 4.653263 8.098878 
Mean dependent -0.735222 3.522680 
S.D. dependent 2.672649 13.00756 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 748.4723 
Determinant resid covariance 653.2287 
Log likelihood -461.9919 
Akaike information criterion 12.42084 
Schwarz criterion 12.72751 
   
   
 
Table A2.22: Vector ECM (4 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:39 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2005M01 
Included observations: 74 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RBU RBOV 
   
   RBU(-1) -0.179989 -0.163934 
 (0.12753) (0.14542) 
 [-1.41131] [-1.12734] 
   
RBU(-2) 0.024932 -0.079560 
 (0.12995) (0.14818) 
 [ 0.19186] [-0.53693] 
   
RBU(-3) -0.043697 -0.190077 
 (0.12683) (0.14462) 
 [-0.34453] [-1.31435] 
   
RBU(-4) 0.025357 -0.076818 
 (0.11908) (0.13578) 
 [ 0.21293] [-0.56574] 
   
RBOV(-1) 0.367759 0.039769 
 (0.10940) (0.12474) 
 [ 3.36159] [ 0.31881] 
   
RBOV(-2) -0.033516 0.058323 
 (0.11614) (0.13242) 
 [-0.28859] [ 0.44044] 
   
RBOV(-3) -0.103484 0.012355 
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 (0.11641) (0.13273) 
 [-0.88898] [ 0.09309] 
   
RBOV(-4) 0.064419 0.160606 
 (0.09585) (0.10929) 
 [ 0.67205] [ 1.46948] 
   
C -1.723419 0.448391 
 (1.14858) (1.30963) 
 [-1.50048] [ 0.34238] 
   
   R-squared 0.168186 0.066209 
Adj. R-squared 0.065808 -0.048719 
Sum sq. resids 4773.175 6205.579 
S.E. equation 8.569333 9.770898 
F-statistic 1.642804 0.576093 
Log likelihood -259.1694 -268.8796 
Akaike AIC 7.247822 7.510259 
Schwarz SC 7.528046 7.790483 
Mean dependent -1.053419 1.401583 
S.D. dependent 8.866027 9.541243 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 6505.668 
Determinant resid covariance 5019.439 
Log likelihood -525.2826 
Akaike information criterion 14.68331 
Schwarz criterion 15.24376 
   
   
 
Table A2.23: Vector ECM (3 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:39 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M11 2005M01 
Included observations: 75 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RBU RBOV 
   
   RBU(-1) -0.183129 -0.181271 
 (0.12538) (0.14694) 
 [-1.46061] [-1.23364] 
   
RBU(-2) -0.001116 -0.037773 
 (0.12456) (0.14598) 
 [-0.00896] [-0.25877] 
   
RBU(-3) -0.035926 -0.084250 
 (0.11693) (0.13703) 
 [-0.30725] [-0.61481] 
   
RBOV(-1) 0.348528 0.040710 
 (0.10614) (0.12439) 
 [ 3.28377] [ 0.32728] 
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RBOV(-2) -0.027374 0.063882 
 (0.11421) (0.13385) 
 [-0.23969] [ 0.47727] 
   
RBOV(-3) -0.065103 -0.114029 
 (0.09342) (0.10949) 
 [-0.69689] [-1.04150] 
   
C -1.814621 1.241266 
 (1.08266) (1.26884) 
 [-1.67608] [ 0.97827] 
   
   R-squared 0.154957 0.048105 
Adj. R-squared 0.080395 -0.035886 
Sum sq. resids 4849.206 6660.471 
S.E. equation 8.444635 9.896874 
F-statistic 2.078218 0.572742 
Log likelihood -262.7610 -274.6625 
Akaike AIC 7.193626 7.511001 
Schwarz SC 7.409925 7.727300 
Mean dependent -1.048286 1.653240 
S.D. dependent 8.806030 9.723936 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 6531.151 
Determinant resid covariance 5368.897 
Log likelihood -534.9049 
Akaike information criterion 14.63747 
Schwarz criterion 15.07006 
   
   
 
Table A2.24: Vector ECM (2 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(1998-2005) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:40 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M10 2005M01 
Included observations: 76 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RBU RBOV 
   
   RBU(-1) -0.180246 -0.148659 
 (0.12026) (0.14272) 
 [-1.49877] [-1.04161] 
   
RBU(-2) -0.024773 -0.057018 
 (0.11464) (0.13605) 
 [-0.21609] [-0.41909] 
   
RBOV(-1) 0.347644 0.035625 
 (0.10425) (0.12371) 
 [ 3.33483] [ 0.28796] 
   
RBOV(-2) -0.016244 0.021016 
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 (0.09174) (0.10887) 
 [-0.17708] [ 0.19304] 
   
C -1.885051 1.407031 
 (1.01004) (1.19866) 
 [-1.86631] [ 1.17383] 
   
   R-squared 0.145768 0.016793 
Adj. R-squared 0.097642 -0.038599 
Sum sq. resids 4902.074 6903.880 
S.E. equation 8.309229 9.860920 
F-statistic 3.028899 0.303167 
Log likelihood -266.1732 -279.1853 
Akaike AIC 7.136136 7.478561 
Schwarz SC 7.289474 7.631899 
Mean dependent -1.043013 1.719110 
S.D. dependent 8.747247 9.675947 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 6240.751 
Determinant resid covariance 5446.611 
Log likelihood -542.5831 
Akaike information criterion 14.54166 
Schwarz criterion 14.84834 
   
   
 
Table A2.25: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI 
(1998-2005) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:41 
Sample: 1998M07 2005M01 
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    RRU does not Granger Cause RRTS 74 1.65165 0.1720 
RRTS does not Granger Cause RRU 0.99156 0.4185 
    
    
 
Table A2.26: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(1998-2005) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:42 
Sample: 1998M07 2005M01 
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    RRU does not Granger Cause RRTS 74 1.65165 0.1720 
RRTS does not Granger Cause RRU 0.99156 0.4185 
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Table A2.27: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(1998-2005) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:42 
Sample: 1998M07 2005M01 
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    RBU does not Granger Cause RBOV 74 0.79150 0.5349 
RBOV does not Granger Cause RBU 3.00003 0.0246 
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Appendix (A3) 
 
Sample (02:2005 – 07:2011) 
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Table A3.1: Unit Root Test - Log of JPY/USD (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LJU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 0.357252 0.9798 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LJU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:51   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LJU(-1) 0.009929 0.027791 0.357252 0.7219 
D(LJU(-1)) -0.010770 0.122663 -0.087800 0.9303 
D(LJU(-2)) 0.049644 0.121076 0.410023 0.6830 
D(LJU(-3)) -0.116120 0.120399 -0.964458 0.3380 
D(LJU(-4)) -0.037250 0.120064 -0.310253 0.7573 
C 0.050089 0.128925 0.388512 0.6988 
     
     R-squared 0.017204 Mean dependent var 0.003751 
Adjusted R-squared -0.051045 S.D. dependent var 0.028722 
S.E. of regression 0.029446 Akaike info criterion -4.138705 
Sum squared resid 0.062429 Schwarz criterion -3.957419 
Log likelihood 167.4095 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.066133 
F-statistic 0.252081 Durbin-Watson stat 1.987702 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.937454    
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Table A3.2: Unit Root Test - Log of RRB/USD (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LRU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.108105 0.2422 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LRU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:51   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LRU(-1) -0.076615 0.036343 -2.108105 0.0385 
D(LRU(-1)) 0.462331 0.114529 4.036802 0.0001 
D(LRU(-2)) -0.070643 0.126716 -0.557496 0.5789 
D(LRU(-3)) 0.054457 0.127064 0.428583 0.6695 
D(LRU(-4)) 0.048452 0.119601 0.405115 0.6866 
C -0.255019 0.121114 -2.105612 0.0387 
     
     R-squared 0.217834 Mean dependent var 0.000176 
Adjusted R-squared 0.163517 S.D. dependent var 0.030442 
S.E. of regression 0.027842 Akaike info criterion -4.250742 
Sum squared resid 0.055813 Schwarz criterion -4.069457 
Log likelihood 171.7789 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.178170 
F-statistic 4.010408 Durbin-Watson stat 2.004614 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002887    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
 
Table A3.3: Unit Root Test - Log of BRR/USD (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LBU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.885118 0.3376 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LBU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:52   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LBU(-1) -0.062441 0.033123 -1.885118 0.0634 
D(LBU(-1)) 0.154322 0.115344 1.337922 0.1851 
D(LBU(-2)) 0.219015 0.115534 1.895670 0.0620 
D(LBU(-3)) -0.094174 0.115596 -0.814682 0.4179 
D(LBU(-4)) 0.042166 0.115320 0.365643 0.7157 
C -0.037596 0.023164 -1.623049 0.1089 
     
     R-squared 0.113186 Mean dependent var 0.006679 
Adjusted R-squared 0.051602 S.D. dependent var 0.041341 
S.E. of regression 0.040261 Akaike info criterion -3.513078 
Sum squared resid 0.116707 Schwarz criterion -3.331793 
Log likelihood 143.0100 Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.440506 
F-statistic 1.837906 Durbin-Watson stat 2.012439 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.116226    
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Table A3.4: Unit Root Test - Log of NIKKI (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNIK has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.555877 0.5002 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNIK)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:53   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LNIK(-1) -0.046622 0.029965 -1.555877 0.1241 
D(LNIK(-1)) 0.187590 0.116186 1.614572 0.1108 
D(LNIK(-2)) 0.009995 0.117173 0.085297 0.9323 
D(LNIK(-3)) 0.150528 0.117063 1.285878 0.2026 
D(LNIK(-4)) 0.086425 0.117481 0.735647 0.4643 
C 0.437756 0.282310 1.550622 0.1254 
     
     R-squared 0.083869 Mean dependent var -0.001882 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020249 S.D. dependent var 0.062626 
S.E. of regression 0.061989 Akaike info criterion -2.649920 
Sum squared resid 0.276669 Schwarz criterion -2.468635 
Log likelihood 109.3469 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.577348 
F-statistic 1.318274 Durbin-Watson stat 1.959239 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.266050    
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Table A3.5: Unit Root Test - Log of RTS (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LRTS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.541026 0.1099 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LRTS)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:53   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LRTS(-1) -0.076983 0.030296 -2.541026 0.0132 
D(LRTS(-1)) 0.354406 0.112453 3.151597 0.0024 
D(LRTS(-2)) 0.116822 0.119654 0.976331 0.3322 
D(LRTS(-3)) 0.131052 0.120751 1.085306 0.2814 
D(LRTS(-4)) -0.027821 0.115527 -0.240821 0.8104 
C 0.561963 0.218321 2.574019 0.0121 
     
     R-squared 0.256803 Mean dependent var 0.014438 
Adjusted R-squared 0.205192 S.D. dependent var 0.111491 
S.E. of regression 0.099396 Akaike info criterion -1.705597 
Sum squared resid 0.711335 Schwarz criterion -1.524311 
Log likelihood 72.51827 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.633025 
F-statistic 4.975760 Durbin-Watson stat 1.992285 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000572    
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Table A3.6: Unit Root Test- Log of BOVESPA (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LBOV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.296322 0.1757 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LBOV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:54   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     LBOV(-1) -0.055337 0.024098 -2.296322 0.0246 
D(LBOV(-1)) 0.164066 0.112790 1.454611 0.1501 
D(LBOV(-2)) 0.072335 0.113894 0.635108 0.5274 
D(LBOV(-3)) 0.098721 0.113125 0.872675 0.3857 
D(LBOV(-4)) 0.074594 0.112874 0.660859 0.5108 
C 0.603103 0.259804 2.321379 0.0231 
     
     R-squared 0.118473 Mean dependent var 0.011308 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057256 S.D. dependent var 0.069874 
S.E. of regression 0.067844 Akaike info criterion -2.469407 
Sum squared resid 0.331403 Schwarz criterion -2.288121 
Log likelihood 102.3069 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.396835 
F-statistic 1.935290 Durbin-Watson stat 1.870517 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.098956    
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Table A3.7: Unit Root Test - Log of return on JPY/USD (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RJU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.663971 0.0003 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RJU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:54   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RJU(-1) -1.241998 0.266296 -4.663971 0.0000 
D(RJU(-1)) 0.238653 0.233568 1.021772 0.3103 
D(RJU(-2)) 0.278211 0.196548 1.415485 0.1612 
D(RJU(-3)) 0.178271 0.163665 1.089239 0.2797 
D(RJU(-4)) 0.151538 0.116587 1.299788 0.1978 
C 0.464755 0.341917 1.359263 0.1783 
     
     R-squared 0.514367 Mean dependent var 0.069911 
Adjusted R-squared 0.480642 S.D. dependent var 4.042436 
S.E. of regression 2.913241 Akaike info criterion 5.050213 
Sum squared resid 611.0622 Schwarz criterion 5.231498 
Log likelihood -190.9583 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.122785 
F-statistic 15.25200 Durbin-Watson stat 1.998604 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A3.8: Unit Root Test - Log of return on RRB/USD (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RRU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.092299 0.0312 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RRU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:55   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RRU(-1) -0.570330 0.184435 -3.092299 0.0028 
D(RRU(-1)) 0.015296 0.171741 0.089064 0.9293 
D(RRU(-2)) -0.102477 0.154198 -0.664577 0.5084 
D(RRU(-3)) -0.061505 0.134608 -0.456921 0.6491 
D(RRU(-4)) -0.135146 0.118752 -1.138050 0.2589 
C 0.020412 0.322024 0.063386 0.9496 
     
     R-squared 0.320673 Mean dependent var 0.027070 
Adjusted R-squared 0.273498 S.D. dependent var 3.335920 
S.E. of regression 2.843374 Akaike info criterion 5.001664 
Sum squared resid 582.1040 Schwarz criterion 5.182949 
Log likelihood -189.0649 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.074235 
F-statistic 6.797462 Durbin-Watson stat 1.963231 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000030    
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Table A3.9: Unit Root Test - Log of return on BRR/USD (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RBU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.255619 0.0205 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RBU)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:55   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RBU(-1) -0.689084 0.211660 -3.255619 0.0017 
D(RBU(-1)) -0.174451 0.193613 -0.901026 0.3706 
D(RBU(-2)) 0.039522 0.171175 0.230885 0.8181 
D(RBU(-3)) -0.102197 0.154092 -0.663219 0.5093 
D(RBU(-4)) -0.098378 0.116808 -0.842224 0.4025 
C 0.460450 0.488711 0.942172 0.3493 
     
     R-squared 0.464272 Mean dependent var -0.012473 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427069 S.D. dependent var 5.422042 
S.E. of regression 4.104064 Akaike info criterion 5.735636 
Sum squared resid 1212.721 Schwarz criterion 5.916921 
Log likelihood -217.6898 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.808208 
F-statistic 12.47932 Durbin-Watson stat 1.946224 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
Table A3.10: Unit Root Test - Log of return on NIKKEI (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RNIK has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.008864 0.0023 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RNIK)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:56   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RNIK(-1) -0.820798 0.204746 -4.008864 0.0001 
D(RNIK(-1)) 0.004306 0.193638 0.022239 0.9823 
D(RNIK(-2)) 0.017356 0.176550 0.098306 0.9220 
D(RNIK(-3)) 0.138033 0.148649 0.928580 0.3562 
D(RNIK(-4)) 0.229744 0.115686 1.985937 0.0508 
C -0.135560 0.695437 -0.194928 0.8460 
     
     R-squared 0.452239 Mean dependent var 0.013550 
Adjusted R-squared 0.414200 S.D. dependent var 8.017508 
S.E. of regression 6.136407 Akaike info criterion 6.540159 
Sum squared resid 2711.196 Schwarz criterion 6.721445 
Log likelihood -249.0662 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.612731 
F-statistic 11.88882 Durbin-Watson stat 2.074870 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A3.11: Unit Root Test - Log of return on RTS (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RRTS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.699657 0.0059 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RRTS)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:56   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RRTS(-1) -0.607189 0.164120 -3.699657 0.0004 
D(RRTS(-1)) -0.033558 0.160246 -0.209417 0.8347 
D(RRTS(-2)) 0.070860 0.151808 0.466774 0.6421 
D(RRTS(-3)) 0.166843 0.137636 1.212205 0.2294 
D(RRTS(-4)) 0.109876 0.116812 0.940622 0.3500 
C 0.894070 1.192750 0.749587 0.4559 
     
     R-squared 0.318089 Mean dependent var -0.008721 
Adjusted R-squared 0.270734 S.D. dependent var 12.07605 
S.E. of regression 10.31259 Akaike info criterion 7.578412 
Sum squared resid 7657.171 Schwarz criterion 7.759698 
Log likelihood -289.5581 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.650984 
F-statistic 6.717121 Durbin-Watson stat 2.012921 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000035    
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Table A3.12: Unit Root Test - Log of return on BOVESPA (2005-2011) 
 
Null Hypothesis: RBOV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 4 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.439079 0.0124 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.516676  
 5% level  -2.899115  
 10% level  -2.586866  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RBOV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:57   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     RBOV(-1) -0.711942 0.207015 -3.439079 0.0010 
D(RBOV(-1)) -0.117867 0.196254 -0.600585 0.5500 
D(RBOV(-2)) -0.045458 0.178710 -0.254365 0.7999 
D(RBOV(-3)) 0.049038 0.152249 0.322087 0.7483 
D(RBOV(-4)) 0.118770 0.115884 1.024899 0.3088 
C 0.794273 0.834469 0.951831 0.3444 
     
     R-squared 0.426813 Mean dependent var 0.017938 
Adjusted R-squared 0.387009 S.D. dependent var 8.912252 
S.E. of regression 6.977737 Akaike info criterion 6.797130 
Sum squared resid 3505.594 Schwarz criterion 6.978415 
Log likelihood -259.0881 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.869702 
F-statistic 10.72271 Durbin-Watson stat 1.898143 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A3.13: Cointegration test - Log of JPY/USD and Log of NIKKEI (2005-2011) 
 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:57   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LJU LNIK    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.075670 6.737056 15.49471 0.6084 
At most 1 0.007656 0.599503 3.841466 0.4388 
     
     Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.075670 6.137553 14.26460 0.5956 
At most 1 0.007656 0.599503 3.841466 0.4388 
     
     Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
     
     LJU LNIK    
11.04689 8.224346    
12.92074 2.986327    
     
          
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
     
     D(LJU) 0.002013 0.002278   
D(LNIK) -0.015470 -0.001888   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 299.6961  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LJU LNIK    
1.000000 0.744494    
 (0.16538)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LJU) 0.022236    
 (0.03612)    
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D(LNIK) -0.170893    
 (0.07798)    
     
     
 
 
Table A3.14: Cointegration test - Log of RRB/USD and Log of RTS (2005-2011) 
 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:58   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LRU LRTS    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.149140 14.41114 15.49471 0.0723 
At most 1 0.022982 1.813544 3.841466 0.1781 
     
     Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.149140 12.59760 14.26460 0.0902 
At most 1 0.022982 1.813544 3.841466 0.1781 
     
     Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
     
     LRU LRTS    
1.628405 2.941352    
15.22006 -1.983941    
     
          
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
     
     D(LRU) 0.005026 -0.002959   
D(LRTS) -0.015849 -0.012554   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 274.5593  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LRU LRTS    
1.000000 1.806278    
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 (0.55777)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LRU) 0.008184    
 (0.00453)    
D(LRTS) -0.025809    
 (0.01798)    
     
     
 
Table A3.15: Cointegration test - Log of BRR/USD and Log of BOVESPA 
(2005-2011) 
 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 19:59   
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07   
Included observations: 78   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LBU LBOV    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.130943 14.95165 15.49471 0.0602 
At most 1 * 0.050046 4.004616 3.841466 0.0454 
     
     Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None 0.130943 10.94703 14.26460 0.1569 
At most 1 * 0.050046 4.004616 3.841466 0.0454 
     
     Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I): 
     
     LBU LBOV    
-25.27864 8.419024    
17.19729 -9.544874    
     
          
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
     
     D(LBU) 0.011250 -0.004622   
D(LBOV) 0.022789 0.004673   
     
          
206 
 
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 270.8178  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LBU LBOV    
1.000000 -0.333049    
 (0.03901)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LBU) -0.284374    
 (0.10910)    
D(LBOV) -0.576085    
 (0.19103)    
     
     
 
Table A3.16: VAR test (4 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:00 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) 0.007432 0.259069 
 (0.15127) (0.33698) 
 [ 0.04913] [ 0.76879] 
   
RJU(-2) -0.044465 -0.116991 
 (0.14787) (0.32939) 
 [-0.30071] [-0.35517] 
   
RJU(-3) -0.219044 0.058730 
 (0.14050) (0.31298) 
 [-1.55904] [ 0.18765] 
   
RJU(-4) 0.041044 0.095129 
 (0.14078) (0.31362) 
 [ 0.29154] [ 0.30333] 
   
RNIK(-1) 0.017883 0.243254 
 (0.06718) (0.14964) 
 [ 0.26621] [ 1.62557] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.110115 -0.064770 
 (0.06784) (0.15112) 
 [-1.62319] [-0.42861] 
   
RNIK(-3) -0.081931 0.174808 
 (0.06968) (0.15523) 
 [-1.17576] [ 1.12614] 
   
RNIK(-4) 0.064175 0.055699 
 (0.06782) (0.15107) 
 [ 0.94627] [ 0.36868] 
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C 0.432018 -0.219921 
 (0.33810) (0.75317) 
 [ 1.27777] [-0.29200] 
   
   R-squared 0.102221 0.062921 
Adj. R-squared -0.001870 -0.045726 
Sum sq. resids 570.2896 2829.949 
S.E. equation 2.874903 6.404198 
F-statistic 0.982039 0.579132 
Log likelihood -188.2652 -250.7381 
Akaike AIC 5.058082 6.659951 
Schwarz SC 5.330010 6.931879 
Mean dependent 0.375118 -0.188176 
S.D. dependent 2.872219 6.262616 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 217.9578 
Determinant resid covariance 170.5617 
Log likelihood -421.7792 
Akaike information criterion 11.27639 
Schwarz criterion 11.82025 
   
   
 
Table A3.17: VAR test (3 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:01 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) 0.009419 0.243611 
 (0.14615) (0.32365) 
 [ 0.06445] [ 0.75271] 
   
RJU(-2) -0.090712 -0.152471 
 (0.13915) (0.30814) 
 [-0.65192] [-0.49481] 
   
RJU(-3) -0.196475 0.074510 
 (0.13761) (0.30474) 
 [-1.42778] [ 0.24451] 
   
RNIK(-1) 0.026934 0.244712 
 (0.06524) (0.14447) 
 [ 0.41285] [ 1.69386] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.124262 -0.074936 
 (0.06582) (0.14576) 
 [-1.88788] [-0.51410] 
   
RNIK(-3) -0.063130 0.186960 
 (0.06647) (0.14719) 
 [-0.94978] [ 1.27016] 
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C 0.445992 -0.182349 
 (0.33064) (0.73220) 
 [ 1.34889] [-0.24904] 
   
   R-squared 0.089579 0.060880 
Adj. R-squared 0.012642 -0.018483 
Sum sq. resids 578.3197 2836.114 
S.E. equation 2.854006 6.320226 
F-statistic 1.164322 0.767109 
Log likelihood -188.8105 -250.8230 
Akaike AIC 5.020782 6.610845 
Schwarz SC 5.232282 6.822345 
Mean dependent 0.375118 -0.188176 
S.D. dependent 2.872219 6.262616 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 212.8109 
Determinant resid covariance 176.3280 
Log likelihood -423.0759 
Akaike information criterion 11.20707 
Schwarz criterion 11.63007 
   
   
 
Table A3.18: VAR test (2 lags) - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI (2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:01 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RJU RNIK 
   
   RJU(-1) 0.046329 0.109796 
 (0.13896) (0.30741) 
 [ 0.33341] [ 0.35717] 
   
RJU(-2) -0.103222 -0.090404 
 (0.13771) (0.30466) 
 [-0.74953] [-0.29674] 
   
RNIK(-1) 0.039492 0.209142 
 (0.06400) (0.14158) 
 [ 0.61706] [ 1.47717] 
   
RNIK(-2) -0.136296 -0.020946 
 (0.06338) (0.14022) 
 [-2.15040] [-0.14938] 
   
C 0.379599 -0.155375 
 (0.32753) (0.72456) 
 [ 1.15899] [-0.21444] 
   
   R-squared 0.062994 0.035438 
Adj. R-squared 0.011651 -0.017415 
Sum sq. resids 595.2076 2912.947 
S.E. equation 2.855439 6.316912 
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F-statistic 1.226920 0.670501 
Log likelihood -189.9331 -251.8655 
Akaike AIC 4.998284 6.586294 
Schwarz SC 5.149355 6.737365 
Mean dependent 0.375118 -0.188176 
S.D. dependent 2.872219 6.262616 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 215.7787 
Determinant resid covariance 189.0014 
Log likelihood -425.7828 
Akaike information criterion 11.17392 
Schwarz criterion 11.47606 
   
   
 
Table A3.19: Vector ECM (4 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:02 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RRU RRTS 
   
   RRU(-1) 0.131860 -0.279382 
 (0.13653) (0.53783) 
 [ 0.96579] [-0.51946] 
   
RRU(-2) -0.347266 -0.803451 
 (0.13403) (0.52797) 
 [-2.59098] [-1.52176] 
   
RRU(-3) -0.207950 -0.745371 
 (0.13439) (0.52940) 
 [-1.54737] [-1.40797] 
   
RRU(-4) -0.130988 -1.043414 
 (0.13488) (0.53134) 
 [-0.97112] [-1.96374] 
   
RRTS(-1) 0.024874 0.294698 
 (0.03423) (0.13486) 
 [ 0.72660] [ 2.18526] 
   
RRTS(-2) 0.090311 0.200362 
 (0.03514) (0.13841) 
 [ 2.57033] [ 1.44759] 
   
RRTS(-3) 0.102211 0.252009 
 (0.03638) (0.14332) 
 [ 2.80929] [ 1.75833] 
   
RRTS(-4) 0.066308 0.183252 
 (0.03890) (0.15323) 
 [ 1.70462] [ 1.19591] 
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C -0.371133 0.181130 
 (0.29509) (1.16245) 
 [-1.25768] [ 0.15582] 
   
   R-squared 0.398309 0.303911 
Adj. R-squared 0.328548 0.223205 
Sum sq. resids 429.3449 6662.470 
S.E. equation 2.494472 9.826369 
F-statistic 5.709598 3.765664 
Log likelihood -177.1937 -284.1311 
Akaike AIC 4.774198 7.516183 
Schwarz SC 5.046126 7.788111 
Mean dependent 0.017589 1.443793 
S.D. dependent 3.044185 11.14910 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 451.0849 
Determinant resid covariance 352.9940 
Log likelihood -450.1460 
Akaike information criterion 12.00374 
Schwarz criterion 12.54760 
   
   
 
Table A3.20: Vector ECM (3 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:02 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RRU RRTS 
   
   RRU(-1) 0.197639 -0.178955 
 (0.13142) (0.52108) 
 [ 1.50386] [-0.34343] 
   
RRU(-2) -0.296363 -0.589250 
 (0.13083) (0.51873) 
 [-2.26524] [-1.13594] 
   
RRU(-3) -0.208050 -1.034837 
 (0.12742) (0.50521) 
 [-1.63279] [-2.04833] 
   
RRTS(-1) 0.026877 0.338286 
 (0.03390) (0.13441) 
 [ 0.79283] [ 2.51680] 
   
RRTS(-2) 0.088164 0.196713 
 (0.03534) (0.14011) 
 [ 2.49485] [ 1.40395] 
   
RRTS(-3) 0.108698 0.259985 
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 (0.03639) (0.14430) 
 [ 2.98678] [ 1.80175] 
   
C -0.284729 0.368487 
 (0.29256) (1.15996) 
 [-0.97325] [ 0.31767] 
   
   R-squared 0.372873 0.265003 
Adj. R-squared 0.319876 0.202890 
Sum sq. resids 447.4951 7034.877 
S.E. equation 2.510527 9.954033 
F-statistic 7.035783 4.266498 
Log likelihood -178.8085 -286.2523 
Akaike AIC 4.764321 7.519291 
Schwarz SC 4.975821 7.730790 
Mean dependent 0.017589 1.443793 
S.D. dependent 3.044185 11.14910 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 467.2715 
Determinant resid covariance 387.1656 
Log likelihood -453.7497 
Akaike information criterion 11.99358 
Schwarz criterion 12.41658 
   
   
 
Table A3.21: Vector ECM (2 lags) - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:03 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RRU RRTS 
   
   RRU(-1) 0.312378 0.135050 
 (0.13116) (0.50620) 
 [ 2.38165] [ 0.26679] 
   
RRU(-2) -0.330767 -0.896288 
 (0.12845) (0.49575) 
 [-2.57504] [-1.80796] 
   
RRTS(-1) 0.027269 0.349103 
 (0.03542) (0.13670) 
 [ 0.76991] [ 2.55385] 
   
RRTS(-2) 0.112895 0.249029 
 (0.03594) (0.13871) 
 [ 3.14107] [ 1.79529] 
   
C -0.175997 0.593040 
 (0.30373) (1.17222) 
 [-0.57945] [ 0.50591] 
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R-squared 0.293884 0.215888 
Adj. R-squared 0.255193 0.172923 
Sum sq. resids 503.8588 7504.967 
S.E. equation 2.627199 10.13942 
F-statistic 7.595612 5.024739 
Log likelihood -183.4351 -288.7751 
Akaike AIC 4.831669 7.532694 
Schwarz SC 4.982740 7.683765 
Mean dependent 0.017589 1.443793 
S.D. dependent 3.044185 11.14910 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 514.2817 
Determinant resid covariance 450.4614 
Log likelihood -459.6550 
Akaike information criterion 12.04244 
Schwarz criterion 12.34458 
   
   
 
Table A3.22: Vector ECM (4 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:04 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RBU RBOV 
   
   RBU(-1) -0.059529 -0.108348 
 (0.15313) (0.27220) 
 [-0.38875] [-0.39804] 
   
RBU(-2) -0.022339 -0.205264 
 (0.14841) (0.26381) 
 [-0.15053] [-0.77808] 
   
RBU(-3) -0.256674 -0.073640 
 (0.14038) (0.24954) 
 [-1.82846] [-0.29511] 
   
RBU(-4) -0.006830 -0.342974 
 (0.14572) (0.25903) 
 [-0.04687] [-1.32406] 
   
RBOV(-1) 0.102451 0.197327 
 (0.08403) (0.14937) 
 [ 1.21921] [ 1.32103] 
   
RBOV(-2) 0.177699 0.128922 
 (0.08444) (0.15010) 
 [ 2.10453] [ 0.85894] 
   
RBOV(-3) 0.152235 0.152064 
 (0.08595) (0.15279) 
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 [ 1.77114] [ 0.99525] 
   
RBOV(-4) 0.022728 0.216778 
 (0.08871) (0.15770) 
 [ 0.25619] [ 1.37464] 
   
C 0.358697 0.769131 
 (0.47222) (0.83942) 
 [ 0.75959] [ 0.91626] 
   
   R-squared 0.174221 0.086565 
Adj. R-squared 0.078479 -0.019340 
Sum sq. resids 1086.743 3433.982 
S.E. equation 3.968614 7.054633 
F-statistic 1.819683 0.817382 
Log likelihood -213.4122 -258.2831 
Akaike AIC 5.702878 6.853413 
Schwarz SC 5.974806 7.125341 
Mean dependent 0.667904 1.130780 
S.D. dependent 4.134149 6.987388 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 486.1090 
Determinant resid covariance 380.4018 
Log likelihood -453.0623 
Akaike information criterion 12.07852 
Schwarz criterion 12.62238 
   
   
 
Table A3.23: Vector ECM (3 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:04 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RBU RBOV 
   
   RBU(-1) -0.055060 0.000269 
 (0.14517) (0.26211) 
 [-0.37927] [ 0.00103] 
   
RBU(-2) -0.008422 -0.150403 
 (0.13811) (0.24936) 
 [-0.06098] [-0.60316] 
   
RBU(-3) -0.250537 -0.046238 
 (0.13685) (0.24708) 
 [-1.83073] [-0.18713] 
   
RBOV(-1) 0.102913 0.170533 
 (0.08173) (0.14757) 
 [ 1.25912] [ 1.15560] 
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RBOV(-2) 0.173384 0.116556 
 (0.08180) (0.14769) 
 [ 2.11962] [ 0.78920] 
   
RBOV(-3) 0.151235 0.124851 
 (0.08412) (0.15188) 
 [ 1.79787] [ 0.82206] 
   
C 0.373969 0.770581 
 (0.46122) (0.83273) 
 [ 0.81082] [ 0.92536] 
   
   R-squared 0.173211 0.056530 
Adj. R-squared 0.103342 -0.023200 
Sum sq. resids 1088.071 3546.896 
S.E. equation 3.914710 7.067976 
F-statistic 2.479071 0.709022 
Log likelihood -213.4599 -259.5449 
Akaike AIC 5.652818 6.834484 
Schwarz SC 5.864317 7.045983 
Mean dependent 0.667904 1.130780 
S.D. dependent 4.134149 6.987388 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 480.8312 
Determinant resid covariance 398.4007 
Log likelihood -454.8653 
Akaike information criterion 12.02219 
Schwarz criterion 12.44519 
   
   
 
Table A3.24: Vector ECM (2 lags) - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(2005-2011) 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:05 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Included observations: 78 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
    RBU RBOV 
   
   RBU(-1) -0.028663 0.071024 
 (0.13918) (0.24556) 
 [-0.20594] [ 0.28923] 
   
RBU(-2) 0.013464 -0.116780 
 (0.13852) (0.24440) 
 [ 0.09720] [-0.47782] 
   
RBOV(-1) 0.104303 0.152770 
 (0.08160) (0.14398) 
 [ 1.27815] [ 1.06104] 
   
RBOV(-2) 0.166449 0.116443 
 (0.08290) (0.14627) 
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 [ 2.00786] [ 0.79610] 
   
C 0.360439 0.852377 
 (0.46257) (0.81615) 
 [ 0.77921] [ 1.04438] 
   
   R-squared 0.124518 0.045933 
Adj. R-squared 0.076546 -0.006345 
Sum sq. resids 1152.153 3586.735 
S.E. equation 3.972772 7.009519 
F-statistic 2.595656 0.878638 
Log likelihood -215.6917 -259.9805 
Akaike AIC 5.658761 6.794371 
Schwarz SC 5.809832 6.945442 
Mean dependent 0.667904 1.130780 
S.D. dependent 4.134149 6.987388 
   
   Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 491.7648 
Determinant resid covariance 430.7388 
Log likelihood -457.9090 
Akaike information criterion 11.99767 
Schwarz criterion 12.29981 
   
   
 
Table A3.25: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of JPY/USD and NIKKEI 
(2005-2011) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:05 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    RJU does not Granger Cause RNIK 78 0.18139 0.9473 
RNIK does not Granger Cause RJU 1.66698 0.1676 
    
    
 
Table A3.26: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of RRB/USD and RTS 
(2005-2011) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:06 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    RRU does not Granger Cause RRTS 78 2.81904 0.0315 
RRTS does not Granger Cause RRU 6.55818 0.0002 
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Table A3.27: Granger Causality Test - Log of Return of BRR/USD and BOVESPA 
(2005-2011) 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:07 
Sample: 2005M02 2011M07 
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    RBU does not Granger Cause RBOV 78 0.61664 0.6521 
RBOV does not Granger Cause RBU 2.18931 0.0792 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
